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ABSTRACT 
 
Coe, Katherine, M.S., December 2020    Resource Conservation 
 
An Exploration of the Adaptive Capacity of Community-Based Organizations in Northern 
Botswana in Response to A Hunting Ban 
 
Chairperson: Dr. Jennifer Thomsen 
  Trophy hunting serves as a large economic sector in several African countries and has been 
considered important for wildlife conservation and local rural development. In many parts of 
Africa, local communities’ attitudes and decisions can affect the fate of conservation efforts 
outside of protected areas and it is thought that benefits from trophy hunting tourism can 
influence pro-conservation behavior at local scales. In Botswana, recent mandates, such as a 
2014 nation-wide hunting ban and a 2019 lifting of the ban, have disrupted the relationships 
between wildlife conservation and rural livelihoods, resulting in adverse economic, social, and 
ecological impacts at various scales. I applied the adaptive cycle model, which tracks changes in 
social-ecological systems over-time, to better understand how trophy hunting tourism and its 
absence influence communities’ perception of wildlife conservation, their use of natural 
resources, and their overall capacity to function and thrive. I assessed Botswana’s trophy hunting 
system through the adaptive cycle model’s four phases of growth (r), conservation (k), release 
(), and reorganization (). This study conducted 54 semi-structured interviews to assess how a 
ban on hunting has shaped the adaptive capacity of three community-based organizations 
(CBOs). Key factors outlining the communities’ adaptive capacities emerged. The lifting of the 
hunting ban in 2019 presents an opportunity for a system-wide transformation if the state 
government chooses to incorporate communities’ critiques on hunting, such as the lack of 
community-based ownership in the trophy hunting industry and implementing strategies to 
allocate greater funds to local economic diversification. This study improves policy and decision 
makers’ foundational and conceptual understanding of adaptive capacity of Northern Botswana’s 
community-based organizations and the role that trophy hunting tourism plays in fostering or 
inhibiting those qualities. Results can help decision makers create policies or processes that 
support the adaptive capacity of CBOs in future times of crisis.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
 
Trophy hunting is one of the largest economic sectors in many African countries and has 
been considered essential for providing economic incentives to conserve wildlife (Dickson et al., 
2009) and to support the sustainability of local communities experiencing economic and social 
challenges (Gunn, 2001). To make scientifically sound decisions regarding trophy hunting 
management and policy, there is a critical need to understand the social and economic constructs 
associated with trophy hunting and how these constructs relate to conservation and local 
livelihoods (Mbaiwa, 2018). Yet, there has been a lack of studies that provide systematic and 
empirical data on trophy hunting and in-depth analyses among differing stakeholders (Marshall 
et al., 2007). To better understand the socio-economic impacts and governance of trophy 
hunting, the perspectives of the local communities in the hunting areas must be examined in 
tandem with the ecological and conservation components. Additionally, research is warranted on 
the implications for local communities and wildlife if hunting is banned in particular contexts 
(Lindsey et al., 2012).  
 While science can drive policy for trophy hunting, human dimensions are often 
underestimated for their integral influence on decision-making (Nelson et al., 2013). More 
recently, there have been strict international policies or bans on trophy hunting; yet, this strategy 
could have extreme detrimental impacts for species conservation and the local communities 
without other realistic alternatives (Lindsey et al., 2014; Lindsey et al., 2015; Di Minin et al., 
2016; Naidoo et al., 2016). The ban on hunting has not proven to provide any positive impacts to 
wildlife populations as evidenced from continuous declines of wildlife populations in Kenya 
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(Nelson et al., 2013). In addition, many of these countries are limited in the financial resources 
they can dedicate to conservation and other forms of tourism are not a viable option in most of 
the regions where trophy hunting occurs (Lindsey et. al 2006; Lindsey et al., 2014; Lindsey et 
al., 2015; Di Minin et al., 2016; Naidoo et al., 2016). These other forms of tourism can also 
require more infrastructure and have greater collective environmental impacts than trophy 
hunting (Di Minin et al., 2016).  
Restrictions or banning trophy hunting can result in frustration among local communities 
that are dependent on the revenues generated from trophy hunting and can rapidly deteriorate the 
local support for conservation (Lindsey et al., 2012; Naidoo et al.,, 2016). Many of the 
communities adjacent to previous trophy hunting sites have been alienated from a lucrative 
economic activity, creating resentment among local residents and increasing demand for 
wildlife-based livelihoods (Lewis & Jackson, 2005).  In addition, it has been indicated that local 
stakeholders are not actively engaged in trophy hunting management and policy decisions 
(Nelson et al., 2013), which can contribute to operations’ weak governance. In order to improve 
the governance of trophy hunting and better integrate it into the system of the communities, it is 
imperative that local communities are allocated more control and ownership (Nelson et al., 2013; 
Lindsey et al., 2014; Di Minin et al., 2016).  
 
Need for Study and Research Questions 
 
The impacts of trophy hunting governance in relation to wildlife conservation and 
livelihood goals have been studied extensively in sub-Saharan Africa (Baker, 1997, Nelson et al., 
2013, Naidoo et al., 2016, Marshall et al., 2007). The various social, ecological and economic 
impacts of trophy hunting tourism, like inequitable and insufficient revenue distribution and lack 
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of community-initiated development, can be traced back to weaknesses in governance and can 
undermine the potential of hunting and encourage overharvesting (Marshall et al., 2007; Nelson 
et al., 2013). These weaknesses stem from centralized control over resources that do not promote 
community participation in decision making over the rules of management and result in policies 
that foster limited ownership, participation, and collective action at the community level (Nelson 
et al., 2013; di Minin et al., 2016).  
 Trophy hunting has been claimed to be the most beneficial to wildlife conservation where 
the central government chooses to devolve revenues and user rights over wildlife, making sure 
that benefits from hunting compensate for its costs to local people and where hunting is managed 
through long-term and competitively divided concession systems (Lindsey et al., 2014; di Minin 
et al., 2016). If community support and participation are deemed as essential components to 
making a particular trophy hunting governance regime an effective and well managed 
conservation tool, it is necessary to seek and represent community perceptions on this topic. 
However, systematic and empirical studies on community perceptions of trophy hunting 
governance are underrepresented in the academic literature and policy documents (Angula et al., 
2018). The studies that do explore community perceptions on rural livelihoods, hunting tourism, 
and wildlife conservation could benefit from a qualitative approach, which can provide a 
richness and complexity to these topics (Charmaz, 2014). 
 There is a lack of studies that present systematic and empirical data on the impacts of 
trophy hunting in tandem with in-depth analyses among different stakeholders involved in trophy 
hunting operations. By conducting 17 interviews with diverse stakeholders and 54 interviews 
with community members, this research project studied community perceptions on the impacts 
of trophy hunting tourism and a trophy hunting ban to understand how those perceptions might 
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illuminate the relationship between stakeholder groups and wildlife conservation. Through 
community based participatory methods and a social-ecological systems approach, this research 
explored how trophy hunting tourism and a trophy hunting ban impacts the adaptive capacity, or 
social resilience, of community-based organizations. Specifically, this study sought to 
understand how trophy hunting tourism contributes to conservation through exploring the 
following questions: 
 
Main Question: 
 
How does trophy hunting tourism and its ban influence the adaptive capacity of the social-
ecological Trophy hunting system in Botswana? 
 
Sub Questions: 
 
1) How do trophy hunting tourism and a hunting ban impact local communities? 
2) How does trophy hunting tourism impact local perceptions of wildlife and wildlife 
management?  
3) What are the factors that influence trophy hunting governance in Botswana? 
4) How did local communities respond to the ban on trophy hunting through changes in 
livelihoods, resource use, and their perception of and attitude towards wildlife conservation? 
5) How could lifting the ban impact communities? 
 
By addressing these questions, we gained a greater understanding of how trophy hunting and 
a ban on trophy hunting impacted local communities and wildlife management. Responses 
provided insight on the various strengths and weaknesses of different trophy hunting governance 
structures. The findings reveal guiding principles for how to adjust or improve trophy hunting 
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governance to better support local communities and wildlife conservation in the Northern 
Botswana region. 
 
 
Background on Trophy Hunting Tourism in Botswana 
 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management 
 
Prior to independence in 1966, Botswana was a British protectorate and its natural 
resources were managed by the British Crown (Campbell, 1973). When newly sovereign, 
Botswana approached the management of its protected areas by implementing severe regulations 
that restricted use of natural resources, like cattle grazing, within the park boundaries (Twyman, 
2000). As a response to this style of governance, local communities became alienated from 
resource management (Mbaiwa, 2012). Influenced by the emerging sustainable development 
movement of the 1980s and 1990s, which promoted governance structures that linked 
community development to wildlife management, Botswana began to implement decentralizing 
policies and allocated 20% of its land to a new management regime called Community Based 
Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) (Twyman, 2000). Community Based Natural 
Resource Management is a natural resource management approach that is especially popular in 
sub-Saharan Africa; CBNRM mandates the devolution of natural resources to a local scale of 
governance. It is considered a conservation strategy by repurposing land around designated 
protected areas in ways so that people living with wildlife might derive greater benefits from it 
and develop a different appreciation of it (Lepetu et al., 2008).  
 The state’s 1986 Wildlife Conservation Policy (WCP) introduced a new land category, 
called Wildlife Management Areas, which converted land formerly dedicated to grazing to areas 
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in which natural resource (both consumptive and non-consumptive) would be the primary 
economic activity (GoB, 2007). Wildlife is a state resource in Botswana and hunting within the 
WMAs is restricted; citizens are only allowed to hunt if they have licenses secured through the 
Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP), which is the government body with overall 
responsibility for wildlife resources. In order to accommodate community-controlled hunting 
(for tourism, commercial, or subsistence natural resource use) and commercial hunting and 
photographic safaris, WCP called for the subdivision of the WMAs into smaller units referred to 
as controlled hunting areas (CHAs).  
 Both the WMAs and CHAs are multiple use areas in which sustainable utilization of 
natural and cultural resources are emphasized, where sustainable use means the appropriate 
consumption of these resources to make sure they are not depleted (GoB, 2007). Per this model, 
controlled tourism activities are allowed in WMAs, but agricultural practices with vast pastoral 
and arable farming are not permitted (Mbaiwa, 2004). Various land uses and wildlife activities 
that are allowed include photographic safaris, film production, game ranching and viewing, and 
controlled trophy hunting (ibid). The hunting quota license provides the communities the right to 
use wildlife in their CHAs. Wildlife resources are, in a way, managed under a common property 
resource management regime in community CHAs; if CHAs are under multi-purpose 
management, communities have no control over the use of non-wildlife resources and cannot 
restrict others from harvesting them (Rozemeijer and Van der Jagt, 2002). 
 
Community-Based Organizations and Joint Venture Partnerships 
 
In 1990, the adoption of Botswana’s Tourism Policy and the CBNRM program involved 
local communities, NGOs, and development agencies in the planning and implementing of 
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trophy hunting activities in several of the community-controlled hunting areas (USAID, 2016). 
Through these changes, villages formed a Quota Management Committee and obtained wildlife 
quotas from the federal government. Communities could use quotas for citizen hunting or lease 
all or part of it to a safari company (Twyman, 2000). If villages chose to get involved with safari 
companies, they had to come together and establish themselves as a legal entity in the form of a 
community-based organization (CBO); after gaining federal recognition as a CBO, the 
organization then formed a joint venture partnership or association with a safari company (Stone, 
2015). The establishment as a CBO was also supposed to solidify the community’s 
accountability to DWNP, enabling it to gain greater ownership over wildlife resources and 
establish enterprises that could provide greater social and economic benefits and enhance their 
livelihood options.  
 The community-based organization (CBO), which is also referred to as a ‘trust’, was 
designed to empower communities to benefit through CBNRM and also provide input in certain 
decisions regarding natural resource management. The structures of each CBO differ, but usually 
include a manager, several employees and community escort guides, and the Board of Trustees 
(BOT), which is a group elected biannually by the village. The BOT is the executive authority 
within the CBNRM organization. BOT is responsible for policy formulation and overall 
administration and direction within the designated management area. The income generated by 
the CBOs are provided by the BOT to the Village Development Committee (VDC), and these 
groups work in tandem to select and pursue development projects on behalf of the villages 
(Stone, 2015). The members of the VDC are elected at the kgotla (indigenous public assembly), 
and two members of the VDC become members of the Board of Trustees. The kgosis, who are 
the chiefs of the villages and usually inherit this position through familial connections, are also 
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included in the operations of the BOT, but they do not have a vote when the group is making 
decisions (Stone, 2015). The BOT is the supreme decision-making body, but both the BOT and 
VDC have the authority to make regulations, approve developments, initiate partnerships with 
the private sector, collect revenues, and decide on benefit distribution (Mbaiwa, 2012).  
 Trophy hunting tourism has influenced the model of partnerships between CBOs and 
tourism ventures. There are three joint venture options for CBNRM in Botswana (Van der Jagt et 
al., 2002), which include joint venture agreements with the private sector, joint venture 
partnership with the private sector, and a set of various arrangements where different parties take 
on responsibilities over certain activities. These agreements differ in the extent to which the 
CBO and private sector company merge assets (i.e. financial, labor, natural resources, capital), 
the sharing of profits, and combined management or control of operations (Lepetu et al., 2008.) 
Under the partnership framework, there is more of an emphasis on a transfer of entrepreneurship 
and managerial skills in tourism business from companies to local communities (Mbawia, 2012). 
Most CBOS in Botswana have opted for Joint Venture Partnerships (JVPs), which end up being 
more similar to joint venture agreements, because they serve more as lease contracts (Mbaiwa, 
2012). Limited training and experience of the leaders of the community trusts serves as a barrier 
for CBOs to form JVPs with safari companies (Kgathi and Ngwenya, 2005).  
 Currently, there are about 147 community-based organizations (CBOs) throughout the 9 
districts in Botswana. Of these CBOs, 94 are registered, 16 not registered, and 37 have unknown 
statuses (USAID, 2016). Figure 1 illustrates the different districts in Botswana. CBOs are spread 
throughout Botswana, but the most high-revenue CBOs are found in Ngamiland and Chobe 
Districts because they are located close to protected areas with good tourism opportunities (ibid). 
CBOs are important for rural development as they cover 61% of the rural population. Poverty in 
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CBO villages (27%) is above the national average (19.3%) and that of rural villages (24.3%). 
Thus, livelihood enhancement and poverty reduction should be important components of 
CBNRM (ibid). 
 
Figure 1. Map of Botswana by District. Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.  
 
The main natural resource management related activities that CBOs engage in are bird 
counting, firefighting, and animal problem control. Livestock, crops, and informal employment 
are most frequently cited as important sources of livelihoods (USAID, 2016). There are a number 
of opportunity costs that are associated with living in these CBOs in such close proximity to 
wildlife-rich areas, such as crop-raiding, livestock depredation, and wildlife-related injury and 
fatality (Mbaiwa, 2012).  Higher poaching rates are already an issue in non-CBNRM areas; 
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wildlife related living costs, like prohibiting livestock husbandry and wildlife hunting might 
cause barriers for conservation efforts in CBNRM areas (ibid). 
 Elephant populations pose a specific source of human wildlife conflict in these CBOs in 
Northern Botswana. Due to an increase in human land use and competition for resources (e.g. 
water) in the Okavango Delta and Chobe regions, there has been an influx of elephants in these 
areas, which have led to greater reports of human elephant conflicts in northern Botswana over 
recent years (Mayberry et al., 2017). These conflicts manifest as crop/property damage, 
injury/fatality and psychological trauma, such as emotional stress and restricted mobility (due to 
food insecurity and reduced safety) (Khumalo and Yung, 2015). The impacts of human-wildlife 
conflict can contribute to people’s negative attitude towards the problem species and can counter 
the intentions of CBNRM programs.  
 
A Hunting Ban and the Lifting of the Ban in Botswana 
 
Botswana has experienced two dramatic natural resource management mandates over the 
past several years in relation to trophy hunting. The Botswana government cited a decline in 
wildlife as the reason for a hunting ban in 2014 (Mbaiwa, 2015), claiming that the issuance of 
hunting licenses had fueled poaching and the “catastrophic” declines in wildlife, while inhibiting 
sustained growth in the tourism industry (Boyes, 2012). Upon announcing this decision, the 
government also referenced a 2011 study conducted by scientist leaders of the international non-
profit organization, Elephants Without Borders. The study found that there had been a 61% 
decline in 11 species. The authors of the study attributed this decline in wildlife populations to 
several causes: poaching, human encroachment, habitat fragmentation, drought, hunting, and 
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veldt fires (Chase, 2011). Although not its exact message, the study is believed to have been 
influential in former President Khama’s decision to ban hunting (Mbaiwa, 2018).  
 Botswana’s decision to ban hunting contributed to African countries’ frustration towards 
NGO and foreign aid organizations’ management prescriptions and interventions, which at the 
time, had been advocating for stricter regulations of trophy hunting tourism and the illegal trade 
in bushmeat (Boyes, 2012). Yet, without local support and alternative livelihood strategies, 
hunting bans can contribute to further negative impacts to conservation (Naidoo et al., 2016; 
Angula et al., 2018). As a result of the ban, all Wildlife Management Areas and Controlled 
Hunting Areas became designated for non-consumptive tourism in Botswana, disrupting the 
economic and social benefits that CBOs received from their partnerships with trophy hunting 
operations (Mbaiwa, 2018). Sixty-eight community-managed concession areas that were 
involved in citizen hunting or private sport hunting were forced to transition to photographic 
tourism areas (Mbaiwa, 2018). Data from DWNP indicates that there were 23 villages with a 
total population of 11,850 people in the Okavango Delta and Chobe Districts that had nine 
concession areas covering 13,890 square kilometers shift from trophy hunting to photographic 
tourism. This transition was difficult for some communities because hunting was undertaken in 
peripheral areas that are not conducive for photographic tourism safaris and infrastructure. For 
example, the photographic tourism potential in the eastern marginal areas of Makgadikgadi Pans 
area is very low (ibid). However, some CBOs have been successful in diversifying their 
economies and transitioning into other revenue building tourism activities, whereas other 
communities remain static in their tourism development ventures (Mbaiwa, 2018; Blackie, 
2019). 
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 In the spring of 2019, the government of Botswana, under the new leadership of 
Mokgweetsi Masisi, announced plans to lift the hunting ban (Republic of Botswana, 2019). 
Trophy hunting tourism was reinstituted in two phases: the first taking place during the fall of 
2019 and consisting of citizen hunting for elephants and the second phase was set for the fall of 
2020, for international tourists (Government of Botswana, 2019), but may not happen due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Understanding how mandates on hunting relate to the adaptive capacity of 
the local communities can provide unique insight on the how the Trophy hunting system 
responds to changes over time and make inferences regarding the system’s overall resilience and 
health. 
 
Background on Study Sites: Chobe Enclave Community Trust, Sankuyo Tshwaragano 
Management Trust, and the Mababe Zokotsama Community Trust  
 
This study investigated how CBOs in Northern Botswana responded to a hunting 
moratorium and the lifting of the moratorium. Northern Botswana consists of three districts (i.e. 
Ngamiland, Central, and Chobe) (see Figure 1). Specifically, this study’s sample included three 
CBOs that are located within Botswana’s northwestern district (Ngamiland) and Chobe District: 
the Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust, the Mababe Zokotsama Community Trust, and 
the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT). Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of 
the three CBOs that participated in this study. CECT, Sankuyo, and Mababe were selected for 
this study because they were amongst the earliest villages to participate in CBNRM programs in 
Botswana; more importantly, they all had established trophy hunting as a form of tourism and 
were greatly impacted by the state mandate to ban trophy hunting in 2014 (Mbaiwa, 2015).   
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Figure 2.  Map of Sankuyo, Mababe, and CECT CBOs in Northern Botswana (Source: Google 
Maps). 
 
The Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT) 
Key natural features of the Chobe District are Chobe National Park and the Chobe River, 
which support large wildlife populations and unique scenic beauty, attracting thousands of 
tourists every year. Kasane is the gateway tourism town in the Chobe region and provides access 
to Chobe National Park and Chobe’s Forest Reserves. The wildlife-based tourism industry has 
led to the development of campsites, lodges, and camps that accommodate its clients (Mbaiwa, 
2015). 
 The Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (Figure 2) was the first community project in 
Botswana and is the exemplar for implementing CBNRM in Botswana (Stone, 2015). CECT is 
situated on land that is bordered by protected areas on the western and eastern sides (Chobe 
CECT 
Mababe 
Sankuyo 
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Forest Reserve and Chobe National Park) and the Chobe river and Namibia on the northern side. 
Resource use is restricted to commercial purposes within these areas (Lepetu et al. 2008). A road 
passes through the Chobe National Park that goes through the villages. The estimated population 
of CECT is 7,500 (ibid). Kasane is about 50 km north of the Enclave and is the hub of the 
tourism industry in northern Botswana.  
 CECT consists of five villages, namely Mabele, Kavimba, Kachikau, Satau, and 
Parakarungu. The ethnic groups found in Chobe enclave include BaSubiya, BaTawana, and the 
!Xo (Lepetu et al. 2008). The enclave villages are located within two areas where trophy hunting 
used to be practiced through a JVP and currently, only photo tourism safaris take place (Stone, 
2015). The main economic activities in CECT are crop production, livestock production, and 
formal employment, which are supplemented by small scale businesses like beer making and 
veld products (Jones, 2002). The CBNRM management structure in CECT consists of the Board 
of Trustees, a Manager, and employees. Each village chooses a Village Development 
Committee, which then sends two of its members to represent that village on the board of the 
Trust. The BOT is held by a Deed of Trust to divide 85% of its annual revenue between the five 
villages and the VDC is tasked with reinvesting the distributed revenue and guiding the 
development and implementation of village projects (Lepetu et al., 2008). 
 
Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust (Sankuyo) 
 
The Sankuyo Trust represents the Sankuyo village (Figure 2), which is located in the 
northeastern fringes of Okavango Delta within Batawana Tribal Territory in the northwestern 
part of Botswana. The village has a population 372 people (GoB, 2002). It is mostly a Bayei 
(Wayei) community with Basubiya tribe forming a significant minority (Thakadu et al., 2005). 
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It’s about 80 km from the town of Maun and is just south of the Mababe Trust, on the outskirts 
of Chobe National Park and the Moremi Game Reserve. 
 The main economic activities of Sankuyo residents are arable agriculture and collecting 
of veld products. People in Mababe also use livestock, like cattle, as an agricultural asset to help 
with food production efficiency (Lepetu et al., 2008). When the government designated 
controlled hunting areas near Sankuyo for community management, the village registered as a 
CBO and became the Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust in 1995. The CHAs NG33 and 
NG34 have high concentrations of wildlife and were managed by STMT for photographic and 
hunting purposes. Sankuyo Village was the first village in Ngamiland to coordinate community-
based tourism activities.  It is also recognized as one of the villages where CBNRM has a 
significant impact on livelihoods (Arntzen 2003; Thakadu et al., 2005). 
Trophy hunting through the CBNRM program at Sankuyo Village was conducted 
through a joint venture arrangement. The joint venture arrangement served as the main source of 
socio-economic benefits that accrued within the village (Mbaiwa, 2005).  
 
Mababe Zokotsama Community Trust  
 
The Mababe Zokotsama Community Trust (Mababe) (see Figure 2) represents the 
Mababe village, which is located along the southeastern fringes of Okavango Delta, between the 
Moremi Game Reserve and Chobe National Park. It is situated about 120 km of the town of 
Maun and is north of Sankuyo Trust. It has a population of about 500 people. The main ethnic 
group in Mababe are the indigenous San (or so called “Bushmen”), who lived nomadic lives of 
hunting and gathering until last two or three decades (Segadimo, 2018). The San are the largest 
indigenous community in Botswana, comprised of small tribes that speak different languages; 
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they are officially recognized internationally as indigenous people, but not nationally by the 
Botswanan government. They are considered politically and economically marginalized and 
vulnerable to exploitation by other ethnic groups; because of their history with hunting and 
nomadic lifestyle, they have been greatly impacted by the government’s hunting restrictions and 
strict land policies (ibid). Mababe became a CBO in 1998. The main activities in Mababe are 
crop and livestock production and employment through the tourism business in mostly unskilled 
jobs. There has also been out-migration from the village to bigger cities to search for other 
employment opportunities (ibid).  
 Both Sankuyo and Mababe are located in Ngamiland District, which is known for popular 
tourist destinations like the Okavango Delta and Moremi Game Reserve. The Delta is a natural 
wetland that covers 16,000 square kilometers (Mbwaia, 2015) and the Game Reserve has large 
bodies of open water and grasslands sustain plants, mammals, birds, insects, and other 
organisms. Over 150,000 people live in the Okavango Delta region of which more than 95% 
depend directly or indirectly on natural resources in the Okavango to sustain their livelihoods 
(NWDC, 2003).  
 
Thesis Chapters 
This thesis is presented in seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction and need 
for this research. Chapter 2 provides context for the body of literature that shaped this study’s 
research questions and the analysis. Chapter 3 explains the methodology and analysis used in this 
research. Chapter 4, 5, and 6 consist of the results and discussion. Chapter 4 provides an 
overview of the impacts of trophy hunting tourism on rural livelihoods and wildlife conservation 
and describes the locals’ experience of the ban; Chapter 5 explores the impacts of the hunting 
ban and the corresponding responses of the CBOs; lastly, Chapter 6 provides a synthesis of 
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locals’ responses to the lifting of the ban and describes future potential paths for the trophy 
hunting system that are based on participant feedback. The thesis concludes with Chapter 7, 
which provides an overview of the findings, recommendations for policy and decision makers, 
and reflections for future research. The appendices and bibliography are included after the main 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Community Based Natural Resource Management 
 
Since the 1990s, Southern Africa has become an important international tourist 
destination and international tourist trends suggest that Africa is currently one of the fastest 
growing tourist destinations in the world (UNWTO, 2019). As a prominent foreign exchange 
earner in several countries, like Botswana (Mbaiwa, 2018) and Namibia (Mcnamara, Desubes, & 
Claasen, 2015), visiting wildlife tourist attractions is a major tourist motivation (Higginbottom, 
2004). African countries have developed both consumptive and non-consumptive forms of 
wildlife tourism through trophy hunting and photographic safaris; both activities are responsible 
for a significant portion of the countries’ GDP (Lindsey et al., 2007). However, the rapid growth 
of tourism in developing countries has raised issues about the industry’s sustainability, especially 
in regards to its access and economic benefits to local economies (Mbaiwa, 2005).  
 As sub-Saharan Africa experienced this exponential growth in international tourism, 
several African countries were under severe criticism due to diminishing wildlife populations 
and evidence of increased poaching (Twyman, 2000; Swatuk, 2005). Critics charged government 
departments with deficiency in the proper management of ecosystems and wildlife populations, 
arguing that the state government was not able to sufficiently provide the resources that a 
protectionist, top-down approach requires (Twyman, 2000). Community based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) approaches to natural resource management were born out of these 
criticisms and proliferated across the Global South in the 1980s as a method to improve 
conservation and alleviate poverty through the inclusion of communities in natural resource 
governance (Swatuk, 2005). CBNRM programs became recognized as a sustainable development 
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tool that could link socio-economic growth with biodiversity conservation (Blaikie, 2006; 
Rapley, 2007; Ribot et al., 2010).  
The institution of CBNRM in sub-Saharan Africa called for a shift from state mandated 
natural resource management regimes to a system of governance that devolved certain rights of 
objective setting and policy making to non-state actors, and more specifically, local communities 
(Swatuk, 2005). This “community based” approach to natural resource management (CBNRM) 
intended to involve communities more in decisions regarding land use, inspire collaborative 
partnerships with private tourism companies, and generate economic benefits at a local level. 
These programs were thought of as a way to improve natural resource conservation, rural 
livelihoods, and reduce human wildlife conflicts and alleviate poverty (Twyman, 2000; Swatuk, 
2005; USAID, 2016).  
There are mixed reviews regarding CBNRM’s successes in improving rural livelihoods 
and biodiversity conservation. Studies demonstrate that communities have benefitted from 
CBNRM projects, strengthening local resource management institutions and boosting local 
people’s skills at negotiating control over resources (Hulme & Murphee, 1999; Mbaiwa, 2004; 
Kgathi & Ngwenya, 2005). Conversely, there has also been research documenting significant 
problems in the implementation and management of CBNRM, which has resulted in failure to 
bring significant benefits to rural communities even when conservation goals are achieved 
(Blaikie, 2006: Khumalo & Yung, 2015). Critics of CBNRM largely attribute its failure in 
empowering communities in natural resource management to poor implementation of policy or 
legislative reforms that have not sufficiently or properly transferred control over natural 
resources to community (Twyman, 2000; Blaikie, 2006; Dressler et al., 2010; Ribot et al., 2010). 
Trophy hunting tourism became a critical CBNRM activity, and the rise and industrialization of 
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trophy hunting occurred alongside the gradual popularization and institutionalization of 
CBNRM. 
 
Trophy Hunting Tourism in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
In the 1990s, trophy hunting tourism became a key vehicle for devolving certain natural 
resource and wildlife management responsibilities to communities and generating revenue at a 
local level in sub-Saharan African countries (Van der Heiden, 1991; Twyman, 2000; Van der 
Jagt & Rozemeijer, 2002). Throughout the world, hunting can be performed for sport, 
subsistence, and to control population size (Coltman et al., 2003). Many countries practice 
trophy hunting tourism; the Inuit in the Canadian Artic hold hunts for polar bears (Ursus 
maritimus) (Freeman & Wenzel, 2006) and the ibex (Capra sibirica) has become a popular 
trophy animal in northern Pakistan (Rashid et al., 2020).  
Sport hunting and nature conservation have been linked together from early times, but the 
origins of the contemporary conservation agenda have roots in nineteenth century colonial sport 
hunting. In government documents, scientific studies, and media publications, trophy hunting 
tourism has also been referred to as ‘safari hunting tourism,’ ‘conservation hunting,’ and 
‘sustainable hunting’ (Lindsey, 2008; Lendelvo et al., 2020). Trophy hunting can be defined as a 
practice that “…entails a hunter paying a fee to kill an animal and claim its body or body parts as 
a trophy of conquest” (Batavia et al., 2018, p. 1). It has also been defined as “an activity where 
wildlife is hunted by means of a rifle, bow, or similar weapon primarily for their horns...and/or 
the skin in order to be displayed as trophies” (Van der Merwe et al., 2014, p. 1). For this study, 
the working definition of trophy hunting tourism is: sport hunting that is conducted on state 
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lands, not private game farms or reserves, and is undertaken for subsistence purposes, but for 
recreation, in which hunters pay a large fee to hunt an animal to secure a physical attribute.  
Under certain governance regimes, trophy hunting tourism can provide opportunities that 
include local communities in its management and operation, enhance communities’ decision-
making powers, and result in benefits that can sustain and diversify livelihoods for local 
communities (Kgathi and Ngwenya, 2005; Mbaiwa, 2015; Naidoo et al., 2016).   
Trophy hunting tourism is a major contributor to wildlife tourism in Africa (Lindsey et 
al., 2006; Saaymen et al., 2018). Along with 22 sub-Saharan African countries, Western, Eastern 
and Central African countries, like Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, participate in 
the trophy hunting industry (Lindsey et al., 2006; Lindsey et al., 2007). The trophy hunting 
industry is growing rapidly: approximately 18,500 foreign hunting clients visit sub-Saharan 
Africa each year, compared to 8,000 in 1990 (Lindsey et al., 2007). Furthermore, the industry 
has estimated to generate up to US$200 million each year (sans economic multipliers) (ibid). 
Trophy hunting operators hold at least 1.4 million km2 of land in sub-Saharan African countries 
that practice trophy hunting, which represents 22% more land than that encompassed by national 
parks (Lindsey et al., 2007). The main species involved in trophy hunting change depending on 
the host country; the most hunted species in southern Africa are kudu, gemsbok, warthog, 
impala, lechwe, steenbok, and zebra (ibid). In Botswana and Zimbabwe, trophy hunting 
generated most of its income from elephants (56% and 27% respectively) (Botswana Wildlife 
Management Association, 2001).  
The southern African trophy hunting industry has grown substantially during the past 
decade; this growth can be attributed partly to the closure of hunting in other countries (e.g. 
Kenya and Botswana), the loss of wildlife in other African regions (e.g. Sudan, Democratic 
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Republic of Congo), and successful conservation outside of protected areas (Lindsey et al., 
2007). Countries that participate in trophy hunting tourism subscribe to different land regime 
schemes, which changes the various decision-making powers of the network of state and non-
state actors involved in the hunting management and operation (Lindsey et al., 2006). For 
example, Namibia passed legislation in the 1990s and early 2000s that devolved user rights over 
wildlife, tourism, and forest resources over to landowners (Mcnamara et al., 2015). The CBNRM 
system in Namibia encourages communities to form land management units called 
conservancies, which act as common property resource management systems for wildlife and 
tourism (Naidoo et al., 2016).  
Despite countless studies on the economic contributions and conservation benefits of 
hunting in sub-Saharan African countries (Lindsey et al., 2007; Nelson et al., 2013; Mbaiwa, 
2015; Naidoo et al., 2016;), trophy hunting tourism and its associated benefits and challenges 
serve as a controversial topic. There is a polarizing academic and public debate that revolves 
around trophy hunting tourism, involving a diverse group of players, from animal welfare groups 
to international conservation organizations (Angula et al., 2018; Batavia et al., 2018). The debate 
about trophy hunting has also gained traction in recent years after the ban on trophy hunting 
tourism in Botswana in 2014, and two contentious hunts in 2015 of the Zimbabwean lion Cecil 
and a rhino in Namibia (Macdonald et al., 2016, Batavia et al., 2018). Research on trophy 
hunting tourism has evolved from investigating the extent to which it actually serves as a 
conservation and community development tool to discussing its ethical foundations (Macdonald 
et al., 2016). The following section reviews the trophy hunting industry’s ecological, socio-
cultural, and economic impacts and how those effects shape the industry’s various opportunities 
and challenges. 
 
 23 
 
Benefits and Challenges of Trophy Hunting Tourism 
 
Trophy hunting can serve as a tool for conservation and sustainable development for 
many reasons. Its characteristics have been studied extensively in different countries and can 
result in various ecological, social, and economic impacts that depend on the country’s history 
with natural resource management policies, local livelihood practices, wildlife populations, and 
political circumstances. Table 1 provides a list of the various ecological, socio-economic, and 
governance components of trophy hunting. 
 
Ecological Benefits and Challenges 
 
 The hunting revenues from trophy hunting tourism can support conservation of wildlife 
in areas where there might be a desire for wildlife to pay for itself and contribute to the economy 
(Lindsey et al., 2006); for example, trophy hunting funds have been considered instrumental in 
the recovery of white rhinoceros (Ceratotherium sinum) populations in South Africa (Leader-
Williams & Hutton, 2005).  
Local communities’ use of natural resources may be restricted due to trophy hunting 
activity, but trophy hunting proponents tout the industry’s ability to create economic benefits for 
local communities, through jobs, and food security, through access to bushmeat from hunts. 
Hunting can also support the operational costs of community based natural resource management 
(Naidoo et al., 2016). The income that trophy hunting generates creates financial incentives to 
promote “wildlife” as a more competitive land use option over agriculture or farming or 
photographic tourism, which might have more “environmentally degrading” impacts (Baker, 
1997; di Minin et al., 2016). Due to the nature of safari hunter clientele and the higher amount of 
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income generated per client, trophy hunting can be a less environmentally impactful and more 
economically rewarding form of tourism than photographic safari tourism (Baker, 1997; Leader-
Williams & Hutton, 2005; di Minin et al., 2016). In certain areas, photographic tourism has 
proven to outcompete hunting as a revenue generator. However, mass market tourism is 
unpredictable and if a country undergoes political instability, mass tourism can quickly dissipate; 
in these circumstances, hunting tourism has proven to persevere (Martin, 1996). 
 Although trophy hunting has proven to provide impressive financial and socio cultural 
gains and does seem to be more sustainable in certain ways over other tourism or land use 
options, the ecological and economic long term sustainability is uncertain. The impact of hunting 
on population dynamics can be complex and hard to quantify (Milner et al., 2006; Sellier et al., 
2016). Habitat loss and retaliatory killings are typically considered the main threats to wildlife 
across Africa, but hunting can also deplete animal populations (Packer et al 2009). According to 
Packer et al 2009, excessive trophy hunting seems to have caused large scale declines in African 
lions, American cougars and possibly African leopards. One way towards establishing 
sustainable management strategies is using population demographic analyses in conjunction with 
harvest trends to limit annual hunting quotas; this can be a difficult strategy to develop and 
implement because some species are difficult to monitor, resulting in a skewed perception of 
population size. Quotas will also have to take into consideration the demands for predator control 
by livestock producers and local communities (ibid). However, these management strategies 
require considerable cross-scale communication, role defining, and accountability, which can be 
challenging to achieve in the context of several trophy hunting nations’ CBNRM approaches 
(Ribot et al., 2010).  
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 There is a lack of research that has been done on how trait based selective harvests might 
change trophy size or quality in particular species over time, which is a concern that has been 
expressed for trophy hunting in Africa. It is unknown how these changes might result in 
deleterious genetic changes within targeted populations (Coltman et al., 2003; Crosmary et al., 
2013). There is evidence that the decline in trophy quality could be genetic, which might not be 
reversible with a simple change in hunting quota, ultimately jeopardizing the genetic integrity of 
certain hunted populations and the overall conservation potential of hunting areas if hunters 
choose to travel to places where sizes of trophies are still attractive (Crosmary et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, trophy hunting tourism usually selectively harvests older males, whose removal 
can represent a loss of healthy individuals that are key for reproduction and social cohesion in 
certain wildlife populations; these demographic changes that can have a direct effect on reducing 
population size and in some extreme cases, can even cause total reproductive collapse (Milner et 
al., 2006; Packer et al., 2009; Selier et al., 2013). However, it’s important to note that these 
studies on the demographic changes in populations targeted by trophy hunting tourism have been 
experimental and not observational. The relationship between harvesting of individuals and 
certain deleterious demographic side effects is not yet understood. There is a need for research 
that clarifies the mechanisms of the relationship between population demographics and trophy 
hunting tourism so that wildlife managers, policy makers, and governments can better understand 
how the expression of demographic effects change across mating systems, habitats and with 
population density (Milner et al., 2006). 
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Socio-Economic Benefits and Challenges 
 
 Trophy hunting tourism can generate income for participating communities, food as game 
meat, and provide opportunities to develop certain skills that might empower communities to 
take a more active role in the marketing and management of the partnerships with safari 
companies (Kgathi and Ngwenya, 2004; Naidoo et al., 2016). The common practice of trophy 
hunting is for the tourist hunting companies to pay a fee to the state or local government in order 
to use a tract of land; the client hunters pay for the permits to hunt and shoot certain species. 
Outside of the cash that is paid to lease concessions of land and pay for the hunting license, there 
are other benefits from hunting tourism, like skins that are sometimes retrieved and sold by 
governmental agencies and meat that can be sold or distributed to local people to contribute to 
their household economies (Baker, 1997; Swatuk, 2005; Mbaiwa, 2012).  
Although CBNRM and trophy hunting tourism’s contribution to livelihoods might be 
small in global terms, incomes from these activities can make a significant difference in 
households. For example, the CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe demonstrated that in some 
areas, dividends surpassed income from agriculture (Bond et al., 2004). However, these benefits 
do not necessarily mean that communities participating in CBNRM are willing to give up other 
livelihood options, which utilize the land, in order to accommodate trophy hunting tourism 
operations. The income from trophy hunting is essential for the management of the area as it is 
used to support CBNRM operating costs; Naidoo et al 2016 predict that if communities were 
unable to cover operating costs, the community would likely no longer pursue conservation as a 
viable land use. They cite the inability of organizations to pay game guards, develop and 
implement management and monitoring plans, and feel a sense of ownership over natural 
resources, as potential reasons that could lead to the increased poaching and over-harvesting of 
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wildlife (Naidoo et al., 2016). Respondents in Naidoo et al’s 2016 study consider the reasons for 
poaching and over-harvesting of wildlife simply as ways to manage the many opportunity costs 
that are incurred by living adjacent to wildlife rich and regulated areas. 
 Trophy hunting tourism in sub-Saharan Arica was intended to serve as a mitigation 
strategy for human wildlife conflict, by placing an economic value on certain species and 
connecting the communities to the benefits that the tourism generates (Lindsey et al 2013; 
Mbaiwa, 2015; Naidoo et al., 2016). Despite its ability to generate revenue for communities, the 
opportunity costs of living near wildlife and being restricted in wildlife management decisions, 
may not represent enough of a motivation to promote “pro-conservation” behavior within 
communities.  
In the human dimensions of wildlife management literature, there has been emphasis 
towards using the more encompassing term of “human wildlife interaction,” to understand 
conflict between humans and wildlife, which includes both positive and negative interactions 
(Nyhus, 2016). This change in rhetoric acknowledges that humans have lived with wildlife for 
generations (ibid); however, as the human population has exploded and wild habitat continues to 
be transformed to satisfy the demands of that growth, human-wildlife interactions become more 
frequent, wildlife populations face greater threats, and regulations and changing social norms 
force humans to relate, interact, and respond to wildlife in more positive ways (Dickman, 2010).  
In the context of trophy hunting tourism, a few strategies which have encouraged human-wildlife 
co-existence include increased usage of fortified kraals to protect livestock at night (Weise et al, 
2018) and the implementation of wildlife corridors to accommodate both human and wildlife 
land use preferences (Adams et al, 2017). Although international organizations and state and 
local government officials in sub-Saharan Africa have developed a multitude of strategies to 
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promote positive local human wildlife interactions, trophy hunting tourism remains a 
controversial option not only at the local and state levels, as aforementioned in this review, but at 
the international scale, as well.  
 Trophy hunting tourism faces backlash and public disapproval from the Western 
conservation community (Macdonald et al., 2016; Batavia et al., 2018). Scrutiny is often for 
unspecified reasons that have to do with ethics (ibid). International scrutiny against trophy 
hunting tourism may have contributed to certain national changes in policies, like a ban in the 
1970s in Kenya and a ban in 2014 in Botswana (which both cited wildlife population declines as 
the main incentives). Policy changes that are informed more by international attitude, rather than 
an understanding of how trophy hunting of wildlife and its benefits and costs are perceived by 
local communities, might achieve the exact opposite of the intended effect, like a reduction in 
biodiversity and in the amount of area under wildlife management (di Minin et al., 2016; Naidoo 
et al 2016; Macdonald et al., 2016). In CBNRM programs that participate in hunting, a majority 
of the benefits can be delivered by a few species; therefore, a targeted hunting ban on these 
species or an import ban, could have a negative effect on the recipient country’s CBNRM 
program by undermining CBNRM governance structures and deflating incentives for 
conservation (Naidoo et al., 2016).  
 
Trophy Hunting Governance Benefits and Challenges 
  
Trophy hunting happens under a diverse range of governance regimes with variable 
impacts and outcomes (Dickson et al., 2009). The growth of wildlife-based land uses during the 
past several decades originates from governance reforms that devolve user rights over wildlife to 
landowners, allowing them to benefit financially from recreational hunting (Bond et al., 2004). 
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However, the extent of the devolution of rights differs according to land tenure regime, which 
results in variable trophy hunting practices that shape community-wildlife relationships and 
wildlife conservation differently. For instance, several Southern African nations, like Namibia, 
Tanzania, Botswana, and Zambia, have experimented with reforms that facilitate community 
based natural resource management and accordingly, devolve significant control over wildlife 
use and benefits to people living adjacent to wildlife on communal lands. Within these CBNRM 
subscribers, Namibia seems to be the only nation that has been able to fully realize and 
implement the promises of CBNRM (Nelson et al., 2013; Naidoo et al., 2016). But even with a 
successful reputation in their execution of CBNRM, Namibian conservancies still harbor 
grievances about trophy hunting’s operation, especially, in regards to benefit distribution and 
strict regulations of their traditional practices on hunting grounds (Thomsen et al. 2020, in 
review). In Namibia, hunting is a key component of revenues to community conservancies, 
whereas in Tanzania, there are weak links between hunting revenue generated on community 
lands and local communities because communities do not have rights over revenue or hunting 
concession allocation (ibid).  
The various social, ecological and economic impacts of trophy hunting tourism, like 
inequitable and insufficient revenue distribution and lack of community-initiated development, 
can be traced back to weaknesses in governance and can undermine the potential of hunting and 
encourage overharvesting (Nelson et al., 2013; Marshall et al., 2007). These weaknesses stem 
from governance centralized control over resources that do not promote community participation 
in decision making over rules of management and result in policies that foster limited ownership, 
participation, and collective action at the community level (Nelson et al., 2013; di Minin et al., 
2016).  
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Trophy hunting governance also involves major international cooperation and 
communication because migrating wildlife populations do not conform to political and social 
boundaries imposed by humans (Duffy, 2006). Maintaining sustainable wildlife populations is 
one of many environmental issues that have become increasingly subject to transboundary 
management (ibid).  
Despite all the challenges to trophy hunting governance, in situations where the central 
government devolves revenues and user rights over wildlife and there is a long-term and 
competitively divided concession system, benefits from hunting are more likely to reach local 
communities and compensate for wildlife-related costs (Lindsey et al., 2014; di Minin et al., 
2016). Lindsey et al 2014 claims that the key governance factors that promote sustainable use 
and foster positive links between trophy hunting and wildlife (specifically, lion) conservation are 
1) revenues from trophy hunting accrue directly to local landholders where hunting takes place; 
2) hunting concessions are granted for at least ten years and ideally longer; and 3) hunting 
concessions are allocated through competitive and transparent bidding process (Lindsey et al 
2014). Although these factors are contextual and refer to specific national situations, Lindsey et 
al suggest that trophy hunting can provide conservation benefits for wildlife where it is well 
managed and conversely, can pose a significant threat where the governance of the industry is 
poor (ibid). In general, the literature consistently claims that community support and 
participation are essential components to making a particular trophy hunting governance regime 
an effective and well managed conservation tool (Lindsey et al. 2007; Naidoo et al. 2016; 
Angula et al. 2018). 
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Table 1.Components of Trophy Hunting Tourism 
 
Ecological Aspects 
 Findings Authors 
Benefits Supports operational costs of CBNRM Naidoo et al., 2016 
 Financial incentives to promote wildlife as a more 
competitive land use option and discourage other uses of 
wildlife like poaching and over-harvesting 
Baker 1997; di 
Minin et al., 2016; 
Naidoo et al., 2016 
 Supports small overall tourist population for less 
environmentally impactful form of tourism than 
photographic safari tourism 
Baker 1997; 
Leader-Williams & 
Hutton 2005; di 
Minin et al., 2016 
Challenges Impact on wildlife is complex and hard to quantify  Milner et al., 2006; 
Selier et al., 2016  
 Excessive quotas do not include the demands for predator 
control 
Packer et al., 2009 
 Trait based harvests may jeopardize the genetic integrity 
of populations and effect population size 
Coltman et al., 
2003; Crosmary et 
al., 2013 
 
 
Socio-Economic Aspects 
 Findings Authors 
Benefits Generate game meat and provide opportunities for skill 
development 
Kgathi 2005; 
Naidoo et al. 2016 
 Creates jobs to work in lodges or as guides and trackers Naidoo et al. 2016 
 Mitigates opportunity costs of living in close proximity 
with wildlife 
Lindsey et al., 
2012; Mbaiwa, 
2015 
Challenges Not sufficient in addressing human wildlife conflict and 
could limit community support for conservation 
Leader-Williams & 
Hutton, 2005 
 International disapproval influences national hunting 
governance and undermines local perspectives  
Macdonald et al., 
2016; Batvia et al., 
2018 
 
Governance Aspects 
 Findings Authors 
Benefits Diverse governance regimes provide opportunities to 
compare and learn from each approach 
Dickson et al. 2009 
 Generates local support for conservation through 
devolution of revenues and user rights over wildlife 
through long term and competitive concession systems  
Lindsey et al. 2014, 
di Minin et al. 2016 
Challenges Transboundary management strategies require cross-scale 
communication and accountability 
Swatuk, 2005; 
Ribot et al. 2010 
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 Inequitable and insufficient revenue distribution and lack 
of community-initiated decisions  
Nelson 2013; 
Fisher et al. 2013;  
 Promoting community participation in decision making 
and encourage ownership at the community level 
Nelson et al. 2013; 
di Minin et al. 2016 
 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
Social-Ecological Systems Approach 
The growth of trophy hunting tourism in sub-Saharan Africa has expanded the network of 
actors and interests involved in natural resource governance, amplifying the complexity of the 
political landscape (Swatuk, 2005; Blaikie, 2006). For local communities in Botswana, hunting 
tourism had become a key driver of social, economic, and ecological change and a main fixture 
in the social-ecological system of community-based organizations (CBOs). Socio ecological 
systems (SES) are systems that include societal (human) and ecological (biophysical) agents that 
interact with one another in unique ways (Holling, 2001). The social-ecological framework 
attempts to study how social, political, and economic components inform and are informed by 
biophysical processes (ibid).  
SES can be challenging to define, as they are composed of ecological and societal aspects 
that operate at various scales.  For the sake of this study, the SES system is the trophy hunting 
system; its physical boundaries included the geographic areas of Sankuyo, Mababe, and CECT 
trusts and its ecological components include wildlife that are hunted as trophies, such as 
elephants, buffalo, and leopards. The social system in this study’s trophy hunting SES includes 
the communities that have trophy hunting, specifically CECT, Mababe, and Sankuyo, and 
encompasses the interactions between their village communities, traditional governments, and 
CBO governments. Although this study focuses on the community scale of the trophy hunting 
SES, it is important to acknowledge that these smaller scale processes are nested within socio-
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political and ecological structures like, shifts in international approval of trophy hunting and 
global climate change, that operate at a greater scale and influence the functioning of the local 
SES. Figure 3 shows an overview of the trophy hunting SES and clarifies which aspects and their 
interactions are the focuses of this particular study. This depiction is not inclusive of all 
components of the greater SES at the local scale.  
Figure 3. Detailed visual overview of Botswana’s Trophy Hunting system as a Social-Ecological 
System (SES). The overlapping of the circle represents the interactions between the social and 
ecological aspects that compose the trophy hunting SES. 
 
 
A systems perspective generates a more comprehensive picture of the Trophy hunting 
system, building on evaluations of previous studies that have focused on socio-economic and 
ecological impacts of trophy hunting tourism on the participating social-ecological system. 
 
 34 
Viewing trophy hunting tourism as a system acknowledges its complexities, moves beyond 
simple linear and reductionist dynamics, and can ultimately provide a more holistic interpretation 
of how the Trophy hunting system to inform management and policy of trophy hunting. As 
complex systems, they have inherent features that are subject to change and uncertainty and will 
experience “disturbances” which release the system into a period of instability (Gunderson, 
2000).  
Although disturbances are often associated with negative or undesirable states, the 
adaptive cycle model and resilience literature generally describes a disturbance as an unusual 
event that causes a shift in a system from its equilibrium, where the controlling social and 
ecological variables had become too densely connected to one another (Holling & Gunderson, 
2002). A disturbance causes instability in one of these components and triggers the system to re-
organize, possibly growing into an overall more resilient and less rigid system (Scheffer et al., 
2002). Social-ecological systems can experience external disturbances, such as natural disasters 
that disrupt social and ecological function (e.g. floods or earthquakes) or internal crises, like a 
social protest to resolve resource conflict (Chaffin et al., 2014). Although often represented as 
acute events in the literature, disturbances can also result of interactions between asynchronous 
cross-scale influences. Cross-scale interactions occur irrespective of time, and thus a system can 
alter between periods of stability and instability rather than follow a linear trajectory of growth, 
conservation, disturbance, release, and renewal (ibid).  
There is a lot of variation within what might qualify an event as a disturbance and this 
study is focusing on how Botswana’s hunting policies have dictated changes within social-
ecological systems. It is critical to acknowledge that there most likely are other cross-scale 
interactions (especially those of a bio-physical nature), other than state interventions in hunting 
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practices, that have taken place or are taking place; however, in this study, the 2014 hunting ban 
and 2019 lifting of the ban are treated as the primary disturbances that initiated change within the 
Trophy hunting system and more specifically, the SES of Mababe, CECT, and Sankuyo in 
Northern Botswana. In addition to defining the terms of a “disturbance” for this study, it is 
necessary to clarify the boundaries of Botswana’s trophy hunting system as a social-ecological 
system.  
 
Adaptive Cycle Model 
Holling and Gunderson (2002) proposed the adaptive cycle model to conceptualize how a 
system changes over time. Figure 6 shows the adaptive cycle model, which can be used to 
describe the dynamic process of how a system responds to an external disturbance and show the 
unknowable uncertainty in a system (Holling and Gunderson, 2002). According to adaptive cycle 
models, systems experience four stages of growth: release, re-organization, remembrance and 
revolt (Folke, 2006). As the system passes through these sequences, it experiences changes in its 
internal structural connectedness, resilience, and potential. The adaptive cycle model and 
resilience theory claim that uncertainty is inherent in systems and thus, systems go through this 
cycle regularly (Gunderson, 2000; Holling, 2001). Holling (1973) suggested that by studying 
enough systems through this model, it is possible to organize specific groups of 
indicators/attributes that help us evaluate the sustainability of a certain system, eventually 
informing models that will manage these systems from an adaptive intention.  
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Figure 6. The Adaptive Cycle Model. (Adapted from Holling & Gunderson, 2002). 
 
As a concept, adaptive capacity has been brought into social sciences/transdisciplinary 
social-ecological research (Gunderson, 2000) and its exact definition varies depending on the 
context and system (Armitage, 2005). Tompkins & Adger, 2004 defines ‘adaptive capacity’ as 
the “…ability of a system to evolve in order to accommodate perturbations or to expand the 
range of variability within which it can cope” (p. 32). It can also represent the function of social 
and institutional relationships in a system, demonstrating how capable social actors are of 
mediating among different interests to overcome negative collective action outcomes and of 
experimenting and adopting novel solutions (Walker et al., 2002; Armitage, 2005). Resilience is 
not necessarily a positive attribute because a resilient government can withstand great change, 
but that government may also be rigid and oppressive (Holling, 1973). Thus, adaptive capacity is 
often thought of as the positive version of resilience (Gallopín, 2006) and can be thought of as 
broad participation, encouraging learning and experimentation, maintaining diversity and 
redundancy, and promoting polycentric governance systems that support local livelihoods (Biggs 
et al., 2012; Linstadter et al., 2016). 
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By applying the adaptive cycle model, it’s possible to interpret the 2014 hunting ban and 
the 2019 lifting of the ban as a types of disturbances/stressors to the trophy hunting system, 
which influence the nature of the relationship between the inherent social and bio-physical 
processes and resulted in a transformation in the systems’ structure, function, identity, and 
feedbacks (Gunderson, 2000). Figure 4 and 5 show how the adaptive cycle model was applied to 
study the evolution of trophy hunting policy in Botswana. The beginnings of the trophy hunting 
tourism industry in the 1980s marks the start of this adaptive cycle model and the growth phase 
(r) of the trophy hunting system. The system continues to grow as villages conglomerate into 
CBOs and become financial beneficiaries of commercial wildlife tourism. Trophy hunting 
tourism becomes a stabilizing feature in Botswana’s economic, political, and social landscape, 
the system transitions into the conservation phase (k), before it is banned in 2014. After the 
disturbance of the ban, the system passes through the release and reorganization phases of the 
adaptive cycle model, during which the communities experience and respond to the impacts of 
the hunting ban. 
Figure 4. Chronological application of adaptive cycle model to Botswana’s trophy hunting 
system.  
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According to the adaptive cycle model, Botswana’s trophy hunting system responds to 
the hunting ban by adapting into a new system without trophy hunting (new r and k phases). This 
system is disrupted by the lifting of the trophy hunting ban in 2019, ushering the trophy hunting 
system into new phases of release and reorganization (See Figure 5).   
 
Figure 5. Chronological application of adaptive cycle model to Botswana’s trophy hunting 
system. 
 
There is a lack of research describing how a hunting ban has changed the relationship between 
communities and wildlife, how communities have adapted to these changes, and what factors 
facilitate communities’ capacity to adapt. By exploring how communities have responded and 
adapted to a hunting ban, there is an opportunity to gain a better understanding of the nature of 
the linkages between community livelihoods, wildlife-based tourism, and wildlife conservation 
to inform trophy hunting governance in the future.  
Using the adaptive cycle model within depth qualitative methods provides space for 
individuals in Botswana’s CBOs to share certain factors or strategies that have allowed them to 
move through the hunting ban. Conversely, there may be certain positive qualities of the 
communities’ social-ecological systems that were lost or enervated due to the ban on trophy 
hunting tourism. By using the adaptive cycle framework to interpret these findings, the 
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communities’ reserve greater power in imagining what a resilient and adaptive community 
social-ecological system looks like, rather than using prescribed ideas about what resilience 
should look like solely based on an ex situ analysis of costs and benefits of trophy hunting 
tourism. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
 
Research Design 
 
This study employed qualitative research methods to explore the perceptions of local 
communities on trophy hunting tourism in Northern Botswana and the adaptive capacity of the 
CBOs after experiencing a ban in trophy hunting and a subsequent lifting of the ban. 
Specifically, semi-structured interviews, were used to enable the researcher to develop a more in-
depth understanding of respondents’ experiences, perceptions, and local knowledge (Creswell, 
2014). A sample of three CBOs, including seven villages, were selected based on their previous 
involvement in trophy hunting tourism and their participation in previous scientific studies. 
CECT, Sankuyo, and Mababe were amongst the earliest villages to participate in community 
based natural resource management programs and trophy hunting tourism in Botswana (Stone, 
2015). Furthermore, it was important to work with organizations that had a long-term 
ethnographic data set was available. These CBOs have participated in trophy hunting since the 
late 1990s and early 2000s and have been included in studies dating as far back as 1998, 
permitting a more holistic understanding of how trophy hunting tourism affected livelihood 
options and local attitudes towards conservation and tourism development (Mbaiwa, 2004). 
Sankuyo and Mababe CBO each consist of one village (Sankuyo and Mababe) and the CECT 
CBO consists of five villages (Mabele, Muchenje, Kavimb, Kachikau, and Parakrungu). Satau, a 
village in the Chobe Enclave, was excluded from the sample because of challenges with travel 
logistics. 
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Study Participants and Data Collection 
 
A sample of participants were selected using a stratified and systematic sampling 
procedure (Noy, 2006), based on the geographic and cultural delineation of social groups 
represented in communities. Key informants were identified through a review of the literature 
and conversations with experts who have a track record of doing research with the CBOs. A 
snowball sampling method was used in order to select other participants.  Interviews were 
conducted with community members, CBO staff, board members, and community leaders 
(village chiefs, village development committee chairpersons, farmers’ association chairpersons, 
lodge managers, tourism and wildlife district officers) that have been directly or indirectly 
involved with trophy hunting tourism in the CBOs. Interviews were also conducted with local 
leaders of nongovernmental organizations that support wildlife conservation, governmental 
officials responsible for wildlife conservation and trophy hunting, and private sector leaders 
involved in trophy hunting operations in the region.  
Out of the 71 interviews, the 54 interviews that were conducted with community 
members were selected for analysis. This decision was made in order to preserve the community 
perspective in the findings and to better comply with thesis deadlines. However, it is possible to 
analyze the remaining 17 interviews that took place with non-community members for another 
publication in the future. Table 2 shows a breakdown of the participants by stakeholder role 
according to CBO. Table 3 provides a breakdown of characteristics and representation of study 
participants. A total of 54 interviews were conducted across the three CBOs. Gender and a rough 
estimate of age were recorded during the interviews.  
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Table 2. Stakeholder Role of In-depth Interviews with CBOs. Excludes 17 non-CBO 
interviews.  
 
 Sankuyo Mababe CECT 
Local Economic 
Venture Employee  
0 2 1 
Private Tourism 
Company Employee 
1 1 6 
Former Hunting 
Employee 
0 0 5 
Village Development 
Committee 
2 2 3 
Kgosi 1 0 1 
Villager 8 3 3 
Commercial Farmer 0 0 2 
Non-Governmental 
Organization 
0 0 1 
Trust Leaders 
(Managers and Board of 
Trustees) 
2 4 3 
Community Escort 
Guide 
2 1 0 
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Table 3. Gender, Age and Stakeholder Group of Study Participants of In-depth Interviews. 
 
Gender Number of Participants 
Female 18 
Male 32 
Mixed 4 
Age  
Youth 19 
Middle Age 24 
Elders 11 
Stakeholder Group  
Sankuyo Community Trust 16 
Mababe Community Trust 13 
Chobe Enclave Community Trust 25 
Tourism sector 7 
NGO 5 
Government officials 5 
 
 
The interview guide was developed using Whitney et al. 2017’s framework for 
identifying adaptive capacity in social-ecological systems. Literature on Botswana’s Trophy 
hunting system and recent policy changes helped inform the specifics of the questions. Topics of 
the interviews for the community members included: the perceived impacts of trophy hunting 
tourism and a ban on hunting on livelihoods and relations with wildlife, how certain decisions 
are made regarding trophy hunting governance, and how CBOs responded to and grew in the 
face of the hunting ban. Topics of the interviews for other stakeholder groups included: the 
perceived impacts of trophy hunting tourism and a hunting ban on communities’ livelihoods and 
relations with wildlife, CBOs’ roles in trophy hunting governance, and how trophy hunting 
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governance could be changed to improve the relationship between wildlife conservation and 
community development.  In depth interviews were conducted with the Interview Guide (see 
Appendix 2), which was revised twice (once after the first two short interviews) and was slightly 
adjusted depending on the participant main identifying stakeholder group.  
When the participant did not speak English, data collection was conducted with 
translators, who were members of the village. All interviews were recorded and transcribed from 
the recordings. Casual conversations with residents were captured in field notes to be analyzed 
using the same method. The method of constant comparison ensures that data are constantly 
analyzed and coded. During this step of the process, preliminary thoughts and possible codes 
were recorded, in the form of memos (Charmaz, 2014).  
 
Data Analysis 
Interviews were transcribed from audio-recordings using a qualitative data analysis 
program (NVivo) to rigorously and systematically identify codes or thematic categories of the 
interview data. Transcripts were closely analyzed and compared to one another. The coding 
techniques used during the analysis can be described as “classifying or categorizing individual 
pieces of data coupled with some kind of retrieval system” (Babbie, 2012, p. 376).  
The codes were based off of recurring and broader themes that related to the research 
objective and research questions. The conceptual framework of the adaptive cycle model 
informed predetermined codes and space was also provided for the emergence of codes that were 
not predetermined and originated from recurring themes in the data. The first round of coding 
involved assigning words, phrases, and interview excerpts to the broad categories, then, axial 
coding was used to categorize themes from the interviews into sub-codes (Allen, 2017). When 
codes had a substantial number of references, an additional round of coding was conducted in 
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order to determine sub-codes. A codebook was developed to keep track of code categories, 
which were given dimensions in order to help consistently and systematically code all transcripts 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Dr. Thomsen and I also spent several sessions discussing data 
themes; during these meetings, data and themes were reorganized in order to assure themes and 
concepts of analysis were similar and consistent (Babbie, 2016). Lastly, to support intercoder 
reliability and limit the biases from one researcher, multiple colleagues were enlisted to review 
the transcripts, produce their own codes, and discuss any differences that emerged in the coding 
process (Huberman & Miles, 2002). One limitation to the data analysis was the inability to cross-
check the themes, linkages, and trends that emerged from the data with participants to assure 
accuracy and reliability. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE GROWTH OF A TROPHY HUNTING SYSTEM & 
THE BAN: AN EXTERNAL DISTURBANCE 
 
The R and K Phases: Growth of a Trophy hunting Tourism System [1986-2013] 
 
The relationship between people and wildlife in Botswana has experienced many 
changes; one of the systematic characteristics that defines this relationship is the Trophy hunting 
system. The adaptive cycle is a useful model to describe and track social-ecological systems 
through dynamic changes (Holling & Gunderson, 2001; Pelling & Manuel-Navarrete, 2011). The 
model frames systems according to four major periods of institutional stability, challenge, crisis, 
and reorganization, with the chance of social systems becoming frozen within any of those stages 
(ibid). This chapter focuses on the “growth” (r) and “conservation” (k) phases of the Trophy 
hunting system in Northern Botswana. Figure 7 shows the dates and key aspects of these phases. 
The growth (r) phase is the first phase of the adaptive cycle model and the social structures and 
components that define this system begin to take shape (Figure 7). Throughout this phase, the 
system is resilient and less stable, so different paths forward remain possible (Scheffer et al., 
2002). During, the conservation (k) phase, dominant structures and social agency begin to build, 
align, and reinforce one another and the system enters a state of highly institutionalized stability 
(Figure 7). As a system transitions from the r phase into the k phase, it begins to accumulate 
assets (whether that be natural or economic capital) that become more connected to one another 
and the system loses resilience (ibid). The results include participants’ perceptions of the 
ecological, economic, and sociocultural impacts of this system. 
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Figure 7. Key Aspects of the Growth Phase, Stabilization Phase, and Ban Disturbance of the Botswana Trophy hunting system. 
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Ecological Impacts 
Most participants discussed the ecological impacts of hunting tourism in two main ways: 
(1) the mitigation of human wildlife conflicts and (2) protection of wildlife from illegal 
harvesting. Alternatively, a few participants shared a relationship between hunting tourism and 
poaching activity, claiming that the industry actually fueled and promoted the demand for the 
illegal wildlife trade.  
 
Mitigation of Human-Wildlife Conflicts 
 Most participants reflected positively on hunting tourism’s capacity to induce fear in 
wildlife and keep them away from the villages to preserve their livelihoods and general safety. 
One person explained: “Animals are afraid of guns [and] will not come around.” Another 
individual shared that this relationship was especially evident with elephants, saying that 
elephants know that bullets are “…falling this side. So they run away from this.” One participant 
shared that trophy hunting was used as a wildlife management strategy: “…in this area, we will 
hunt close to the village. By doing that, we know elephants would move out. They would still 
come, but not in such a big number because they are clever.” 
 Some participants felt the hunting outfits specifically targeted the animals that were 
causing conflict in the villages. This concept of the hunter providing protection of the village is 
expressed by an interviewee as:  
 
“… if you check that stats of how many people were killed in the years that hunting was 
being done, the numbers were very minimal because elephants were pushed away. 
Remember, the hunters will patrol behind the village where you find the herds of 
elephants. For example, if you find a breeding herd of elephants, you scare it and push it 
back. But if you find a bull elephant with the right tusks, you shoot him, and if he is in a 
group, that group will move out.”  
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A few participants deviated from the popular opinion that hunting tourism induced fear in 
wildlife, and rather, that hunting caused wildlife to become more aggressive. Most people 
believed that hunting and provoking aggression in wildlife was still another effective strategy to 
mitigate human wildlife interactions. One individual shared that when animals are hunted, 
“…they don’t come back…they don’t go through that area, they use a different area, because 
they have learned that they have been shot. There is a belief that when you shoot animals, they 
become more aggressive. Obviously, they have to do that, but they become aggressive and then 
they get pushed out.” Sometimes the aggressive response of wildlife to hunting can be a result of 
the malpractice of the hunter as one participant shared: “Not everybody who hunts has the skills. 
Sometimes they don’t do it direct or in a good way.” 
  Others did not share an exact mechanism for how hunting helped control wildlife and 
reduce human-wildlife conflict, but knew this relationship to be true. With hunting tourism, 
participants viewed wildlife as “controlled,” because the hunts managed to reduce human 
wildlife interaction; Hunting “reduced the number of animals- the animals [that] used to roam 
around the village” and “…minimize[d] population[s] in the area.” Villagers felt “…we were 
safe because the number of animals were controlled…there were no more animals roaming 
around the village.”  
 
Protection of Wildlife and Relationship with Poaching 
There were mixed responses amongst participants regarding the relationship between 
trophy hunting tourism and wildlife protection. Most participants shared that trophy hunting 
tourism helped reduce the illegal harvest and trade of wildlife. Trophy hunting tourism catalyzed 
the creation of a group of local community escort guides, whom were tasked with multiple 
responsibilities. They ensured that hunting operations upheld quota and ethical regulations, 
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monitored and recorded wildlife population abundance estimates, reported human wildlife 
incidents, and patrolled the villages’ concessions for illegal tourist and poaching activity.  
One individual described the guides’ role as “recording all activities that they come 
across within our concession area, should it be a lion coming to the village killing either a goat 
or….when they found that some people, they suspect that had been poaching…in the area, they 
report with the Department of Wildlife.” Sometimes, the escort guides were the first to observe 
and record any poaching incident, as one individual said “…we were 99.9% witnessing the 
poaching event before any DWNP and other military.” One participant shared that if a tourist 
hunter encountered an animal that was not included in their assigned quota and an escort guide 
was not present during that hunt, that animal may be killed illegally: “…and those people [trophy 
hunters]…find an elephant here, they kill it. But if an escort is there, this animal cannot be 
killed.”  
 In addition to monitoring potential illegal activity of outsiders, the community escort 
guides also police the village for any signs of law-breaking, a role that was revealed in one 
individual’s shares: 
“When the CBNRM program came, the main issue was trying to solve this issue of 
human wildlife conflict and also create conservation and create employment… So in the 
community we had the attitude change…We kill with control and then we get benefits 
that are coming directly to the village. So the community has to set community escort 
guides and that is the group that are patrolling the area to see if there is any illegal 
activity. We can even report their own community member to the Wildlife [Authority] or 
to the police.” 
 
 One of the benefits of trophy hunting tourism is that it supported local conservation 
through an increased willingness to report any localized illegal wildlife activity. One participant 
reinforced this point, saying that:  
“The local people- when they are up in the forest…they are able to report to law 
enforcers [and say] ‘we see some tracks here that we suspect. We found an elephant here 
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that is dead, but it looks like it has bullet holes. We see here that there is a carcass, but it 
looks like it was skinned and not eaten by carnivores.’ They have been doing that.”  
 
 However, it is notable to mention that these statements about the reduction of local illegal 
harvesting came from local government leaders and not individuals in the community, which 
suggests that these sentiments may not be as widespread at a community level. One individual 
directly refuted the assumption that locals even poach by saying, “Sankuyo people do not do 
poaching; poaching is mostly done by those people who are in power. Mostly based on trophy 
hunting, the people in power, they can hire a person…They can come and kill an elephant 
because they know their channel of communication.”  
 Participants shared how trophy hunting tourism acted as a de facto anti-poaching unit 
whose physical presence in the bush was effective at deterring illegal harvesting of wildlife. For 
instance, one participant expressed that, “…[the poachers] realize- no in this area there is 
hunting...How will you poach when everyone is looking at you?” Additionally, hunters provide 
monitoring of remote areas that are more vulnerable to poaching: “…poaching happens in areas 
where they don’t have any activity. Like very inaccessible areas, where photographic guys don’t 
reach. But we as hunters, we reach those areas…where poaching will take place.” However, this 
belief of hunting operations as benevolent and essential overseers of wildlife is challenged by 
others’ perceptions of hunting malpractice.  
 When participants spoke of any negative ecological impacts of hunting tourism, they 
voiced concern about outfits exceeding quotas and the different conservation ethic when hunting 
is done for “business” and not “consumption.” Within these sparse voices, the major concern was 
how hunting tourism might have led to a decrease in wildlife species. Only one participant 
shared that “the numbers were dwindling.” Another participant who echoed this concern 
qualified it by saying there was a decrease in some wildlife species “…but not elephants. 
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Elephants were still in large numbers.” Alternatively, one participant shared that the arrival of 
hunting tourism made it more difficult to detect illegal activity in the landscape: “Maybe they 
were competing because they know that there is hunting. Maybe some people here, they hear the 
sound of the gun and say maybe they are hunters even though they are poaching.”  
 Hunting tourism malpractice could manifest as hunting too many animals, hunting the 
wrong individuals of the species, or hunting a different species, all of which locals recognize as 
having negative implications for the populations. One participant said that “…There is a procedure 
whereby you have to shoot the old, but some [of the trophy hunters] don’t want to shoot the old. 
They will shoot even the young ones or the females who are going to give birth.” In addition, locals 
may find a way to hunt an animal that is not included in their assigned quota. As one participant 
elaborated “…sometimes we just open hunting for the birds. But these guys [locals] don’t hunt the 
birds, like guinea fowl. These guys are hunting the springbok and the antelope. When they go to 
Wildlife [DWNP], they just want the permit for the birds. But they don’t shoot the birds. They just 
shoot the antelope.” 
 A few individuals expressed that hunting tourism fueled a market for the illegal harvest of 
wildlife. One participant shared that with “…hunting comes very serious repercussions- including 
poaching, including trafficking.” Another individual suggested that non-Batswana guides are more 
likely to get involved in illegal trade schemes and are also less likely to report illegal activity to 
the authorities: “When you take Batswana only, it’s good. Because Batswana cannot go and collect 
and do anything. I trust Batswana.” One person shared that any individual who works in hunting 
tourism, Motswana or not, is susceptible to getting lured into the illegal trade market. He shared 
that anyone working in the hunting operations do have a unique understanding of the routine 
movements of anti-poaching units, making it easier for them to execute inconspicuous illegal 
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operations. For example, “I will know that the soldiers are stopping this side, wildlife is stopping 
this side, I can use the way to shoot. To be a poacher, it’s not the people who don’t understand that 
bush- to be a poacher is the one who knows that bush, they are the one who is going to destroy 
that things.” These statements challenge, albeit weakly (due to their sparse representation within 
the greater sample size), others’ more prominent claims that hunting tourism solely contributes to 
monitoring and protecting wildlife.  
Economic Impacts 
The arrival of trophy hunting tourism had mostly positive economic impacts by providing 
jobs, supporting extant livelihoods, and creating a substantial source of income for the 
communities. There are also some challenges within these changes associated with the type of 
benefits accrued and their distribution within the villages and amongst stakeholders. 
 
Employment 
 
More than half of the participants shared that hunting tourism generated positive 
employment opportunities for members of the communities. Interviewees shared that “…people 
were benefitting from hunting…because there [were] some businesses with the hunting…And 
the joint venture hired a large percentage of the village.” One individual who worked as an escort 
guide reflected on self-sufficiency and pride that came with his job: “Because I was working and 
having something at the end of the day, I was helping myself.” Additionally, locals felt these 
jobs with hunting outfits were well paid: “People were being paid extra money than in 
photographic.” Locals became “regular” hires for the hunting outfits, creating the sense of job 
security within the villages: “…And after six months, when the hunting season starts, they will 
come back and rehire those people again. That is one of the advantages of hunting that we saw 
when it comes to sustainable employment. And it paid better.”  
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Hunting tourism provided jobs through the outfits in skinning, tracking, serving, cooking, 
guarding, and guiding. Participants felt that these jobs properly aligned with their skillsets and 
provided equal opportunities: “In hunting, all households, they were equal. People were just 
taken equal.” Another individual further endorsed hunting tourism for its economic impacts 
because: “…the hunting department was employing more employees- you have the experience 
and the qualifications- it was taking more people, those who are not educated and everybody was 
very happy. That’s why it was good.”  
Despite these benefits, participants also recognized that trophy hunting failed to provide 
enough jobs and sometimes chose to hire people from beyond the communities. An individual 
revealed that: “The hunting camp was employing only …12 people and it was seasonal.” And 
another person shared that many companies were outsourcing hunting jobs to foreigners: “What I 
hated most about hunting was that most of the companies here were outside professional hunters, 
foreigners. They were not locals.” This person emphasized that hunting’s “high” employment 
statistics could have actually been a result of foreign hires: “They were mainly foreigners, which 
means that they increased unemployment in Botswana. Because if Batswana were given the 
opportunity to conduct hunting, then there would be more employment.” 
In regards to professional development, participants mentioned that there were few ways 
to accelerate and advance into other higher paying positions with greater responsibilities. 
One individual spoke of the requirements to become a professional hunting guide, comparing the 
process to the arduous one that a photographic safari guide endures: “…you have to know the 
animal tracks, the direction they are traveling- all this information that the hunter needs is the 
same that the photographic guide will use. The only difference is the use of weapon.” However, 
costs for certifications were an inhibiting factor as one local said, “Locals were only hired mainly 
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as trackers. But the training for you to have a PH [professional hunter] license, you have to go 
through the DWNP, which means that most of the Batswana don’t have that access to train 
because they don’t have money to do the training.”  
 
Community Benefits 
 
Individuals expressed how income from hunting tourism provided benefits to the entire 
community. One individual explained that before CBNRM’s creation of trusts, people used to 
buy licenses from the government to hunt in a “raffle system.” However, this system was 
ineffective because people were over-hunting and “…arguing about not getting their license.” He 
shared that the government resolved these issues by starting CBNRM and the trusts “…so that 
everyone could benefit.” Another individual shared that in the old system “….not everyone was 
benefitting…[the CBNRM policy] was geared towards spreading the money or the benefits 
equally...when the money is given to a trust ,that money is divided amongst the villages.” This 
distribution of funds from hunting tourism engendered a feeling of equity within the villages: 
“….the lifestyle was much better because everyone had income.”  
Interviewees described how the funding from hunting supported opportunities for 
community projects. One person explained this process: “When there was hunting, this trust got 
money from hunting and then there is a committee [VDC] that runs the development for the 
village. That committee asks for the money from the trust to make some developments for the 
village.” Some of these developments have brought amenities like a health clinic or improved 
water access, reducing their need to travel distances and decreasing interactions with wildlife.  
With trophy hunting, many participants grew to appreciate wildlife as the harbingers of 
income into their communities, whether that be through hunting quotas or land rentals. One 
individual said that receiving these monetary benefits from wildlife has become somewhat of a 
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right, in exchange for the sacrifices they have made to their livelihoods: “We have spent money 
on the protection of animals for the last three decades. The country should begin to reap where it 
has sowed. Tourism as the second biggest foreign currency after mining will even become bigger 
and better and better with hunting.”  
 Collective funds from trophy hunting tourism were used to help diversify the economy 
and provide professional opportunities. One participant, who lived in CECT, shared that their 
trust “…managed to build Ngoma Safari Lodge. That was an initiative of the CECT because of 
the proceeds of hunting.” In addition, if the trust had more income, they were able to “employ 
more kids to the campsites, to look after the campsite, to look after the clients” and also “…send 
people to school to training institutions.” 
Few participants expressed negative aspects of how the funds were distributed from 
hunting. For example, the income created an even greater economic divide between the elite and 
others in the communities: “…those who say that the hunting was good…are the ones that got 
something. Rich people are getting something [from hunting]- they are using the poor people.” 
One person referred to economic inequity between the communities and the hunting outfits, 
claiming that “…most of the owners of those hunting safaris had banks outside of Botswana. So, 
they are paying less tax here and benefitting more for their countries.” Withstanding these 
individuals, most of the comments about the collective economic benefits of trophy hunting 
tourism were positive.  
 
Meat from Hunting 
 
 During hunting tourism, there was an increased sense of food security within the 
community through the distribution of meat. Individuals stated “We were eating a lot of food” 
and “I can say maybe that I just like hunting. It can just feed the community.” When citizens 
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could no longer traditionally hunt, hunting outfits were tasked with the responsibility of 
providing meat for the villages. One person described the benefit of meat to the community: 
“When it is hunting season, those communities living in the wildlife areas normally have 
improved nutrition. The carcass of the slaughtered animals provide so much meat proteins. They 
are bread and butter for the communities affected for the high-end tourism.” Meat was something 
that everyone could benefit from: “Hunting [tourism] was very good. When they killed the 
animal, that animal was brought to the community. Those who were destitute and other people 
who could not give themselves anything, they were just given the meat for themselves to cook.”  
One person remarked on the irony of only being able to eat elephant meat if it is killed by 
a foreign hunter instead of traditional hunting. They expressed gratitude and then dependence: “It 
is not allowed for you- only yourself to kill an elephant for survival, as a person in the village to 
kill an elephant for survival. But during hunting time, when guests come and kill the elephant, 
then they will take it to the community for survival meat. It benefitted us more than I can 
believe.” According to one individual, the provision of meat supports their belief that the 
communities are the true owners and stewards of the wildlife: “…these white people- they take 
the skin of the elephant and then me, myself- as the owner of the elephant- they give me the 
meat.” 
 
Governance 
 
 CBNRM and the trusts prioritized leadership skills that differed to the traditional 
government. According to a few participants, these new skills included reading, writing, English 
fluency, and business acumen. One interviewee spoke of this transition as a “problem” for their 
village:  
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“…They [the government] was just sitting and tell us we want people, people who can 
read and write…We have one madala- he was an old man- he didn’t know about trade, he 
didn’t know about write. He was the one, he was a chairperson when our trust was 
starting…he tried to pick up our community, so our community was having money by 
that time. But…the man said, we want the people [who] can read and write, then.” 
 
Even amongst these institutional changes, some traditional political structures remained 
intact. For example, the kgotla, which the official meeting area for the villages, has served and 
continues to serve as a mechanism for public assembly and deliberation of new ideas. The Kgosi 
may not retain the sole power to manage wildlife, but they still play a role in local governance.  
 
Inter-governmental Collaboration 
 Based on participants’ reflections regarding the efficacy of the CBO, it is difficult to 
deduce whether or not this change from traditional structures to CBNRM achieved the goal of 
involving communities in natural resource management. Several participants embraced the CBO 
and CBNRM, expressing improved collaboration between the communities and the state. After 
the institution of trophy hunting tourism and the trusts, the state government and communities 
began to establish hunting quotas together. One person shared how this collaboration is now 
considered essential to the proper management of wildlife: “…here in Botswana, for decisions 
[on quotas] to be made, it is made by the government. They will decide that motion and then it 
will be done in the Parliament whereby there will be a debate, then after that, it is said that the 
whole nation will make an agreement on that issue. We cannot make that decision on our own.” 
To mediate potential power imbalances, one former BOT member explained that although 
“…the [federal] government is the mother board,” there are members of the government 
departments that serve on an expert “Technical Advisory Committee (TAC)” that works directly 
with the BOT to negotiate mutually beneficial agreements with tendering safari companies.  
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 Economic benefits from CBNRM agreements with the trophy hunting and photo tourism 
companies provided traditional village bodies with a renewed sense of responsibility in 
governance. For instance, the Village Development Committee, which is an elected group of 
villagers that “protect[s] the life of the community or the life of the people [in the village]…. the 
ones who are assessing what people need and their living style” was able to be more proactive in 
village development projects with the increased influx of CBNRM funds. In some cases, this 
increased productivity translated into greater collaboration and communication with the state 
government. One person claimed, “When the government brings the development, they go to the 
VDC office. They talk about developing the village, how people live in the village, what they 
need, and what they need.” When asked if they thought if the collaboration between the VDC, 
the state, and the CBO was effective, one individual responded affirmatively,  
 
“For now people are happy with it, because each village and community decide how they 
want to use the money. It is not any individual who is benefitting, but the community at 
large. The VDC will call for a committee meeting today and will give them the report 
that you have this amount at [X]. Each time they give the reports, that money will stay at 
[X]. Every time that the community wants to use that money, they will write a letter to 
get that money…” 
 
Most participants spoke fondly of the CBO’s community escort guides, which became a 
key part in maintaining the villages’ presence in and connection to the land and wildlife. The 
guides were responsible for “taking care of the environment”, doing “animal counts,” and 
“making sure there is no poaching.” These communities utilized the community escort guides as 
a way to reduce wildlife conflict: “…whereby they would suspect that the lion had been coming 
to the village during the night, they alert the community members… at the same time, doing 
some night patrol around the village, so that if any chance they can see the lion, just try to scare 
it away from the village.”  
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Sociocultural Impacts 
 
Trophy hunting tourism prompted significant sociocultural change within the 
communities, such as a rapid dissolution of cultural identity founded in hunting traditions and the 
problematic integration of subsistence and market-oriented perceptions of wildlife.  
 
A Different Conservation Ethic 
 
Hunting tourism and CBNRM changed local communities’ relationship with the natural 
world. One individual shared that they “…grew up being encouraged to do conservation at 
school…some years back there used to be no controlled hunting, but people were hunters and 
gatherers. But when this CBNRM policy came, it changed my mind. When I look at an animal, I 
think of conservation and not killing. Even I will teach my kids that now. You must conserve 
this. They mean something important to our country.” This repackaging of subsistence hunting 
for meat as “anti-conservation” was contradictory to the communities’ traditional conservation 
ethic. An elder and member of the San tribe in Mababe described this change as:  
“They [the communities] used to manage hunting during the [traditional] hunting. People 
used to know which kind of wild animals they have to eat so that it cannot get eliminated 
or get finished. They have that experience with how to manage their lives with eating this 
beast. The government now has stopped this hunting for the Bushmen now. The 
Bushpeople now are not living their good life.”  
 
Participants described how practicing their traditional hunting skills was a way to 
commune with and promote healthy ecosystems. One person shared: “Hunting was for us, was 
very important for our land. Because we got a lot of animals in the land. Rich of animals.” 
Hunting was a way for villagers to embody the vision that they have for conservation and 
sustainability as described by one interviewee: “Our ancestors and grandparents valued, 
respected wildlife…they hunted for future use.” The arrival of hunting tourism shifted the 
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responsibility of the villages as stewards of wildlife and the land to the state government and in 
some cases, to the hunting operations.  
The implementation of CBNRM was intended to empower rural communities in natural 
resource management and although it certainly has its challenges, most people recognize its 
symbolism of reclamation and its collaborative intentions. One individual perceived trophy 
hunting tourism and CBRNM as a way to build on the communities’ management knowledge 
and skills: “CBNRM is just a product of tomorrow. For it to come is because our natural 
resources were visible to the government. Then they thought to improve upon our traditional 
skills of taking care of our resources.”   
 
Greater Tolerance of Wildlife  
 
One individual shared that tourism’s strong monetary value of natural resources has 
changed the meaning of their village, claiming that there is “…no more a community village- it 
is a community business area…everything you see is money to us. The tree you see is money. 
Everything you see, you see it is money, because it is a business area.” Another participant 
perceived this capitalist appropriation of wildlife to be problematic when superimposed with the 
subsistence conservation ethic of the villages: “if I am given the chance to kill an impala, I will 
sell the whole impala and because where I live, maybe there is nothing because I sold the whole 
impala, so I am forced to go and hunt again. If you kill animals for selling, it causes more 
damage than killing animals for consumption.” This person is suggesting that the market-
oriented perception of wildlife may ultimately place extra pressure on wildlife. 
The practice of hunting tourism generated perceptions of wildlife as being harbingers of 
benefits and in turn, communities became more comfortable accepting certain costs from 
wildlife, like crop raiding and fence destruction. Trophy hunting promoted a sense of ownership 
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and greater tolerance for wildlife:  
 
“…take for example, you know that an elephant is destroying your field. You know we 
have also something, in return, maybe in the form of something like a house built for 
you- not directly from that particular elephant, but as proceedings from the elephant 
being hunted. So I think that hunting helped our community alter their perceptions in a 
right position, even if maybe they say, an elephant destroyed my house today- I might not 
get compensated directly by the Wildlife department- but maybe in a way, Botswana 
there will be hunting somewhere, an elephant will be hunted there. Hunting helped bring 
a good perspective to the community members in regard to that.” 
 
 When asked if there were any negative aspects about trophy hunting, some individuals 
could not think of any examples, asserting that “there were no negative things” and “no 
challenges.” People reiterated that “life was much better”, “hunting was good for us,” and 
“everything” was better. Despite this support, in the mid 2010s, a state mandate calling for a 
nation-wide hunting ban served as a disruption to the Trophy hunting system and the old ways of 
functioning within the system were no longer viable.  
 As most of the reflections on the hunting system focus on the ‘k’ phase and are positive, 
most negative feedback are attributed to CBNRM and the photo tourism industry. When 
referring to negative changes, like the dissolution of cultural identity founded in hunting 
traditions and local or state capture of benefits, many participants did not blame trophy hunting 
tourism. Instead, they associated these changes with the more encompassing structure of 
CBNRM which facilitated hunting. For example, some people took issue with the integration of 
the traditional and the state sponsored CBO governments, pointing out problematic power 
dynamics and divisiveness within the communities regarding their level of trust for the CBO 
governments. Another individual claimed that the gradual dispossession of his tribe’s traditional 
lands “started around the same time as the trust thing started.” Both of these critiques focus on 
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CBNRM and do not acknowledge the fundamental role that trophy hunting tourism played in 
catalyzing CBNRM (Campbell, 1973).  
 
The Ban: An External Disturbance [2014] 
 
In the fall of 2012, the former President of Botswana, Lieutenant General Ian Khama, 
announced at a public meeting in Maun, that no hunting licenses would be issued after 2013 and 
that all hunting in Botswana would be banned by 2014 (Boyes, 2012).  The Botswana 
government cited a decline in wildlife as the main reason for the ban (Mbaiwa, 2015; Blackie, 
2019), which covered both subsistence and commercial practices (excluding those done on 
privately held, independent game farms, which are found in Western Botswana) (LaRocco, 
2016). Upon announcing this decision, the government referenced a 2011 study conducted by 
scientist leaders of the international non-profit organization, Elephants Without Borders, which 
attributed this decline in wildlife populations to hunting, poaching, human encroachment, habitat 
fragmentation, drought, and veldt fires (Chase, 2011).  
The government initiated workshops to discuss potential impacts of a moratorium on 
hunting. The exact agenda and types of discussions that took place throughout these workshops 
is unclear, but it is notable that most respondents in this study did not acknowledge that the 
workshops took place. Some participants involved in these sessions (i.e. academics, communities 
living in wildlife areas, conservationists, scientists, the Botswana Wildlife Management 
Association, and NGOs) opposed the hunting ban. In addition to local and regional opposition, 
there is marginal scientific evidence directly linking Botswana’s trophy hunting industry to 
declines in wildlife populations (Mbaiwa, 2015). However, the government followed through 
with the ban, stating that the issuance of hunting licenses had encouraged poaching and the 
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declines in wildlife, while inhibiting the sustained growth in the photo tourism industry (Boyes, 
2012). 
In the adaptive cycle model, the 2014 hunting ban serves as a disturbance to Botswana’s 
Trophy hunting system. The impacts of the ban across the nation, especially on the CBNRM 
regime, are complex and unequal. The ban placed novel external pressure on the dominant 
institutions that had formed to support the trophy hunting industry, rural development, and 
wildlife conservation. The Trophy hunting system entered a phase of “release” () whereby 
certain resources and capital that had reinforced those dominant institutions “scattered” (Holling 
& Gunderson, 2001; Sheffer et al., 2002). During this ‘’ phase, the system experienced 
profound stress; the rigidity that had allowed the system to institutionalize dissipates, creating 
space for internal and latent diverse components to take root and express themselves in the next 
phase of “reorganization” ().  
 
Wildlife Population Estimates  
Community members attributed the government’s rationale for the hunting ban to 
declining wildlife populations. For example, several respondents echoed one person’s belief that: 
“the reason that prompted the government to do the hunting ban was because the numbers were 
dwindling. The numbers were going down.” Another individual commented: “it didn’t take long 
for government to reverse hunting and say that hunting should stop because conservationists 
thought number of animals going down and needed to allow wildlife to regrow.” Some 
interviewees shared the concern about changing wildlife numbers as: “I think the hunting was 
dropped because the numbers of wild animals. It seems like it was dropping down.” Similarly, 
there was sentiment that the government was assessing the situation: “It was another move which 
the government saw fit- let’s stop the hunting for now, let’s check these numbers. Let’s allow 
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them to multiply.” One individual reflected on personal observations of wildlife declines as “The 
government stopped the hunting because they said that the number of animals are going down, 
like lions…because there was a shortage of lions in our area.” It is important to note that lion 
hunting was banned in 2001 and lions were not amongst the animals included in hunting tourism 
before the 2014 ban. 
When asked about the reasons for the ban, many respondents indicated that they were not 
well informed about the decision. One individual shared, “We were just told [the] hunting ban 
[is] in place because the numbers of animals have gone down. And which animals, how and why, 
was it hunting? Some of us are not very well informed about that.” Another participant felt that 
the investigations did not properly address the specific ecological and social aspects of their 
village: “you can’t use the same decision that you can decide for Maun to [X] because they are 
two different places.” This person indicated that a decline in wildlife may not have been a 
universal problem; therefore, a universal hunting ban may not have been the most effective 
solution. 
Others expressed distrust with population data that have been used to inform the decision 
for the hunting ban. For instance, one person shared that the experience of the animals on the 
ground did not match the science that they believed informed the ban: “…scientists are saying 
the number of animals are going down, while on the ground, it shows that the number of animals 
are almost growing daily. We used to have elephants in the northern and northeastern sides of the 
country, but as we speak, we have elephants as far as the southern part. Back in the day, it was 
very rare to find an elephant near the capital city.” One participant indicated that many species 
being hunted, like elephants and buffaloes, still have healthy populations: “Most of the animals 
that were interested by the hunters were elephants, buffaloes, which according to that research, 
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we had still had good numbers. Yes, there wasn't any clear reason why simply hunting has to 
stop.”  
However, when explaining how and why the ban happened, there were also respondents 
whom called into question the raw data in the research. For example, one interviewee expressed 
the connection to personal interests:  
 
“We have elephants- which in Botswana, they say that we have around 150,000 to 
200,000. I’m not sure…the numbers keep changing. According to your interests, I can 
put the number to my interests. Because the researcher, I think put the number to 100,000 
who advises the president and said that the number of elephants was reducing and things 
like that. So that is how the decision came to be.” 
 
 
Lack of Community Consultation 
 
In addition to declining wildlife numbers, participants associated the hunting ban with 
lack of consultation between the state government and the local communities, which may explain 
why there was such diversity in perceptions of the government’s rationale for banning hunting. 
The majority of individuals felt that the communities were excluded and not properly consulted. 
People shared their shock with the news as: “And it never came in a proper way in ‘how is 
hunting? Should we stop it?’ so we can throw ideas. It just came from the Parliament saying 
there is no hunting anymore. So what can we do? Just accept this situation.” Another participant 
shared how quickly the news of the ban unfolded: “When the ban was announced, it was just 
announced. They never came and consulted anyone about it” and “It was very hard because they 
didn’t even come to us and tell us that the hunting will stop.” 
 Several participants called the ban “…a personal decision by the president” because 
“…maybe the top guy didn’t want animals to be killed.” Some individuals were not surprised by 
this decision: “mostly what I have observed is that whoever gets into power, they have their own 
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agenda, like elsewhere in the world… our former president was very much interested in animals 
and conservation, so hunting for him maybe was a bad thing.” 
 An individual spoke to the invaluable importance of consultation in making sustainable 
and inclusive decisions:  
“If you don’t consult, you say I am not part of you. You consult me because you 
appreciate and know that I am a shareholder. And if you are a shareholder, that means 
there is ownership…So it means that you recognize that I own that product or that natural 
resource…the fact that you don’t consult me is showing that you know that I don’t own 
that. It means that the sense of ownership has been insulted by not consulting…It 
happens everywhere.” 
 
There was only one individual who believed that the trusts and communities were 
properly included in the decision to ban trophy hunting tourism:  
“When people are saying President Khama is taking uninformed decisions, I was very 
touched because I was saying this is not right…Because I was part of the board... In 2008 
when this tourism meetings started, when they were discussing the hunting 
ban…for...five years, every year, there was a tourism meeting….” After these meetings, 
“…they got back to their homes, they reported to their communities saying that this is 
what is going to happen with the hunting ban…it was a process…not something that was 
a decision that was just made then and there.”  
 
 This apparent oversight of the government clearly left an indelible impact on people 
within these communities, as, years later, they were “…still wondering why they were not 
consulted.” With little consultation, the government seemed unaware of the needs of the villages 
related to trophy hunting tourism: “When the ban was instilled, the community complained. 
They said, but why do you stop the hunting now? How will the community survive?” 
 Many shared that the government failed to promote the growth of the photo-tourism 
industry as an alternative type of tourism in the areas that were to be most affected by the 
hunting ban. For example, “There was nothing that had been coming in from the government 
side to cover that hunting ban assertion….Just dropped there. Just a hunting ban. and then the 
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government went away from us…The government would have promoted lodges or photographic 
by their decision. So it sounds like a negligence during that period.” In addition, the state’s 
ignorance regarding communities’ various dependencies on hunting tourism created new issues 
over access to resources that persisted at the local level.   
 This decision to ban hunting contradicted community involvement as the basic principle 
of CBNRM. One individual reflected:  
“…when CBNRM was introduced on the early '90s, the policy states clearly that it was 
established to try and uplift the lives of people living around the animals, the 
communities living around animals. The better way of improving their lives is to listen to 
them, maybe get some advice from them, engage them before you can make any decision 
of such kind. They should be engaged, maybe have part on how best they can be done or 
just being controlled, you're just doing some new policies, whereby they haven't been 
engage. Some policies work against them.” 
 
The international community was also mentioned as a group that influenced the hunting 
ban decision. One respondent shared: “Other countries say, how can country like Botswana be 
slaughtering animals? It’s not good for us who want to see them!” When other individuals placed 
the international community at the center of the ban, they spoke with chagrin, acknowledging 
that the nation financially depends on other countries, but frustrated that their values should play 
such a great role in the nation’s wildlife management decisions:  
“Nowadays, the government is controlled by foreigners- somebody overseas in Britain, 
America- who is saying that if you kill them, we are not going to buy your diamond… 
That somebody is the one who is regulating. That is why things are like this. Because 
now we depend on somebody who is overseas. I don’t know who is this somebody.”  
 
When talking about the international community in the context of the hunting ban, one 
participant referenced specific entities: “….[the hunting ban] was just a personal interest by the 
sitting president of the time… all the guys that I know who are really close friends of him who 
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were now pushing for photographic tourism. So those guys sit on one of the boards of Nat Geo 
[National Geographic]. So when Nat Geo says something- the whole world answers.”  
Amongst the participants, there was limited agreement in the government’s rationale for 
the hunting ban, suggesting that most community members and leaders were not properly 
consulted in the making of the decision. These mixed responses support participants’ feelings 
that the ban happened abruptly and unexpectedly. The communities did not feel included in the 
decision and that those that were involved in the decision were “outsiders” who do not live with 
the day-to-day impacts. 
 
Discussion 
Key Aspects of Growth [1986-2002] 
 
 “Growth” or “exploitation” (r) is the first stage that a social-ecological system 
experiences (Gunderson, 2000; Holling & Gunderson, 2001; Scheffer et al., 2002). The colonial 
rationalization and motivations for trophy hunting, which best suited the interests of the British 
Crown, provided the institutions and norms that dictated the growth of the modern Trophy 
hunting system (Adams, 2004). Specifically, imperial trophy hunts, the beginnings of a colonial 
game reserve system, and strict citizen hunting regulations of the 1880s-1960s provided new 
institutions of conservation and protectionism that informed natural resource access and 
management in late 20th and early 21st centuries in Botswana (MacKenzie, 1988; Adams, 2004). 
The Trophy hunting system began to experience growth in the 1990s, under the guidance of the 
CBNRM regime. The late 20th century adoption of CBNRM in Botswana increased the 
expansion of commercial wildlife markets into rural villages (the ‘r’ phase), which led to the 
formation and distinction of economic and social structures that promoted the exploitation of 
wildlife and the growth of consumptive and non-consumptive wildlife-based tourism industries. 
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 When Botswana became an independent country in 1966, it inherited a centralized 
wildlife governance system and the national government was concerned that conflict of land use 
would contribute to declines in wildlife populations (Kelly & Gupta, 2016). In response, 
Botswana gradually adopted the CBNRM program and made wildlife tourism an official activity 
in 1986; within this CBNRM program, landholders were granted user rights to wildlife and 
commercial uses of wildlife were encouraged and regulated (Child et al., 2002). An increasing 
global demand for wildlife-based tourism and a new community-based governance framework 
marked the “exploitation” or “growth” phases that eventually led to a trophy hunting institution. 
Through CBNRM, rural communities can financially benefit from the hunting tourism sector; 
this connection is one of the more powerful arguments in the pro-hunting discourse, which has 
helped justify the trophy hunting tourism industry and allowed it to become a key fixture in 
stabilizing and defining Botswana’s Trophy hunting system (Mbaiwa, 2004; Swatuk, 2005).   
 
Key Aspects of Stabilization [2003-2013] 
 
During the period of ‘stability’ (k), trophy hunting tourism is at its greatest potential 
(Holling et al., 2002). In this phase of the adaptive cycle model, dominant social structures 
gradually build, align, and reinforce one another in a system as the system enters into a state of 
highly institutionalized stability (k) (Pelling & Manuel-Navarrete, 2011; Scheffer et al. 2002; 
Walker et al. 2002). CBNRM was the dominant institutional structure, the trophy hunting and 
photo-tourism industries thrived, and wildlife-based tourism became the second greatest 
economic sector in Botswana. 
The Trophy hunting system played a significant role in initiating CBNRM in sub-Saharan 
African countries (Kelly & Gupta, 2016); when it came time for the national government to 
devolve user rights to rural villages and facilitate community ownership over these resources, the 
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trophy hunting companies were already viable and attractive potential partners to help facilitate 
this transfer. Most of the participants’ perceptions of the Trophy hunting system reflect the 
system’s ‘k phase’, when it was at its highest potential, had become a stabilizing element of 
people’s lives, and was generating significant benefits for the communities.  
 According to this study’s participants, the certain aspects that defined the stabilization 
phase of the hunting system were an increase in communal funds, greater employment 
opportunities, an increase in social welfare projects, more viable crop farms, and less conflict 
with wildlife. It is difficult to pin-point the exact time when the system transitioned from the 
growth to conservation phase based solely on this study’s participant data; to create more of a 
specific timeline, it is helpful to bring in secondary data from the government’s records. The 
number of villages registered with CBNRM and the number of hunting quotas issued can be both 
symbols and drivers of the growth and institutionalization of the Trophy hunting system.  
 Two main aspects of the stabilization phase were an increase in the number of villages 
participating in CBNRM in Botswana and multi-year consistency in the number of hunting 
quotas issued by the government. According to the National CBNRM Forum, the number of 
registered CBOs has vacillated between 67 CBOs in 2003, to 106 in 2012, to 94 in 2015 
(USAID, 2016). However, only 12% of the total registered CBOs in all of Botswana were 
participating in trophy hunting tourism during its last year in 2012 (Mbaiwa, 2012). Even though 
trophy hunting tourism was directly benefitting only 13 registered CBOs, it was still considered 
an invaluable contributor to the economy and status of wildlife conservation both at local and 
national scales in Botswana (Masisi, 2019).  
 According to participants, their experiences of the stable phase of the hunting system was 
most defined by the wealth it accumulated for their communities. This accumulation of monetary 
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wealth can be observed through statistics that describe the amount of economic loss the CBOs 
incur after hunting was banned. For example, CECT experienced an annual income dropping 
from P6.5 million to P3.5 million in 2014 and lost about 15 jobs within its community (USAID, 
2016). Income generated from tourism in Sankuyo Village dropped from P3.5 million to P1.8 
million and the Trust experienced 35 job losses and Mababe adopted their economic activities 
from handicraft and hunting to ecotourism and lost a considerable amount of income from this 
transition (ibid). 
If the number of quotas issued to CBOs is a valid indicator of the stability of the Trophy 
hunting system, then it seems that the system reached its zenith in the mid 2000s. Upon closer 
look at the number of quotas issued in the Ngamiland District, it appears that the trophy hunting 
industry may have stabilized and reached its “peak” phase during the mid 2000s (see Figure 5), 
at license totals of 1,079 and 1,049. In the last few years before the hunting ban, the number of 
quotas decreased significantly each year. These numbers do not include the number of quotas 
issued in the Chobe District, which is Botswana’s other popular area for trophy hunts. 
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Figure 5. Annual Wildlife Quota in Ngamiland District 2000-2012. Missing data from 2012, 
which is the last year in which hunting licenses were issued. 
 
 
 
 
Lack of Stakeholder Engagement for the Ban 
 
In general, communities did not feel that they were adequately consulted on the decision 
for the ban and the decision to ban hunting served as a disturbance that left the communities’ 
economically, politically, and culturally vulnerable. Blackie 2019 found that 66.3% of the 
households surveyed in their study on the impacts of the hunting ban in CBOs in the Ngamiland 
and Chobe Districts, felt that they were “merely informed” that the ban was happening and only 
5.9% agreed that they were properly consulted regarding the decision to ban. There were many 
speculations about the reasons for the ban, which included a decrease in wildlife populations, the 
influence of an anti-hunting international conservation ethic, and personal politics of the 
president. Consultation of the communities may have provided authorities more of a 
comprehensive evaluation of hunting tourism. Studies (Manfredo et al., 2004; Treves et al., 
2006) have noted the importance of community engagement in addressing natural resource 
 
 74 
issues, and specifically, those that involve human wildlife conflicts. Dickman (2010) suggests 
that one way to address social factors that contribute to human wildlife conflict and achieve long 
lasting conflict resolution is to broaden the study approach from species-specific conflicts to 
looking at the wider socio-economic, cultural, economic conditions under which these conflicts 
happen. A few practical solutions to engage communities in the process of resolving natural 
resource issues are: initiating and supporting local task forces to represent community needs in 
decision-making processes (McKinney & Harmon, 2007), integrating workshops to educate 
community members on the dimensions of an issue and utilizing innovative learning tools (Lee, 
2013), and initiating joint fact-finding missions to integrate the community’s knowledge and 
experience of the issue in higher level decision-making processes (Bingham, 2003).  
The presence and integration of diverse stakeholder perspectives in governance can be an 
indicator of a resilient and adaptive system that has greater capacity to function in the face of 
disturbance (Folke et al., 2002; Ballard & Belsky, 2010). Stakeholder consultation can prevent 
the implementation of detrimental and unsustainable resource management decisions (McKinney 
& Harmon, 2007). Naidoo et al., 2016’s study simulated a trophy hunting ban in Namibian 
conservancies; the simulated ban significantly reduced the number of conservancies that could 
cover their operating costs, possibly negatively affecting incentives for conservation on 
communal lands (Naidoo et al., 2016). Blackie’s 2019 study on the impact of a hunting ban on 
rural livelihoods found that the hunting ban in Botswana resulted in less local enthusiasm and 
participation in conservation. As a result of the lack of stakeholder engagement in Botswana’s 
hunting ban, the state suffered a loss in local support and the system experienced a crisis in 
structure. 
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Despite its claim to being “community-based,” CBNRM opened new political spaces 
through which a variety of non-state actors (i.e. private sector, civil society) can articulate and 
assert rights over land and resources (Twyman, 2000). To maintain this new network of 
stakeholders, CBNRM often neglects the social, political, and geographical differences within 
and between rural communities that may challenge CBNRMs’ goals (ibid). Although CBNRM 
intends to democratize decision-making within communities and may amplify historically 
marginalized groups, it can also empower the local elite as the sole representatives of the 
community (Mosimane & Silva, 2014). In Botswana, there is a difference between the more 
thorough and gradual consultation process that community members expected and the type of 
consultation process for the hunting ban that actually took place, which sometimes are needed to 
make more rapid changes within communities. CBNRM ushered in a shift from a traditional 
governance style to a fast-paced, globalized and connected approach is sometimes necessary to 
see change happen quickly (Hulme & Murphee, 1999; Ribot et al., 2010). There is a tension 
between community members’ desire to reach goals like economic prosperity, cultural 
recognition, infrastructure improvement, and technological access more immediately, while also 
wanting to maintain traditional governance practices, like a thorough and representative 
consultation.  
The catastrophic collapse of the hunting system in response to the ban indicates a lack of 
resilience and the expression of vulnerability within the system (Gunderson, 2000; Pelling and 
Manuel-Navarrete, 2011). This lack of adaptive capacity can be attributed to top-down 
governance structures that excluded communities and other stakeholders (i.e. hunting operations) 
from the decision-making processes that led to the ban. While it is tempting to interpret the ban 
as a negative disturbance, a disturbance is technically an unusual event that causes a shift in the 
 
 76 
system from its equilibrium (Scheffer et al., 2002) with no normative assignment. The ban 
disturbed a Trophy hunting system at equilibrium; the system’s response to the ban can 
illuminate the adaptive capacity of the system and opportunities can be created during the 
“reorganization” phase. The following chapter will discuss how the community-based 
organizations responded to the disturbance of the ban.  
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CHAPTER 5. RELEASE AND REORGANIZATION AFTER THE 
BAN [2014-2019] 
 
Release and Reorganization After the Ban 
 
After the hunting ban was imposed in 2014, Botswana’s CBNRM and hunting system 
experienced many drastic changes and challenges to their operation and growth. Figure 6 shows 
the dates and key events that describe the release () and reorganization (α) phases of the 
Trophy hunting system. According to the adaptive cycle model, when a system experiences a 
shock, participants’ social behavior may begin to diverge and challenge the established dominant 
institutions that once held that system in place. In response, the system can either suppress that 
divergence and maintain those old institutions or release into a new phase of generation (Holling 
& Gunderson, 2001; Scheffer et al., 2002). If it enters into a release (see “” in Figure 8), it will 
experience a period of re-organization or mobilization (see “α” in Figure 8), when the expression 
of diverse social action leads to new internal structures. In this phase of reorganization, groups 
with similar interests form bonds, organize social capital, and have different levels of tolerance 
for extant or emergent institutions (Pelling & Manuel-Navarrete, 2011). The hunting ban served 
as a shock to the hunting tourism system in Botswana. Exploring how the rural communities of 
Mababe, Sankuyo, and CECT were impacted by and responded to the ban can illuminate the 
hunting system’s resilience. The following sections outline the respondents’ perceptions of the 
ecological, economic, and sociocultural impacts of the 2014 ban on trophy hunting tourism 
followed by how the communities adapted to the ban and what social and political structures 
might cultivate or inhibit the communities’ adaptive capacity. 
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Figure 8. Key Aspects and Dates of the Release and Reorganization Phases of Botswana’s Trophy hunting system. 
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Ecological Impacts and Responses 
 
Increased Human-Wildlife Conflicts 
Respondents noted an increase in human-wildlife conflict as a result of the hunting ban.  
Many respondents believed that the practice of trophy hunting tourism caused wildlife species to 
fear humans, thereby mitigating human-wildlife conflict. One community member saw the ban 
as an essential period that changed relationships between villagers and wildlife:  
“Batswana are very peaceful people. The Bantu, or the people who live within the Chobe 
region, have co-existed with animals. They have been doing their best in the hunting era. 
After hunting, they survived with animals still. But it became now a provocation when 
elephants were now killing people left right and center. Not killing them out there in the 
wilderness, but killing them within the streets. When they went to the plowing fields, 
elephants were attacking them in the fields. When they fenced their fields, elephants 
came and wrecked the fences. When they made small gardens behind their yard, 
elephants came there and damaged them.” 
 
According to participants, there was a distinct difference in their daily lives before and 
after the ban: “The difference is that nowadays, we can compare with the time when hunting was 
there. The animals…are getting aggressive to people. They are killing people. There are many in 
the village. They are roaming around…our lives are in danger.”  Similarly, another respondent 
reflected “…our lives were better because the animals were afraid of hunters”. In the face of the 
ban, one person shared, “they [wildlife]…know that they are not being shot at. They are 
protected. Maybe some of them don’t even know the sound of the gun, they just move freely. 
They don’t know anything about death.” Similar to humans, wildlife adapt to change as 
described by an individual: “ as time changes, animals change, just as people change…They can 
think to do this, try to avoid this, they are always evolving their mindset.”  
 Others shared that the hunting ban led to an increase of wildlife numbers because hunting 
tourism was an important population control measure. Respondents described the situation as 
“There are many elephants now because they are not being killed” and “…the number of animals 
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have exceeded the limit.” Increased wildlife numbers heightened competition for wildlife’s 
access to water and crops especially during the dry season. For example, when there is “…no 
water along the river…animals are coming into…homes.” One person shared, “When they come, 
they harvest crops by themselves…It [the fence] does not stop elephants. They step over, they 
come in, they destroy everything.”  
 One of the government’s main strategies to address human wildlife issues is through 
compensation. Most villagers found compensation strategies ineffective, reporting that the 
money is not sufficient to cover for infrastructure and crop damage or livestock loss. One 
individual remarked: “It takes someone who has money in his bank to rear crops in his field. For 
someone like me, who doesn’t have money or fences, you just do it in Jesus’ name.” One 
participant insisted that compensation will never work, because to some people, money is less 
valuable or useful that the food that they believe they could grow in a “wildlife-free” 
environment. In addition, some argue that there will never be compensation justifiable for a 
human death: “…losing a life, you never recover that. If someone gets killed by an elephant, 
whether there is or is not compensation, you never get the person back and that is the most 
painful part.” 
Many of the grievances regarding the state’s management of wildlife were present when 
hunting was in place, but the ban seemed to serve as a turning point for exacerbating the local 
frustration. Some locals shared “…it’s more like those animals are controlling our lives now”, 
and “before  [the ban] these animals were not killing people. Now they are killing people.”  
The introduction of the hunting ban might have made communities even more vulnerable to the 
misgivings of the state’s ineffective compensation and prevention program for human wildlife 
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interactions; these challenges may have limited the breadth of the villages’ adaptive capacity to 
respond to the hunting ban.  
 
Reduced Protection of Wildlife  
When hunting was banned, locals perceived a change in the community and state’s 
capacities to protect wildlife from illegal activity. Some respondents attribute this increase in 
illegal activity with animals to changes from the ban like increased unemployment, food 
insecurity, and an overall loss of benefits from CBNRM. One individual reported how the 
economic losses from the ban drive locals to hunt: “I just think that if you get hunger, [you] think 
about poaching now. When you have money, you can’t poach…[Now] there is nothing. There 
are too many people who aren’t working. They will go and poach.” Another individual shared 
how communities began to poach in response to the ban because they felt as if they “…don’t 
own these animals…they are taken back to those periods before CBNRM where communities 
only knew wildlife when conservation was the mandate by the government.” According to this 
individual, hunting tourism provided a relevant context for wildlife conservation that had a value 
independent of governmental imposition. Other participants argued that cultural norms prevent 
locals from poaching wildlife, indicating that, in general, the presence of hunting tourism does 
not have much of an impact in affecting locals’ involvement in illegal wildlife activity. One 
person explained that villagers are never the ones poaching: “….I think poaching is high. And as 
a local who grew up here and loves their home, how does that make you feel when you hear 
about higher poaching? I don’t feel well. This poaching is not done by locals.”  
 The ban also impacted local reporting of illegal activity. Participants shared that 
community members were less likely to report illegal activity because they did not feel as if they 
benefitted sufficiently from wildlife without hunting tourism. Some people also felt that they 
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may be blamed if they report a poached animal to state authorities: “…if you report it, they will 
ask you so many questions. You were trying to help, but now they are putting the blame on you. 
That is why when people see things, they don’t do anything.” In addition, all the CBOs 
experienced a substantial decrease in the number of guides that were supported by hunting 
revenue, inhibiting the communities’ capacity to monitor wildlife numbers and observe and 
report illegal activity to government officials. One individual noticed: “…when they stopped 
hunting, all of a sudden, there was poaching happening in those areas, so they recruited most of 
the guys from BDF [Botswana Defense Force] to patrol those areas.” 
Hunting outfits provided presence in remote areas that deterred poaching especially since 
photo tourism does not operate in many of these areas. They said, “poaching is high now because 
when hunting was there, people were going around in the hunting area. They [trophy hunters] 
will see some footsteps…that these footsteps are for poachers or something. But after the ban, it 
is only photographers- they are on the road.” Conversely, one person noted that after the ban, it 
was actually easier to recognize when illegal activity was occurring: “it was easier to see if there 
was poaching when the hunting was banned. The government could hear the rifle when it would 
go off and know it was poaching.”  
 
Economic Impacts and Responses 
Limitations to Traditional Livelihoods and Reduced Tourism Employment 
 
 Many communities rely on farming, ranching, or harvesting practices to feed and 
generate income for their families. After the hunting ban, many individuals reported that without 
the control on wildlife populations, wildlife interfered more with crop production and harvesting. 
One individual remarked how farming, after the ban, has become unprofitable: “as a farmer…we 
don’t get much profit due to the animals damages.” The ban also threatened other ways of life, 
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such as harvesting grasses due to increased dangers of wildlife as one person explained: “some 
people cut grass and sell for money- now [they] cannot make a profit. [They] go back home 
when [they] see [an] elephant, can’t cut, nothing to do.” Despite these challenges, villagers 
demonstrated persistence: “you can have it [profit from harvest] if the elephants will not raid 
your field. But if this year, they went through, you will go home with empty hands.”  
The hunting ban also resulted in villagers losing employment associated with the hunting 
industry. Many participants emphasized that hunting tourism was the only viable industry 
supporting the villages and that once it disappeared, there were no other options. Respondents 
described the situation as “there is nothing to do in village” and “there is nothing to rely on.” 
Many shared deep emotions like, “Now we are suffering. People are not working.”  
 A few individuals were hopeful that the photo-tourism industry could fill the employment 
void from the hunting ban. These jobs were sometimes perceived as more favorable than those 
offered by the hunting outfits: “The hunting camp was employing only- I think it was- 12 people 
and it was seasonal…but the photographic…you see that employment is permanent…double of 
what was being employed during hunting.” However, many people did not believe there were 
sufficient employment options to support livelihoods. One individual explained: “Now a lot of 
people are sitting around. They can’t farm, they can’t do anything, they can’t rear anything 
because of the way it is. Because most of their income is through tourism.” 
 The ban reduced the trust’s income and as a result, the trust was not able to offer as many 
jobs to villagers. One respondent shared how “…they [the community] was making more money 
[during hunting]. They was making a million Pula- half a million Pula [43,000 USD]. But now 
they are not…photographic is not enough money.” One leader shared that in order for the trust to 
survive the ban, they had to “…cut down the amount of money we are filtering down to the 
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people, so that at least the trust can move on.” Without hunting tourism, there was also a 
decrease in demand for certain positions, like the community escort guides, whom used to play 
an integral role in escorting commercial hunts. Without the additional income from hunting 
tourism, some trust positions became completely voluntary. However, individuals working in the 
trust as guides or as trustees expected the trust to eventually provide compensation; this decision 
placed the trust in a vulnerable political position, as it was not able to compensate for some of 
these employees who continued working during the years after the ban. 
 
Reduced Community Benefits 
 
The trusts that participated in hunting tourism came to rely heavily on the industry’s 
profits; when hunting was banned, the trusts suffered a huge cut in income. As a result, the trust 
had to reduce certain social benefit programs and infrastructure development. The sudden drop in 
income as a result of the ban was so significant to the communities that one individual described 
the situation as: “…the money stops and everything stops.”  
 In addition to infrastructure projects, the efficacy and breadth of social welfare programs, 
which relied on hunting tourism income, suffered in the face of the ban. For instance, one person 
shared that during hunting, the communities would “…have allocations for student 
scholarships…the trust also has logistics for the funerals and everything. So all those things 
could not be supported well in that period [of the ban].” As one person claimed, during the 
hunting ban, the community struggled: “They were struggling- our mothers, our fathers have too 
many children, they can’t provide for them. Some leave schools. Some are depressed.” 
Respondents did not hold the photo-tourism industry in a favorable light, perhaps due to 
the misalignment between the non-consumptive motivations of the participating tourists and 
locals’ hunting traditions or to the lack of the industry’s direct economic benefits to the villages. 
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Although the subject of criticism, many participants recognized the essential supportive role that 
the photo-tourism industry played in their villages’ survival of the hunting ban. One individual 
put it bluntly: “So, this is one of the reasons we survived. Because we had two baskets [before 
the hunting ban]: non-consumptive and consumptive.” Some people shared that the photo 
tourism companies rose to the occasion, taking on social welfare responsibilities that hunting 
outfits had championed: “…Those people [the tourism companies] are trying to develop our 
village. Right now, when you go inside this hall, you will see the clothes that they donate to the 
village…They are helping our village.” Participants praised these companies as donating to 
support their primary schools, purchasing school buses to safely transport children, and bringing 
basic items to villagers, like toiletries and clothing.  
 CBOs reassessed their connections with one another and realized that a stronger network 
was helpful in creating a unified voice to respond to post-ban challenges. One individual shared 
how helpful communication with other CBOs were in formulating strategies to bring the hunting 
back: “There have been numerous meetings- trusts and other NGOs- and other interested parties, 
meeting up and making a lot of noise about this hunting ban…It has been very clear from the 
second day after we heard that the ban shall be introduced the following day. People made it very 
clear that this will not work.” Another person explained the importance in strategizing amongst 
domestic and international CBOs for a future without hunting: “We have been together lately. 
There has been a lot of benchmarking that has happened within trusts. Even far beyond 
Botswana and across the country…We share information about how we have survived, a lot of 
things about natural resources, monitoring.” 
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Absence of Meat from Hunting and Food Security 
 
The ban on hunting revealed the villages’ dependence on tourist hunts for meat and 
highlighted vulnerabilities within the local food systems. Extensive social dynamics of families 
further complicated the impacts of the hunting ban on food security. Extended families tend to 
meet the household demand for food through a combination of subsistence, commercial, and 
purchasing practices. According to participants, the ban carried ecological and socio-economic 
consequences that either completely prevented or greatly challenged these practices. 
One of these issues is the inconvenience of purchasing food, whether that is meat or other 
products, when it is not sourced or grown locally: “…you can’t plow here, you can’t have any 
veggies. So you always have to go back to Maun to do your groceries and bank. And there’s no 
public transport, so you just hitch hike back and forth.” One individual explained this situation: 
“…to buy from shops, you have to have money. And if you do additional research around here, 
not every household has got someone working…We tend to be big in number in a household, so 
life is expensive.” 
 For the villages, bushmeat is a culturally important food and provided food security: 
“…old people who know that- this hunting, it was six months hunting, then get six months for 
the animals to recover- so the villages know that in this six months we had something to eat.” 
One elder shared that both the insufficient crops and lack of bushmeat brought malnutrition to 
the villages: “It [the ban] affected our mental health….because we don’t have enough to eat. In 
our culture, we are living in extended families, so it’s difficult to bring food on the table.”  
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Sociocultural Impacts and Responses 
 
Reduced Tolerance of Wildlife  
 
As a result of the hunting ban, respondents perceived increased wildlife activity within or 
close to the villages resulting in increased conflicts and sometimes death. One community 
member explained “…the hunting ban was bad. It was bad for our lives…the freedom movement 
of the human being in this area was bad. You can’t understand why. You would be attacked by 
elephants. That is why most of us have a lot of injuries from being attacked by elephants.” This 
perceived increase in wildlife attacks has created an atmosphere of helplessness within the 
villages. Upon arrival at one of the villages to conduct interviews for this study, a child had been 
attacked by a buffalo earlier that day: “A school child was attacked by the buffalo, which means 
that there is nothing that we can do compared to when hunting was there.” When asked if 
farmers ever were allowed to retaliate with guns, one farmer answered affirmatively: “You 
know, in the past, it was. People were allowed to shoot and kill.” When prompted for 
clarification on when “the past” was, this person said “before the hunting ban…people were 
given authority [to shoot and kill nuisance wildlife].”   
People shared sentiments of the hardships of living close to wildlife as “all those animals-
we are the ones who are cushioning them…the land here is mostly for these wild animals. and 
they just want us to be squeezed like this.” Others amplified the stressful conditions as feeling as 
if they “…are just this thing within the house” and that “they [the animals] are now the villagers 
and we visitors in this world because they are everywhere.”  
One person enumerates all the types of human suffering that they see as consequences of 
the ban on hunting:  
 
 88 
“…the hunting ban brought challenges to the livelihood of the people. As I’ve indicated, 
because these animals have multiplied in numbers, they have gotten used to going 
through the settlements. Not only did they damage or threaten the crops, but they killed 
human beings… Starvation arrived in the households, people became destitute, people 
became fatherless, because the people that are taking care of households are fathers of the 
house.” 
 
According to this individual, the hunting ban is responsible for more than an increase in 
wildlife attacks and damage to crops, but accredits wildlife with starvation, destitution, and 
“fatherless” children. 
Feeling more threatened by wildlife after the ban has contributed to a culture of fear 
within these communities. One person explained, “Elephants used to get inside the village so 
during the evening, you can’t go outside…” Another respondent shared sentiment about the 
elephants in the village as: “We have a situation. And it needs to be attended to.” After the ban, 
some people report that it became more difficult to go into the bush: “Back in the old days, we 
used to thatch grass everywhere. but nowadays, we couldn’t even manage. You couldn’t do that. 
Now people die each and every year being killed by elephants.”  
 Lastly, the hunting ban contributed to a loss in communities’ sense of ownership of 
wildlife. This difference in ownership before and after the ban was very clear when one 
individual claimed: “The beneficiaries of these elephants are our neighboring countries. We are 
raising elephants here. When they mature, they cross over to the neighboring countries and those 
countries harvest them. Logically, it now says to the local community that you do not have 
ownership of these animals because you are not beneficiaries to these animals.” According to 
many participants, being an owner of wildlife is one in the same with being considered or trusted 
as a conservationist; one person shared that the practice of hunting tourism solidified this 
analogy: “[with hunting], they are part of the owners [of wildlife], part of the conservationists.” 
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Thus, if community members feel as if they do not benefit or own the wildlife, they do not feel 
recognized as conservationists and effective stewards of the land and wildlife.  
 
Governance Responses 
 
Expanse in Partnerships with Photo Tourism 
 
During the ban, CBOs reassessed their partnerships with photographic companies, 
looking for various ways to generate greater benefits for the villages. A respondent emphasized 
how ventures with photo tourism lodges were the piece that either ensured a CBO’s failure or 
survival after the hunting ban: “…it was a good time [the hunting ban] to be able to review some 
of these things…Because when the hunting [ban] was introduced a lot of trusts did close down. 
Only a few survived. We are one of those that survived. The reason why we survived is because 
I’m not sure- if by the grace or what- because we had two lodges.” One leader described how 
after the ban, CBOs were encouraged to reassess the benefits they received from their photo 
partnerships: “…[the trusts] became very aggressive in addressing the investors and lodge 
owners- really saying- please look into promoting cultures…we have associations that came out 
and [are] focusing on craft making and you know, weaving…and they came out only during this 
time [of the ban]. People are now appreciating that culture and selling it as a product.” Leaders’ 
intention of making partnerships more beneficial to the communities was indoctrinated into the 
villagers, as one person admitted: “We are always told that we have to stand on our feet to create 
jobs for ourselves, so that we can’t suffer for a long time because the hunting is not open...” 
Several individuals credited the CBOs’ increased involvement and benefit from photo tourism to 
the economic stimulus of hunting tourism. As one person shared: “…in the era of hunting time, 
the community of [X] were able to build a lodge called [X]/ They have another Lodge which is 
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[X]. That was money that was driven out from hunting and they were able to use it to build this 
business facilities.” 
After the hunting ban, CBOs leaned into developing their own photo tourism camps and 
ventures, which allowed them to continue to generate income after the ban. One community 
leader described how having a diverse and flexible approach to land management and 
development was key to making this transition to photo tourism ventures: “we had our own 
campsite which is still operating today…so it’s one of the things that has kept us going during 
the hunting ban issues.” A leader of one CBO shared that the trust is currently working on 
diversifying their campsites to offer certain tourism activities like Mokoro rides (boat rides).  
In principle, the government had encouraged the cultivation of deeper partnerships 
between villages and photo-tourism companies to soften the impact of the ban. Although the 
photo-tourism outfits were able to provide employment and continue to pay the CBOs for land 
rentals, these benefits were not sufficient to cushion the economic hardship initiated by the 
hunting ban. One person lamented: “It [the campsite] is owned by the community… so the 
money that they got from those campsites, they managed to survive even though it was little. It 
was very little.” In general, participants believed that CBNRM funds from land rentals amounted 
to much less than the cost of hunting quotas; it was an unrealistic expectation for the photo 
companies to compensate for the economic loss of the quotas, at least for the first few years. To 
one individual, it was very clear from the beginning that this “transition plan” of the 
government’s would not work, because the tourism industry had yet to succeed in improving 
livelihoods of the rural communities (at least enough improvement): “The Ngamiland and 
Okavango areas have whole communities living in abject poverty. And yet, these are mainstay 
areas of tourism. It shows the evidence that tourism has, in the past, been… wrong.” In addition 
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to expanding extant relationships between photo tourism companies and the trust, the state hoped 
CBOs would begin to develop their own tourism ventures after the ban. However, this 
expectation overlooked failure in the CBNRM model to effectively transfer skills to villager 
employees and build local capacity. 
 There were also a number of cultural and institutional barriers that prevented villagers 
from participating in the photographic tourism job market such as fluency in English and literacy 
and certain costly certifications. In general, the barriers that prohibited certain individuals from 
participating in the photographic industry contributed to this local belief that only certain 
individuals could qualify for the industry’s position. As one person shared, “in photographic it’s 
different. They just take those who have qualifications, papers, are educated- any experience that 
they have.” One participant clarified that the demographic most affected by the hunting ban were 
the elders: “Most people who are affected during this hunting ban are the older people. The older 
people are mainly the ones who lost their jobs.” Due to their set of skills and experience that 
were specialized for hunting, it became difficult for elders to find opportunities within other 
fields; most people who lost their jobs in hunting found it difficult to transition into other lines of 
work. This person’s reflection, along with others’ commentary on photographic qualifications, 
suggests that there was a feeling within the villages that households might be benefitting more 
from the photographic industry, while the villages as a whole benefitted more from the hunting 
industry, because there were less barriers to participate as an employee.  
In general, there was local resistance to a complete transition to photo tourism. Photo 
tourism was described as a “last resort” and villagers found the move difficult, saying they 
“didn’t know much about ecotourism” and that, after the ban, they are “still learning how photo-
tourism works…big change.” Many participants said the government’s plan to transition CBOs 
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to photo tourism was unrealistic due to logistical and structural problems. One individual did not 
believe that the photo tourism industry held much of a solution for the CBOSs because industry 
“…has been designed in such a way that it bring(s) minimum benefits to the country.” Another 
respondent explained that the CBOs are “…beholden by those photographic camps who are still 
there.” Another individual shared how the photographic companies are a temporary relationship: 
“For now, the money comes from that lodge and [X] lodge only so they pay the community. 
Those people are renting the community.”  
Conversely, some villagers, in particular the youth, adopted an open-minded attitude 
when thinking about how their communities will recover from the hunting ban. One individual 
described this approach: “Development kept growing slowly by slowly until it stopped, and 
everybody collapsed. Like something froze. All we can do is start from the beginning and come 
up with new plans.” 
 
Reliance on State Welfare 
 
The state government provided support to communities after the hunting ban through a 
drought relief program and other social welfare assistance. Former hunting employees found 
work in the government welfare program, Ipelegeng, which organizes and implements 
development projects within the villages and pays workers monthly salaries.  
 Government sponsored rural development programs were overwhelmed with addressing 
the villages’ economic loss experienced during the hunting ban. Even though Ipelegeng was able 
to curtail some of the ban’s negative impacts on village employment and poverty, many 
participants criticized it for its inefficacy and stigmatization of those working in the program, 
calling them “helpless.” One person remarked how working for Ipelegeng during the hunting ban 
has somewhat tranquilized the villagers, keeping them complacent: “As for now, they have just 
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given up. They have told themselves that they will live through Ipelegeng.” Ipelegeng had a 
quota for the number of villagers it could employ, leaving some former hunting employees 
without work. One person shared: “since hunting was stopped, it is very difficult for us, because 
there is a problem called Ipelegeng. That program takes only 55 people, which means most of us 
stay within our homes without doing anything. that is why we say hunting is very important for 
our life.” One participant shared that the geographic distance between the villages and decision-
makers caused the misallocation of resources: “If you look at the people who make decisions in 
this village, people who are sitting in towns and offices that have never been here…These people 
have never come to see how these people are doing. They just went and made that decision.” 
Some people faulted a lack of regulations and government incentives for photo tourism 
and CBOs’ inability to cover the costs of the hunting ban. Specifically, when explaining the 
challenges that CBOs faced in collaborating with photo companies, several participants 
mentioned the Land Bank Policy (LBP). The LBP was enacted in 2014 as a directive that 
designated portions of villages’ concession areas for tourism activities and transferred ownership 
of these areas from the Land Board to the Ministry of Environment, Wildlife, and Tourism 
(Mbaiwa and Hambira, 2019). One person described how CBOs felt a loss of ownership over 
their concession areas as a result of the passing of the LBP: “Government changed rights from 
community to government.” When talking about the policy, participants mainly grieved the 
disappearance of the consultation process and the reduction in CBOs’ capacity to make decisions 
in CBNRM partnerships. One person described the situation as “…it was not only hunting that 
stopped. There were a lot of decisions that were now moved from the people to somewhere. 
Some of these decisions about our own natural resources, people were unable to make. Where 
now is ownership there?” 
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Fearless Leadership Style from CBOs 
 
Some leaders of the villages’ traditional and CBO governments perceived the ban as a 
period of hardship that offered an opportunity to explore diverse strategies. One leader called the 
ban a reflective time which “…opened our eyes…[and so] we ventured into diversity and other 
things.” Another individual from a different CBO shared that this invitation towards open-
minded leadership was intentional and “…to broaden the product base so that we diversify our 
income generation.” Leaders spoke of the ban as a time of great self-awareness for the trusts: 
“…hunting was primarily done by CBOs…really suffered a big blow, but we are smarter now.” 
These leaders were instrumental in guiding the villages through the ban through their willingness 
to try other economic ventures may have inspired the villagers to adopt a similar mindset.  
Despite leaders willing to take risks and diversify away from hunting tourism, the CBOs 
still experienced governance issues, which challenged their capacity to prepare and respond to 
the hunting ban. These governance issues were reported as occurring at the regional and national 
levels. All three of the CBOs shared how there was a delay in turning over the leases from 
hunting to photo tourism, thus stalling the potential flow of benefits from new partnerships with 
photo companies. This issue was especially poignant in Mababe, as one person shared: “…There 
was a delay in turning over their leases from hunting to photo. Not sure why…maybe Land 
Board could have caused the delay or could have been chief. But, yes there was a delay, which 
probably cost Mababe some years of income.” Leaders suggested that they are not in the habit of 
saving to invest in future projects. One person attributed explained: “…you are allowed to make 
sure all the money is given to the people to use. It is meant for that…So, for some trusts, when 
the news [of the hunting ban] came- it meant all the money, the source, got cut…you don’t have 
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any money to invest.” Some leaders shared that it was challenging to mobilize village 
populations to move forward and accept a life without hunting tourism. 
CBOs adapted in several different ways in response to the hunting ban. However, 
because the ban was a moratorium, they were still hopeful that hunting would return. As one 
person shared: “People made it very clear that this [ban] will not work. If you say it is a 
moratorium, [this] means temporary. Now you are giving us hope that you are reviewing 
something. At some point you are going to reintroduce it. And we are just glad the new regime, 
they have just done that.”  
 
Discussion 
 
Key Aspects of the Ban: Release Phase [2014-2019] 
 
The speed and cohesiveness of a system’s transition from being “scattered” after a 
disturbance to mobilizing and ultimately, settling into a new system, is a sign of the system’s 
resilience (Holling and Gunderson, 2002). During the “release” phase, the system needs 
guidance as certain influential ideas take hold and it may enter a potentially undesirable 
structure. According to the literature, this phase has been characterized as “relatively short” 
(Walker et al., 2002, p. 7) and rapid. However, CBO members consistently describe the “release” 
phase as a period of great suffering. Eventually the Botswana Trophy hunting system 
transitioned from being one in “release” after the ban to beginning to “reorganize” and grow into 
a stable system without trophy hunting.  
The negative impacts initiated by the ban indicates that hunting tourism was a 
foundational element of the system and when it was taken away, the Trophy hunting system 
experienced a profound disturbance. The impacts of the hunting ban on the Trophy hunting 
system included a decrease in income for local development projects, the loss of access to meat, 
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and less funding for conservation efforts, which are consistent with other studies (Onishi, 2015; 
LaRocco, 2016; Mbaiwa, 2018). Many respondents also perceived an increase in human-wildlife 
conflicts, and more specifically, wildlife-related injuries and deaths. This fear towards wildlife 
and concerns about survival was exacerbated as the locals felt a loss in ownership of animals, 
because the ban had resulted in the generation of less economic benefits and the complete 
cancellation of their traditional hunting culture.  
It is important to recall the timing of this study, immediately after the lifting of the 
hunting ban, and acknowledge that participants’ grievances about the state of the CBO system 
may have existed prior to the hunting ban and that the ban simply catalyzed their expression. For 
example, the Land Bank Policy ceded villagers’ autonomy over the land to the Botswana 
Tourism Organization (BTO). The Policy’s overlap with the hunting ban, which reduced benefits 
from wildlife, may have created a negative perception about wildlife and protected areas, making 
it difficult to correlate any subsequent behavior with a specific policy change (Leader-Williams 
and Hutton, 2005). Thus, participants’ grievances may be related to the villages’ tumultuous 
relationship with the state or villages’ perception of international involvement in state policies. 
 It is unclear exactly when the Trophy hunting system transitioned from the release to 
reorganization phase. When asking respondents when their lives started to improve after the ban, 
they were not able to provide exact dates, mostly because many had not experienced much 
improvement. Secondary data on the economic recovery of the CBOs after the ban was not 
available to provide further context. In a 2016 report on CBNRM in Botswana, USAID 
investigated how different CBOs had navigated the economic turbulence incurred by the hunting 
ban. Information regarding CECT’s financial status after the trophy hunting ban was not made 
available, so it is unclear how they have fared financially since the trophy hunting ban in terms 
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of diversification of economic activities (USAID, 2016). Two years after the ban on hunting, 
CBNRM benefits were considered important in less than 15% of CBOs (USAID, 2016) which 
suggests that the revenue and social programs from the hunting tourism industry had been 
responsible for a substantial portion of CBNRM benefits for the majority of CBOs. The dramatic 
decrease in CBOs benefitting from CBNRM after the hunting ban suggests that CBNRM 
projects had begun to emerge as supplementary sources of livelihoods and revamping CBNRM 
might not even be an effective strategy for reorganizing the Trophy hunting system.  
 
Key Aspects of Responses to the Ban: Reorganization Phase [2014-2019] 
 
Many individuals referred to the hunting ban as a period of learning and reflection, which 
indicates the presence of adaptive capacity in the Trophy hunting system. Walker et al., (2002) 
expound on how learning is an important aspect of resilience, including “..the flexibility to 
experiment and adopt novel solutions, and development of generalized responses to broad 
classes of challenges” (p. 7). Adaptations to diversify their economies and reduce their 
dependency on hunting indicates that they are taking the opportunity to learn from this ban. In 
addition, CBOs’ efforts to expand partnerships and grow local economic ventures demonstrate 
social cohesion and the capacity to self-organize (see Figure 6), which are recognized as factors 
of positive adaptive capacity (Osbahr et al., 2008; Onyx et al., 2014). 
Participants expressed that funds from previous hunts had been used to develop 
community-based projects, like a sorghum mill in CECT and a photo tourism venture in Mababe. 
The influence of hunting tourism is present in many of the CBOs’ adaptive measures, which puts 
into question CBOs’ true capacity to grow in more of an independent direction from hunting 
tourism, if its adaptations directly rely on hunting’s funds. CBOs’ capacity to combat increased 
human-wildlife conflict and food insecurity and to revitalize local economies through 
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partnerships with photo lodges and local projects is dependent on the accumulation and 
investment of hunting funds (Batavia et al. 2018). 
When a system is undergoing change, there are certain adaptations that are going to 
preserve the system and others that amplify resilience (Scheffer et al., 2002; Whitney et al., 
2017). As the CBOs adapted towards a system without trophy hunting tourism, they also needed 
to rely on relationships with the photo tourism industry, the state government, and the trust 
government. Both of these growth and survival adaptations, which manage for production and 
sustainability are important objectives (Walker et al., 2002) and are characteristics of the 
reorganization phase. As the CBOs and the national government work to build resilience in a 
system, both of these phases experience their own costs and benefits and it is important to 
understand their trade-offs and synergies. For example, in addition to relying on funds from 
hunting tourism to adapt, CBOs were also dependent on welfare and support from other political 
entities, which enabled the system to cope with uncertainties. The existence of certain “survival 
structures,” like state sponsored poverty reduction programs and welfare through the private 
sector, afforded the CBOs time to reflect, consider their strengths, and plan how to move forward 
through the hunting ban. However, the politics and economics of the CBNRM program had 
become dependent on the function or role of trophy hunting tourism, undermining the system’s 
capacity to recover from the ban. 
Certain structures, like weak rural development and human wildlife mitigation programs 
and changes to the concession bidding process, limited CBOs’ capacity to adapt and change in 
the face of the hunting ban. In addition, certain adaptations that might have facilitated a quicker 
recovery received cultural resistance from within the communities. Deep rooted beliefs, like an 
aversion and deep distrust of the photo-tourism industry, served as overlooked challenges in the 
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implementation of particular adaptive strategies (Gupta, 2013). The reasons that certain 
communities resist change differs depending on context; for example, religious beliefs 
influenced adaptations to climate change in two rural communities in Malawi and Zambia 
(Murphy et al., 2015) and in Rural Appalachia in the United States, core values, like respect for 
privacy, was responsible for cultivating cultural resistance to technology in rural, low income 
communities (Hamby, et al 2018).  In the Botswana CBOs, this resistance to change post-ban 
reveals that while the strategies may have been economically helpful to the CBOs, they were not 
socially responsive.  
 
Hunting Tourism as an Incentive for Local Wildlife Conservation  
 
One salient social-ecological impact of the hunting ban was the change in community 
perception of an increase in human wildlife conflicts (HWC). Many participants believed that 
trophy hunting tourism was responsible for instilling a sense of fear within wildlife and in its 
absence, wildlife became more aggressive towards humans. Conflicts with wildlife ranged from 
the raiding of crops to the destruction of infrastructure, but also included less direct impacts, like 
reduced access to meat and employment opportunities. There was a tendency to blame the ban on 
this perceived rise in conflicts and not consider how other factors, like a historical lack of viable 
HWC mitigation options and support for these options, might contribute to a rise in these 
conflicts (Gupta, 2013). While rural communities in other sub-Saharan countries’ affirmation of 
trophy hunting’s role in their protection from wildlife (Lindsey et al., 2007; Dickson et al., 2009; 
Naidoo et al., 2016) is consistent with these associations between hunting and conflicts, there is 
limited data on HWC. For instance, the yearly number of reported elephant-related raid incidents 
in the state’s records does not begin until 2008 and is inconsistent, making it difficult to identify 
potential trends in the relations between HWC and the 2014 hunting ban (Pozo et al., 2017).  
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 A primary justification to continue practicing hunting tourism is that it impacts wildlife 
behavior and local economies in ways that engender rural communities’ support of wildlife 
conservation efforts (Lindsey et al., 2013; Naidoo et al., 2016). Support for activities that 
encourage conservation grows in lieu of other potential economically attractive avenues of 
resource use like the illegal trade of wildlife (Mbaiwa, 2018). Sufficient benefits to villages is, in 
theory, supposed to mitigate negative local interactions with wildlife, like retaliative killings and 
contributing intelligence to poaching operations (Mbaiwa, 2015).  
 In the absence of hunting tourism and certain benefits, findings suggest that locals 
developed negative perceptions of wildlife, but exactly how their behavior changed based on 
these new perceptions is unclear.  Participants associated an increase in illegal activity post-ban 
(Schlossberg et al. 2019) with the absence of hunting outfits that used to patrol the landscape. 
Thus, a greater level of wildlife poaching may be due to a change at a larger scale in the system, 
rather than a result of a change in local attitudes towards wildlife and the subsequent increase in 
local involvement in poaching regimes. However, some individuals did share that a greater level 
of food insecurity post-ban may have motivated some community members to engage in 
“poaching for the pot,” which involves targeting certain ungulates and ground-dwelling birds. 
Motivations for locals to engage in poaching may be more related to food security rather than 
other measures of economic poverty (Duffy et al., 2015). Therefore, trophy hunting tourism may 
be one effective way to mitigate poaching and reduce human wildlife conflict; however, to 
specifically address the locals’ influence in anti-conservation behavior towards wildlife, the state 
can focus on implementing measures to increase access to meat for locals. To potentially address 
the more high-level drivers of illegal wildlife activity, the state may want to allocate more funds 
towards anti-poaching operations and the lobby for greater restrictions on wildlife trade.  
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Lack of Alternative Stable States 
 
One of the limitations in the interpretation of the adaptive cycle model is that a system’s 
survival and continued functioning throughout a time of disturbance can actually be mal-
adaptive: some systems are lauded for their ability to resist crisis or recover quickly from a 
disturbance, but oppression and rigidity may be concealed in the system (Holling and 
Gunderson, 2002). A maladaptive system is one that appears functional, but maintains certain 
unhealthy dependencies, disparities, and inequities (Gunderson, 2000; Holling and Gunderson, 
2002). Walker et al., (2002) claims that if the system does retain a sufficient amount of old 
components through the release and reorganization phase, “…it [the system] can reorganize to 
remain within the same configuration as before” (p. 7). Even if this same configuration is 
retained, novelty can still emerge during this phase, whether it be “…new institutions, ideas, 
policies, and industries” (ibid).  
Botswana’s Trophy hunting system was drastically affected by the hunting ban and did 
not experience a smooth recovery. As the Trophy hunting system was reorganizing after the 
release phase, new components, like diversification in economic activities and a willingness to 
support new ideas emerged. The introduction of new components, whether in the same or 
different configuration, can build resilience (Scheffer et al., 2002; Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete, 
2011). For the CBOs that were able to survive the ban, their capacity to adapt challenged 
widespread community assumptions that hunting tourism was essential to their continued 
operation.  
However, most members of the communities still rejected this “more resilient and 
diversified” system because it did not have hunting tourism. This new Trophy hunting system 
without hunting was very rigid and did not allow for the emergence of new components. Tension 
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between different levels of governance and stakeholders in addition to structures that legitimated 
“old” power players like the tourism industry (photo-tourism operators replacing hunting 
operators) complicated any collaborative opportunities for conflict resolution and recovery. 
Additionally, failure of the new system to function could be attributed to a resurgence in certain 
dominant social structures, like the state’s encouragement of partnerships between CBOs and 
photo tourism companies, which provided insufficient benefits for most CBOs and prioritized 
international tourism companies and investors (Mbaiwa, 2018). Botswana’s reliance on welfare 
programs to address systemic issues like poverty, income inequality, and unemployment could 
be another social structure to inhibit the new system’s success (Botlhale and Molokwane, 2019). 
These social structures negatively impacted the viability of a system without trophy hunting 
tourism. 
 A “waiting” attitude that was prevalent within the communities during the reorganization 
phase may have supported the revival of these structures. Gunderson (2000) recognizes this 
response in “waiting” as one of the possible reactions when shifting stability domains and crises: 
“The first thing [in response to a crisis] is to do nothing and wait to see if the system will return 
to some acceptable state. One consequence of this option is that the social benefits of the desired 
state are foregone while waiting to see if the system will return to the desired state” (p. 432). The 
post-ban system failed to renegotiate a new social agreement or expectations, and people were 
left wanting the social and economic benefits that only hunting could legally provide (access to 
sufficient bush meat, continued practice of hunting traditions and knowledge, sufficient funds for 
development projects).  
A combination of the marginalization of alternative discourses and a “waiting” attitude 
caused the system without hunting to pass through the reorganization phase quickly and stabilize 
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into a new system. This quick maturation into a “failed” alternative state may reveal a lack of 
proper structural guidance during this period that, if applied, may have resulted in a more 
successful and resilient system without hunting tourism (Walker et al., 2002). Perhaps through 
certain interventions, like a reversal of the Land Bank Policy to empower CBOs more in their 
JVPs with photo tourism companies or a crisis management plan to address socio-economic 
deficiencies that a hunting ban would create, stakeholders would have experienced a different 
system without hunting tourism. Their experience with the ban would still have been 
challenging, but it may have been less difficult. In addition, they may have been convinced that 
there could be an alternate stable state without hunting. However, previous institutions that 
prioritized private sector interests and protectionist conservation efforts (DeMotts and Hoon, 
2010) continued to dominate the “new” system. After the ban, the photo tourism industry thrived 
(Kane, 2015) and the community members reported feeling excluded from its success and 
disenfranchised through the hunting ban; in conclusion, they failed to experience an alternate 
stable state without hunting. 
 The challenges that the trophy hunting system faced in adapting to the ban exposed 
vulnerabilities related to trophy hunting. As the CBOs experienced the impacts of the ban and the 
system began to reorganize, communities could become more aware of how different 
components of the system were dependent on hunting tourism to operate and continue to grow.  
The lifting of the ban in 2019 seems to have been a response to community perceptions of the 
hunting ban’s role in an increase in HWCs and decrease in socio-economic CBNRM benefits 
(LaRocco, 2016; Mbaiwa, 2018). The government’s decision to reverse the moratorium could be 
interpreted as a response to the community feedback and indicate a growth in adaptive capacity; 
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how the new trophy hunting system grows from the lifting of the ban will reveal if the system 
has become more adaptive or not. 
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CHAPTER 6.  LIFTING OF THE BAN: ANOTHER DISTURBANCE 
[2019-present] 
 
Lifting of the Ban: Another Disturbance 
 
In 2014, the president at the time, Ian Khama, cited wildlife populations’ decline as the 
reason for banning hunting tourism. In 2018, A Nationwide Presidential Cabinet Sub Committee 
was set up to review the hunting ban, which involved a nationwide process including kgotla 
meetings and consultations with local authorities and other stakeholders (Elephants without 
Borders, community trusts, the NGO council, and Botswana Wildlife Producers Association, 
amongst others) (Republic of Botswana, 2018). Ultimately, the Sub Committee recommended 
the ban’s lifting. On May 23, 2019, the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and 
Tourism (MENT) made an announcement to officially lift the hunting moratorium of all species, 
including elephant, buffalo, leopard, large antelopes, kudu, zebra, and others (Republic of 
Botswana, 2019). The incumbent president, Mokgweetsi Masisi, announced a decline in local 
support and an increase in human wildlife conflicts as the reason for lifting the ban five years 
later.  
Most interviewees claimed how adequate consultation with communities about human-
wildlife conflict contributed to the lifting of the ban. They described these consultations as: 
“…the community trusts were called together to discuss the issues and explain why they think 
that hunting should come back. We were extensively consulted. And farmers were consulted. 
Researchers were consulted in Botswana…including other stakeholders.” One person 
emphasized people’s concern about the increase in human injuries and deaths related to wildlife: 
“The predators and the elephants, especially the elephants, are killing a lot of people here. Every 
month a person is killed by an elephant.” According to government reports, seventeen people 
were killed by elephants across Botswana between August 2018 and 2019; during that year in the 
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Chobe District, seven elephants were shot in self-defense and five people were killed (Mahr, 
2019). Data on wildlife related deaths and human related deaths before the hunting ban were not 
included in Mahr’s report, which demonstrates the empirical gap in relating real human wildlife 
conflict to the practice of hunting tourism.  
Although most participants viewed the lifting of the ban as a response to an increase in 
human wildlife conflict, other people saw the lift as a political strategy to mobilize rural support 
for the upcoming presidential election, which was scheduled five months after the lift of the ban. 
One person was critical that the new presidency would actually implement the lifting of the ban, 
citing his experience with Botswana politics: “…with the new president, with the politics- there 
are promises, promises, and then they get their vote and forget about you.” Furthermore, some 
people attributed the lifting of the ban to the incoming president’s sustainable-use approach to  
resource management in comparison to the previous president’s protectionist, “pro-
photographic” approach. 
The lifting of the hunting ban is yet another disturbance to the Trophy hunting system. 
After the ban, a system without hunting tourism began to take shape. As the system underwent 
the release phase (α), most stakeholders moved into polarized positions; these views were fairly 
extreme (pro-hunting, anti-hunting) and often related to one’s stakeholder identity (i.e. tourism 
industry, village leaders, government officials). During the reorganization phase (), opinions 
and responsibilities solidified and coalitions emerged, which were mostly defined by one’s 
position on the ban. Stakeholder divisiveness on the reasons for and implications of the hunting 
ban proved to be a great challenge in cultivating social cohesion and collective learning, which 
are indicators of a system’s adaptive capacity (Walker et al., 2002). According to the community 
perspective, the post-ban system had transitioned into an undesirable state; in short, they 
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believed that they had struggled to function and grow without hunting tourism. Through the 
participants’ eyes, the government recognized and addressed this failure through the lifting of the 
ban, which would release the Trophy hunting system into another period of release and renewal. 
This chapter explores the diverse community responses to the lifting of the ban. These 
responses are types of system “feedback,” which describes how humans perceive their impact on 
ecosystems and change their behavior in response to those perceptions (Scheffer et al., 2002). 
Based on the adaptive cycle and resilience literature (Gunderson, 2000; Pelling and Manuel-
Navarrete2011), there are multiple possible paths forward for this hunting system in Botswana. 
Since it has been only a short amount of time since the last disturbance event, it is unclear at 
point which path the system will take. These next chapters will attribute key governance 
characteristics to each path which may help inform which “feedback” the system experiences 
since the lifting of the ban and going forward.  
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Figure 9. Key Aspects and Dates leading up to the Lifting of the Hunting Ban in Botswana’s Trophy hunting system. 
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Positive Feedback: A Return to the Old System 
 
Many participants responded positively to the news of the reintroduction of hunting 
tourism and insisted that hunting tourism operate in a similar state upon its return. For example, 
one participant stated: “I want it [hunting] to be done like it was done in the past. Everything the 
same” and “nothing change[s] when [it] comes back.” Participants mostly associated hunting 
tourism with community benefits and less human wildlife interactions. One person shared that 
most people were overjoyed at the news: “I am telling you that people are wallowing in 
glee…People are in a dancing mode. You know, if you have an opportunity to talk to the kgosis 
[chiefs]- you will see that there is no song, but people are dancing to the news.” Another 
participant shared: “We think about big things when hunting is coming.” Positive reactions to the 
lift not only expressed great expectations as they waited for hunting tourism to return since the 
ban was implemented.  
In this “positive feedback” of the adaptive cycle, participants projected their past 
perspectives of hunting tourism on their expectations for a return to “normal” as hunting 
returned. However, these expectations do not acknowledge changes that have occurred in the 
system after the ban such as changes in stakeholder relationships and the diversification of CBO 
economic activities. Yet, there remains a prominent belief that things will return to the phase 
prior to the ban, as one person claimed: “That is why we are willing for the hunting to come back 
again so we can get back to our normal life.”   
 
Reduced Human-Wildlife Conflict 
 
Many participants believed that a return to hunting tourism will result in less human-
wildlife conflict. By reducing the wildlife populations and targeting problem animals, people 
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believe that the return of hunting tourism will allow them to farm safely and they will be able to 
“live free of animal threats” because “…nothing disturbs us, [our] lifestyle is quiet and okay.” 
Participants believed that once hunting returned, wildlife will move into the safer areas, like 
national parks, and keep away from villages. One individual described this change in wildlife 
movement as: “…the hunting will be done close to the village up to a certain distance towards 
the photographic zone. When you do that, elephant are very clever. They will move towards the 
photographic area where there is no hunting. By doing that, you reduce the conflict, the fight in 
the village, the danger of the elephants raiding people’s fields.”  
Many people perceived the return of hunting tourism as the only solution to human-
wildlife conflict. When asked if there was any other way of co-existing with wildlife that didn’t 
involve hunting tourism, one participant responded: “Nothing except the hunting. Hunting is the 
key…all of the people in [X] are waiting for the hunting.”  
 
Improved Community Benefits 
 
With the return of hunting tourism, communities also expected to receive the same types 
of benefits as before the ban such as an increase in employment opportunities, growth in local 
businesses, and greater food security. Participants advocated for return of the status quo: “I don’t 
want anything to change. In terms of benefits, we want to have some benefits like we used to 
have when we last had hunting.” The state government’s promises to re-purpose CBNRM to 
empower communities might be partially responsible for participants’ expectations for an 
increase in community benefits once hunting is reinstated. One person revealed the government’s 
promises: “Because [of] the CBNRM program, we are told by the Minister that it [the benefits 
from hunting tourism] will come in full force back to us.”  
One way that the government might reinvigorate CBNRM is through the lifting of the 
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Land Bank Policy (LBP). According to participants, the LBP inhibited communities from 
developing productive relationships with the private sector and served as an obstacle in adapting 
to the hunting ban. The government’s promise to lift the LBP in tandem with the hunting ban 
inspired a sense of hope that CBNRM will return “in full force” and better support communities. 
With the lifting of LBP, the communities expect to be able to hold tenders for their concession 
areas and selection of operators. This change provides a foundation for the community-operator 
partnership. One individual expected that his village will work with the same hunting operators 
as before the ban: “if you take another one [hunting operator] who you have never operated with, 
you start off fresh. You will not understand. It is better to take somebody who has been doing 
that before.”  
 
Regulated Hunting Operators 
 
When endorsing the return to hunting, participants often refer to it as “controlled,” 
reinforcing this image of hunting outfits that wholly adhere to ethical and environmental 
regulations. Several participants insisted that if reinstituted, hunting outfits would not endanger 
fragile wildlife populations: “Because they are not just going to kill an elephant randomly. They 
don’t do that. They kill the biggest one.” They also shared that hunters were an integral piece in 
the maintenance of a safe landscape for wildlife: “When hunting comes back, the poaching will 
go down because they [the poachers] will realize there is hunting. You go poaching, the hunters 
who are hunting will catch you.” This connection between trusting the outfits is clear when 
people talk about how the hunting is “controlled:” “The controlled hunting, whereby there are a 
certain number of species which is given to be hunted so we don’t exceed that number.” 
These reflections on hunting tourism’s contributions to human-wildlife conflict and 
community benefits emphasize hunting tourism as overall very positive. These assumptions 
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neglect the certain changes that have occurred during the ban and the role these changes may 
play in the return of hunting tourism. Just as there were those who advocated the return of 
hunting, there were also participants who voiced concerns about the lifting of the ban. For 
example, one villager shared that hunting tourism would not mitigate human-wildlife conflicts 
because it does not target the problematic animals:  
“I believe that it is something that is in their minds that hunting will reduce. They don’t 
even know that it’s not each and every animal that will be hunted. And I believe that 
although it might come or it’s coming, I don’t believe lions- like for the lion population is 
very low- so I don’t think they will be on that list. So it is something in our minds that 
hunting will reduce [the conflict].” 
 
 Several individuals echo this participant’s reservations about the promises of hunting 
tourism, suggesting pre-existing negative impacts of hunting tourism that will return or worsen 
with the lifting of the ban. These perceptions will be explored in the next sub-section. 
 
Dissenting Feedback: A Future Without Hunting 
 Several participants challenged the reinstitution of hunting; these dissenting perspectives 
demonstrate a certain level of diversity in social attitudes that may not have existed before the 
implementation of the ban. Some of these perspectives originate from the perceived negative 
impacts of hunting tourism, but some of them are simply fundamental. For example, one person 
expressed that they just “dislike hunting”: “[Hunting is] not a part of the solution, but some will 
say it is the part of the solution. But even though wildlife is destroying people’s properties, I 
dislike hunting. They can hunt, but I don’t like hunting.” Some villagers disagree that the return 
of hunting tourism will improve and progress rural development, ecological health, and 
stakeholder relationships.  
 
Disruption of Ecological Balance 
 
One of participants’ concerns regarding the return of hunting tourism is that it will disrupt 
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ecological balance by introducing unnecessary pressure on wildlife populations. Some 
participants expressed a general sense of distrust towards the hunting outfits, viewing their 
impact on population demographics as much greater than the kill included in their quota. One 
person expressed that the hunting outfits cannot be trusted to operate within the bounds of the 
government regulations: “…every time that they [hunters] move out there with hunting, they are 
there with the wildlife. But we as villagers can’t trust something that you can’t see there. So we 
don’t put too much trust on them because we don’t know what they are doing out there.” A few 
participants believed that hunting employees, who are not locals, even assist in poaching 
operations. Due to this perceived relationship between hunting tourism and poaching, one person 
predicted that illegal trade of wildlife will increase with the return of hunting. They explained the 
situation as:  
 
“[Hunting] will be another problem….If you employ me [for the hunting outfits] to be the 
witness for hunting…I will know that the soldiers are stopping this side, wildlife is 
stopping this side, I can use the way to shoot. To be a poacher, it’s not the people who 
don’t understand that bush- to be a poacher is the one who knows that bush, they are the 
one who is going to destroy those things.” 
 
This perception that hunting is linked to poaching may also impact tourism. One tourism 
employee recalled a conversation about the lifting of the ban with a group of tourists: “Some 
people are concerned specifically about the operation of the hunts. They say that hunting will 
stop us from coming here because we know that you [hunters] will mix with poachers on the 
way.”  
 
Insufficient Community Benefits 
 
Certain individuals felt that their communities did not benefit sufficiently from their 
partnerships with hunting outfits and were skeptical about the lifting of the ban providing a better 
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future. Some concerns focused on how the reintroduction of hunting would exacerbate extant 
economic inequality within the villages and between regions. Villagers complained that, “…if 
this money is coming for the community, we just hear…those who are rich are the ones who get 
something. But poor people don’t see anything.” One person indicated that no matter the benefits 
that the communities received from their partnerships with hunting outfits, unequal power 
dynamics remain an issue. This person boldly exclaimed: 
 
“We have practiced hunting for over 20 years- what souvenir do we have from hunting? 
… do we truly know how much it costs? So the operator was even boasting for the people 
who work for him, ‘…you guys are very stupid. I am running away with a profit that I am 
making from only one elephant.’ I believe that this cheating is still going to happen 
again.” 
 
In addition, hunting outfits’ tendency to out-source labor aggravated locals that were not 
benefitting enough in terms of direct employment opportunities.  
Some participants believed that the photo-tourism industry provides more long-term 
sustainable benefits than the hunting tourism industry. Once hunting was reintroduced, there was 
fear that the operation and reputation of hunting outfits would stifle the growth of photo tourism. 
As one person shared, “…if you come here for photographic [safari], definitely you don’t want 
to see an animal killed.” Another feared that with hunting, wildlife would move away and 
become less interactive with tourists during photo safaris: “…now if we have somebody saying 
that we should be introducing [hunting] here, what is going to happen to our elephant 
population? Tourists are coming for those elephants.”  
 
Distrust Among Stakeholders 
The villages’ perceptions of trust towards the CBO government, the photo tourism 
industry, and the state government that were already fragile due to histories of mistreatment and 
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suppression, were further exacerbated by the hunting ban and the lack of proper response on 
behalf of the villages. According to some participants, the photo tourism industry’s position 
against hunting tourism demonstrated their lack of support for local community empowerment 
and development. The tension between the photo and hunting tourism industries may challenge 
their capacity to collaborate together in the future. For instance, one person interpreted the 
“photographers” anti-hunting position as an attack on the village way of life: “…they 
[photographers] don’t want guns to be shot. They want to preserve wild animals. they don’t want 
to take care of our [village] life. They want us to move from our culture to where they want us to 
live.”  
 Throughout the ban, the villagers also lost trust in the CBO’s leadership capacity 
resulting in critiques of the return of hunting and its ability to benefit the communities. For 
example, one person shared that the management of the trust has become less transparent and 
their decision-making processes do not properly include the diverse village voices:  
“But I feel that we do not benefit equally as community members because there are some 
changes on…like in our way of operation. So normally when it comes to decision 
making, we vote through majority. That’s how we used to operate. But now, I feel like it 
is not like that now. Now the decisions are taken only by the management.”  
 
 Another individual referred to this change in local governance as a “gap” between 
leadership and community: “When you look at it right now, it seems like there is that gap, but 
once that gap can be closed, I think it will lead into some development.” Others are certain that 
leaders’ lack of transparency regarding CBNRM funds will persist with the reintroduction of 
hunting: “…we will be told that there is somebody who has paid some money for a lion or 
buffalo, and we are not gaining anything.” 
 Lastly, the state government’s lack of guidance and planning to prepare the communities 
for the hunting ban generated distrust between the two entities, which may provide a challenge 
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when responding to the lifting of the ban. The communities’ distrust of the state during the 
hunting ban was often attributed to geographic distance and a lack of local context in the state’s 
decisions. For example, one individual stated: “…most of the people who are in the capitol town, 
they are educated people, and also they are free from the kind of life that we are living here. So 
they can make some points and do what [they want].”  People expressed uncertainty about future 
plans doubted that they are going to be included in the process of defining the hunting 
management plans: “I don’t know the model [for hunting] that they are going to use. They are 
figuring out how it should be done without consulting us here- the people who are really on the 
ground.”  
 In addition to those community members that fully endorsed and rejected the 
reintroduction of hunting, there are individuals who advocated for a return to hunting on the 
condition that it be new and improved.  
 
Critical Feedback: Hopeful for A New Hunting System 
 
Although there are many participants that are looking forward to the reintroduction of 
hunting tourism, they also seek several changes to the operation and management of the hunting 
system that will better reflect community interests. Whether or not these opinions will be 
addressed and executed through the final hunting management plan remains to be seen. One of 
the call for improvements included a community-based economic plan that is less dependent on 
hunting tourism and structural changes to empower communities in CBNRM. One community 
leader shared how the hunting ban served as a critical period that allowed individuals to reflect 
on the local socio-economic and ecological impacts of hunting tourism and generate their own 
critiques of the hunting system. This person explained: 
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“…[the ban] helped us. Yes, it opened our eyes because after the ban, we were thinking- 
for over ten years that we’ve been hunting. What did we do? What we can look back and 
say, for ten years, with these hunters, we did this. So, we used to use the money [from 
hunting] in the village for some development. Not doing something which will come in 
place of hunting if hunting will stop. When the money comes for hunting, we will invest 
this money in other things that will bring money into the village so that if after five years, 
ten years, the government thinks we will stop hunting again- we are not hard hit like we 
were, because we learned.” 
 
Economic Diversification 
 
After the hunting ban, communities realized that they could not be as dependent on 
hunting tourism for economic stability. Photo-tourism and heritage tourism projects, like cultural 
villages, offered an opportunity for economic diversification. One person expressed their desire 
to develop a village in ways that would interest more tourists in their culture: “we need to work 
here…and develop…So that people [tourists] can, maybe when they pass here, they can find it 
interesting…We must make it so our village can interact with other people when they pass here.” 
One person noted that ideas for this kind of local development did not exist when hunting outfits 
were operating: “[Now] they are making baskets, beads…they are making profit for the 
community. But when there was hunting, people were not thinking about this. They were just 
killing animals. After hunting, they opened…and this means that they have the vision to do 
things.” Funds from hunting can be used to initiate these development projects until they become 
self-sustaining. 
In addition to developing a diverse economic portfolio that is less dependent on hunting 
tourism, some participants saw how hunting can help them achieve personal goals. For instance, 
one woman shared that she plans to use employment for the hunting outfits as a financial 
stepping-stone to attend business school. She stated that before the hunting ban, she was content 
with her life working for the outfits and didn’t think about going to school. But after the ban, she 
realized that “…education is the most important thing…I needed a better job instead of staying.”  
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Diversification of Strategies for Human-Wildlife Conflict 
 
 After the hunting ban, some community members became more open to diverse and new 
solutions to address human-wildlife conflict. One participant asserted “I believe hunting or no 
hunting- we can control the animals. We can make good corridors for them. It’s just managing 
them.” Possible strategies to alleviate human wildlife issues include methods like the use of chili 
peppers, DWNP patrols, and wildlife corridors that been effective at times, but need to receive 
more support in order to improve in efficacy. For instance, farmers report that the smell of ‘peri 
peri’ or chili peppers aggravates elephants and the plant can be hung on fences to deter elephant 
travel through their fields. However, one farmer shared that there are challenges to its 
implementation: “…it’s a lot of work to do it” and sometimes supplies run out. In addition, one 
person shared that if DWNP hired more personnel and constructed stations more evenly 
throughout the remote areas, they could respond to complaints more quickly and prevent more 
conflicts. Opening boreholes to attract wildlife away from human settlements, translocating 
problematic wildlife, and building electric fences to encircle the villages were mentioned as other 
possible strategies.  
 
Operation of the Hunting Outfits 
 
In general, participants that advocated for a return to hunting tourism want the operations 
to be more ethical and sustainable such as tightening quotas to be stricter about which species are 
included. One person suggested that the hunting quotas solely include elephants: “They have to 
specialize on the elephants and not the cats because the cats’ numbers are very low.” Another 
person echoed this sentiment: “There are those animals that I feel shouldn’t even be touched. 
There is only one species that I feel should be dealt with, which is the elephant.” Some of these 
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requests are less feasible than others, like one person demanded that hunters pay for each bullet 
they shoot until their targeted animal is effectively killed: “one elephant, one bullet, have to pay 
again, just shoot once, don’t shoot twice.”  
In concert with stricter regulations, some participants want to adopt a more adaptive 
management approach to the hunting operations. One person shared that “I know for sure that at 
some point, the hunting ban will come. It is a sustainable tool. We want it that way. At some 
point it will come, stop for a while, we review our things, are we still okay? Then we come back 
again, introduce it.” Some people envision that hunting should be cyclical and that hunting 
tourism should operate as long enough for sufficient funds to be channeled into conservation and 
be banned when wildlife populations show signs of diminishing. Allocating funds to 
conservation efforts and rural development projects need not be separate objectives, as one 
individual noted: “…we can [use the hunting money] to pay compensation for our villagers so 
that they feel that our resources are looking after them as well. The board will do that through 
their managers- not the government.” One individual shared that adopting an adaptive approach 
for hunting tourism will be challenging and stakeholders need to be very careful because “…at 
the end you could end up having nothing to hunt.”  
 
Re-Structuring Community Based Natural Resource Management 
 
Many participants’ recommendations to improve hunting tourism included redefining the 
terms of joint venture partnerships so that communities might receive more benefits. An integral 
part of the CBNRM program, joint venture partnerships are any arrangement between the private 
sector and the communities who have rights over natural resources (DWNP, 1999). According to 
a 2001 report, although the partnership could lead to the co-development and management of a 
lodge, most JVPs in CBOs take the form of sub-lease agreements where a safari company just 
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pays a community for its use of the quota and land for tourist hunts (Gujadhur, 2001).  
There has been a call to reform JVPs so that communities are not just involved in a 
formal agreement, but they actively participate in its formation and implementation (ibid).  A 
few of these demands are greater pensions for elders, more expensive quotas and land rentals, 
and requirements to hire locals. One person shared that these changes would ensure that 
“…everything would be more citizen empowerment centered.” Another community leader 
advocated including lawyers and a government appointed advisory committee in the crafting of 
contracts between the private sector and the communities. The inclusion of these external parties 
may provide villages with the proper information and legitimacy they need to make agreements 
that reflect community values. One person shared that developing better agreements can be 
achieved through “…the proper alignment of government and trust rules and policies….once 
they are put in as requirements, any hunter who is hunting will know, looking at that, whether or 
not they are fitting or not.” 
While it’s clear some participants’ recommendations explicitly concern the terms of the 
joint venture partnerships, some individuals’ demands require restructuring CBNRM. 
Participants would like to see the villages gradually adopt some of the responsibilities that are 
usually reserved for the hunting safari companies, such as the advertisement and sale of quotas to 
interested tourists. One person shared, “the community should sell the quota, not to the JVP, but 
sell it directly overseas because they…can have the travel agent there who can help them market 
their quota. I think the community can earn more than the JVP.” Individuals would not only like 
to see the villages market quotas to potential tourists, but want the ownership of lodges and 
campsites to gradually transfer to the CBOs.  
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Another way that participants believed the hunting system could be more community-
centric would be to institute a citizen hunting initiative, whereby individuals could qualify for 
rare quotas and exercise traditional hunting practices on their land. One former hunter claimed 
that the raffle system was better because “rich or poor”, one could be granted a quota and access 
to meat; he believed that a lottery would increase the community’s sense of ownership, because 
if you won an animal “It was yours. You could sell it and do something with your life with that 
money.” According to the new management plan (DWNP, 2019), a citizen hunting permit cost 
8,000P ($696 USD); knowledge of this high price during these interviews may have reduced 
expectations about their capacity to participate in a hunting raffle system. Another individual 
shared that quotas should only be given out to professional hunters to ensure that regulations are 
followed more tightly, which could be challenging in a new lottery system.  
In general, respondents envision new social structures that prioritize accountability 
between representatives and constituents. They want to see more regular in-person 
communication between government officials and villagers regarding the action or lack of action 
on their recommended changes to the system. One person shared that these two groups will only 
achieve this level of communication if the government is “…close to the community and engages 
with them [the communities] on almost everything [policies] that the government wants to 
change or wants to implement.” Community members also would like their CBO leaders to have 
experience in business and be a diverse group in age: “…we have to take maybe five youth and 
five elders so that maybe if the youth didn’t get things right, the old people will say “no, we will 
do it this way, not that way.” By having a board that is diverse in age, recommendations and 
proposals might be more reflective of the wide spectrum of community needs. 
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Whether or not participants believe that these changes will be enacted is unclear. One 
person frankly stated “And I’m not sure what is going to happen.” However, participants do 
articulate a number of structural adjustments that need to be made in order to make these changes 
feasible. 
 
Discussion 
 
Key Aspects of the Lifting of the Ban: Future Scenarios and Adaptive Capacity 
 
Both the ban in 2014 and its lifting of the ban in 2019 serve as disturbances to the Trophy 
hunting system. Some CBOs were able to survive without hunting tourism; however, the 
capacity to adapt was limited. Adaptive capacity is understood as the “….ability of a system to 
evolve in order to accommodate perturbations or to expand the range of variability within which 
it can cope (Adger, 2004, p.32) and an increased agency among stakeholders to negotiate among 
different interests to overcome negative collective action outcomes (Armitage, 2005). Thus, 
adaptive capacity is related largely to a system’s ability to allow for diverse thought and 
accommodate unexpected change. One of the major indicators of adaptive capacity in the revived 
Botswana hunting system is how the state incorporates community feedback in the planning and 
implementation of the hunting operations. The lifting of the ban seemed to be in response to the 
negative local feedback to the hunting moratorium; however, the decision to lift the ban could 
have been political strategizing. Thus, the adaptive or mal-adaptive nature of the system will be 
revealed in how the new hunting system is implemented and specifically, how community 
feedback is incorporate in policies and planning. 
The return of hunting could signify a system transformation or the persistence of an old, 
mal-adjusted system. Transformability is the capacity to create a new system in the face of a 
disturbance, which can include shifts in norms or values, patterns of interactions among network 
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members, patterns of use or consumption, and shift in organizational and political relationships 
(Carpenter et al. 2001). According to Gunderson (2000), after a disturbance, the management 
actions are: to do nothing and wait for the system to return to its desired state,  to “…actively 
manage the system and try to return [it] to a desirable stability domain, or to “…admit that the 
system is irreversibly changed and…to adapt to the new altered system” (Gunderson, 2000, p. 
432). Because this research took place after the lifting of the ban and before the re-
implementation of hunting, it is unclear whether the system will return to the original state, adopt 
a more balanced state, or attempt an entirely new configuration. To inform resilience of this 
Trophy hunting system, it is helpful to envision different future scenarios, discuss ways that they 
might be reached, and make inferences about each scenarios’ adaptive capacity (Folke et al., 
2002). Figure 10 shows three potential future scenarios for how the new trophy hunting system 
in Botswana will proceed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124 
 
 
Figure 10. Key Aspects and Dates of Possible Future Scenarios for a new Trophy hunting system in Botswana.  
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Scenario A: A Return to Old Hunting Tourism 
 
Although it is impossible to completely return to a pre-ban Trophy hunting system, one 
potential future scenario is to adopt a configuration that is very similar to the “old” system in 
function and structure. The ringing endorsement of the lifting of the ban may prevent certain 
critiques with the old hunting system from being addressed (see “Positive Feedback”) and these 
conservative attitudes can reinforce the dominant social structures, stifling the growth of new 
institutions. One individual shared the predominance of this perspective: “Most people will say 
that we want hunting to go back like they said it used to be.” In times of crisis, this local-level 
desire to return to the old state or “way of doing things” is well documented (Inglehart and 
Baker, 2000); especially within impoverished communities that live under more stressful 
conditions. Although a return to the old hunting tourism system might be embraced by most of 
the rural communities, a move like this could risk ignoring the power of other drivers in the 
system.  
The revival of certain dominant structures which excluded local knowledge from higher-
level decision making and a lack of accountability and transparency will indicate a return to the 
old system. Although communities have generated many recommendations since the ban, they 
lack certain information that would help clarify the feasibility of these recommendations and 
shape their expected outcomes. There is a lack of awareness regarding the types and amount of 
resources that might be required to enact their demands, like an increase in personnel to enforce 
stricter regulations on hunts and timely evaluations of wildlife populations. The perceived 
population of elephants in Botswana provided a key piece of information to decisions regarding 
the hunting system and it is a prime example of how misinformation can generate polarized 
 
 126 
perceptions about resource management and stifle the growth of adaptive capacity (Tiam Fook, 
2015).  
The political realities of a lack of local awareness of decision-making, governance, and 
communication are all signs of decreased agency in social actors that may predict a return to the 
old system and a reduced adaptive capacity (Armitage, 2005; Ballard and Belsky, 2010). With its 
low diversity and rigid structures that are resistant to change, a return to the “old system” may be 
more politically acceptable and may be interpreted as more desirable. However, the system’s 
return to normal can be a ‘rigidity trap,’ where uncritical consensus or suppression of alternatives 
leads to an excessively stable institutionalized regime (Scheffer et al., 2002). If hunting tourism 
succeeds in asserting its dominancy in the Trophy hunting system, it is very possible that the 
system will, once again become vulnerable to change and at greater risk of catastrophic collapse 
(Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete, 2011).  
 
Scenario B: A More Community-Centric Hunting System 
 
Old structures have begun to emerge in this transition period after the lifting of the ban 
and participants are providing critical feedback that could re-shape these structures in ways that 
represent a more diverse group of stakeholders and build resilience in the new hunting system 
(Folke, 2006). This critical feedback includes the reversal of the Land Bank Policy, more 
accountable leadership in the trust, and greater community benefits from partnerships with 
hunting outfits. According to the adaptive cycle model, the implementation of participants’ 
recommendations to the new hunting system is dependent on strong social capital and the 
emergence of complementary social structures (Scheffer et al., 2002; Pelling and Manuel-
Navarrete, 2011). Thus, many of these changes that participants would like to see are only 
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possible with robust and transparent communication and consultation between the state 
government, CBO government, and the villages.  
Disturbance events and crises can provide opportunities for learning and innovation and 
diversify adaptive responses, like the improved knowledge of risk among those affected and 
increased awareness of vulnerability (Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete, 2011). Critical responses 
that encourage the conditional return of hunting demonstrate that respondents have learned about 
how hunting tourism can rigidify and monopolize the Trophy hunting system in negative ways. 
These responses qualify as the type of systematic “remembering” that happens in response to a 
shock (Folke, 2006). Participants’ comments on the inequity of benefit distribution and their 
interest in cultivating local economies that focus more on photo and cultural tourism reveal 
unpleasant memories of the communities’ dependencies on tourist hunts for economic, cultural, 
and political sustenance. This “remembering” of the negatives of hunting tourism could combat a 
certain attitude that might encourage the suppression of these negative memories in favor of a 
system that upholds the powerful (in this case, the tourism industry and the state). The 
incorporation of this critical feedback in the new system may improve adaptive capacity and help 
build resilience (ibid). In the trophy hunting literature, there are many studies that have assessed 
community feedback and provided recommendations for how to incorporate this feedback to 
improve hunting planning and management (Jew and Bonnington, 2011; Garvin, 2017). 
However, whether or not these recommendations are pursued in Botswana remains unknown. 
The incorporation of community feedback into the new hunting system could set a precedent for 
the village and state institutions to develop creative livelihood options and improved 
accountability mechanisms (Speranza et al., 2014; Whitney et al., 2017). 
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Scenario C: An Adaptive Hunting System 
 
After the lifting of the ban, one possible future scenario for the Trophy hunting system is 
to adopt a more adaptive management approach to hunting. In this approach, trophy hunting 
tourism is not a permanent fixture in the system’s structure, but an activity that is brought in and 
put on pause based on the system’s diverse social and ecological feedback. Adaptive 
management “assumes surprises are inevitable…knowledge will always be incomplete, and 
human interaction with ecosystems will always be evolving” (Gunderson, 2000, p. 433). In 
adaptive management governance, the system utilizes a knowledge base that has accumulated 
over time to respond and conform to changes in natural resources and encourages a diversity of 
resources for livelihood security to keep options open and minimize risk; these characteristics of 
governance are very similar to management approaches informed by traditional knowledge 
(Berkes et al., 2000). With an adaptive management approach, the Trophy hunting system will be 
designed for more gradual responses to changes in policy and the system will decrease its 
dependency on trophy hunting. 
The hunting system is dictated by social and ecological interactions and dynamic 
feedbacks. For instance, the pressure to hunt increases when HWC appears to increase; however, 
problematically, the return of hunting may not address these conflicts (Blackie, 2019). In an 
adaptive system, these types of social and ecological feedback would still inform management 
actions, but the system would build greater resilience through the diversification and innovation 
necessary to function through periods of non-hunting.  
In order to create an adaptive management system, Gunderson (2000) suggests “1) 
highlight uncertainties 2) develop/evaluate hypothesis (policies) around set of desired system 
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outcomes 3) structure actions to evaluate or test these policies, to see if they result in action” (p. 
434). Key indicators that the system has the ability to try an adaptive approach include structures 
that incorporate diverse stakeholder feedback and an emphasis on risk management, and operate 
in a more flexible and uncertain space (Gunderson, 2000; Scheffer and Westley, 2007). 
Stakeholders may feel uncomfortable with the risks and short-term costs that come with an 
enhanced flexibility. An adaptive system might embody what Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete 
(2011) poses as the “ideal state of resilience,” (p. 10) where the function and structure of the 
system takes place across the four phases (stabilization, release, reorganization, growth). In this 
context, the characteristics of each phase balance each other with enough rigidity for the system 
to continue to function and opportunity for the exploration of diverse, novel elements.   
These three scenarios are not all inclusive, nor should they be; one way to practice and 
build resilience is facilitating a social environment that creates opportunities to learn and 
increase adaptive capacity “…without foreclosing future development options” (Folke et al., 
2002, p.437). There may be adaptations and challenges that seem one way now and actually turn 
out to being integral in building resilience within the system. Thus, it may take years for lessons 
harvested from the hunting ban to reveal themselves and prove useful, and if this does happen, it 
will be difficult to link these lessons to the ban. In general, resilience theory and the adaptive 
cycle model advocate for the creation of space within and between processes and structures to 
allow new components and ideas to be seen (Pelling and Manuel-Navarrete, 2011). 
 After the lifting of the ban, the Trophy hunting system is operating in a period of 
“reorganization,” where hopefully, social institutions adjust to incorporate the lessons that the 
system has learned from the initial disturbance of the hunting ban. Whether or not the new 
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system incorporates participants’ feedback will illuminate our understanding of the resilience of 
Botswana’s Trophy hunting system. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
 
Summary of Findings 
This study provides an in-depth understanding of how livelihoods and perceptions of 
wildlife throughout Botswana’s CBOs have responded to and changed in the face of drastic shifts 
in national hunting policies (the 2014 hunting ban and the 2019 lifting of the ban). By applying 
the adaptive cycle model to Botswana’s Trophy hunting system, it is possible to view the ban as 
a disturbance that disrupted a stable system (k) and initiated phases of release () and 
reorganization (α). Figure 11 shows the key aspects and dates of all of the adaptive cycle phases 
of Botswana’s trophy hunting system, leading up to the 2014 ban and the 2019 lifting of the ban. 
The ban provoked a system-wide collapse: old structures that had become fixtures and stabilized 
the Trophy hunting system failed and space for new ideas and institution to take hold opened 
(Figure 9). Figure 10 shows three potential future scenarios for how the new trophy hunting 
system in Botswana will proceed. 
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Figure 11. All the Key Aspects and Dates of Botswana’s Trophy hunting system. 
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The majority of CBO members perceived the new system without hunting as unstable 
and inconducive to their livelihoods, their culture, and wildlife conservation. Their feedback 
suggests that there was tension between the communities and wildlife and that hunting tourism 
was the stabilizing factor that kept this relationship functioning. In general, communities 
considered a system without hunting as undesirable; however, a “desirable” system is not always 
the most resilient and can be the result of a maladaptive system (Holling, 2001). Thus, even 
though a system with hunting tourism seems to be the most desirable (at least according to most 
community members), it may not be the most resilient system and its principles and structures 
may not adapt to crises or translate well into alternate states. 
 This study’s findings support previous research that has explored the role of trophy 
hunting tourism in human wildlife conflict mitigation and community perception of wildlife and 
protected areas; however, this study also acknowledges the unique aspects of Northern 
Botswana’s local social-ecological system and the evolution of this system over time through the 
application of the adaptive cycle model. Various studies associate perceived benefits from trophy 
hunting tourism with a positive local attitude towards wildlife conservation (Mbaiwa, 2004; 
Nelson et al., 2013) and state that if hunting were banned, local communities would respond by 
rejecting protectionist conservation principles and engaging in activities that exploit wildlife or 
compete with wildlife for land (Naidoo et al., 2016). The impacts of the Botswana hunting ban 
on the Trophy hunting system are well documented; these changes include a decrease in income 
for local development projects, the loss of access to meat, and less funding for conservation 
efforts (Onishi, 2015; LaRocco, 2016; Mbaiwa, 2018; Blackie, 2019). These studies illuminated 
how both the protection and sustainability of rural livelihoods had become dependent on the 
practice of trophy hunting tourism. However, this research lacked a more holistic perspective 
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that would acknowledge rural communities’ agency and capacity to respond to the ban and the 
power structures that might empower or inhibit their responses. If some CBOs were able to 
survive and even, grow, during the system’s release and reorganization phases after the ban, 
decision-makers can create policies or processes that make it possible for other CBOS to adopt 
similar strategies. 
 Although the ban created severe challenges for hunting CBOs and challenged societal 
resilience, results from this study also indicate that the ban provided opportunity for learning and 
innovative responses. One salient response was communities’ realization that they cannot rely so 
heavily on hunting tourism as their main economic activity. Learning and innovation were 
inhibited by lack of economic diversification and a reliance on government aid, suggesting that 
certain structures that dominated the “old” Trophy hunting system (pre-ban) were still influential 
and prevented the post-ban system from growing or evolving into a more stable system that 
functioned without hunting tourism. Even though the lifting of the ban was considered a 
response to community struggles, the lifting of ban also served as another disturbance to the 
Trophy hunting system. How the system incorporates stakeholder feedback, especially in regards 
to rural dependency on trophy hunting, can provide insight on the system’s overall adaptive 
capacity. 
 
Outlines for the 2019 New Hunting Management Plan 
The government of Botswana has moved forward with a hunting management plan and 
the new plan does consider some of the recommendations and feedback of various stakeholders, 
especially the CBOs. In a recent government publication that outlined the new hunting and escort 
guidelines for the 2019 season (Republic of Botswana, 2019), the guiding principles appear to 
integrate community members’ critical feedback. Some of the most community-centric guiding 
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principles that determine the location of the hunting concessions were where: “1) Problem 
Animal Control (PAC) and Human Wildlife Conflict (HWC) is high, 2) CBOs have lost 
significant revenue due to the hunting moratorium, provision of employment and protein, 3) 
poaching incidents have been consistently reported” (p. 6). While these guidelines seem to have 
incorporated the lessons and recommendations that community members developed from their 
experience of the hunting ban, the ambiguity of some of the language in the recommendations 
and the selection of the locations for hunting concessions allows for alternative interpretations 
that may disempower communities. It is also important to acknowledge that, in the aftermath of 
the lifting of the ban, the government of Botswana has opted to refer to the ‘hunting ban’ as a 
‘suspension’ or ‘moratorium’ in official publications regarding trophy hunting policy (ibid, 
2019). Framing the hunting ban as a calculated suspension could risk diminishing the 
stakeholders’, and especially the CBOs’, traumatic experiences of the hunting ban. It is necessary 
to give notice to this change in rhetoric around the evolution of trophy hunting policy in 
Botswana in order to preserve the community experience of the ban as a ‘ban’ for future 
interpretations of hunting policy by the national government or outsiders. 
 In some ways, the new guidelines completely counteract certain CBOs’ expectations and 
demands for the new hunting system. Firstly, in the map displaying the new controlled hunting 
areas (See Appendix 3), the CBOs of Mababe and Sankuyo are not granted hunting concessions 
and instead, their areas (NG/41, NG/42, NG/43, and NG/34) are allocated for “maximizing 
benefits through non consumptive utilization”. The Chobe Enclave will receive one hunting 
concession on the Western End (CH/1) and the other concession (CH/2) will remain as a 
protected area in the Chobe National Park. Therefore, although all three CBOs were planning on 
the return of hunting tourism to their lands and communities, the new hunting management plan 
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will only meet the expectations and demands of CECT. CECT has the opportunity to experience 
Scenarios A, B, or C as discussed above (Figure 10). Mababe and Sankuyo will continue 
growing towards a system without hunting tourism and will most likely benefit from a system 
that is adaptive (Scenario C), where the priorities of all stakeholders of the Trophy hunting 
system are taken into consideration and hunting tourism adapts to the social/ecological feedback 
of wildlife population numbers and local perceptions of human wildlife conflict. 
 The current management plan does acknowledge a few pieces of feedback, like the 
allocation of lands to citizen hunting raffles and the mandatory increase in partnerships with 
Batswana owned/based operators. However, the raffle quotas are expensive (8,000 Pula or $800 
USD) and require the winners to travel to certain regions of the country to use the licenses. 
Furthermore, some participants argued during interviews that whether or not a company is 
“Batswana-owned or based” will not explicitly address the systemic racism that extends into the 
national tourism industry and often favors White Batswana (both ex-pats with Botswana 
citizenship and White native Batswana) over Black Botswana. This lack of clear language may 
fail to address concerns about the hunting industry’s economic leakage and perpetuate feelings of 
a lack of locally derived benefits.  
 In general, this management plan does not trend towards adopting an adaptive 
management approach for hunting tourism. The plan does seem to have incorporated various 
stakeholders’ recommendations for how hunts are to be operated and managed (Scenario B), 
which indicates a certain level of adaptive capacity that could be valuable when experiencing 
future ecological or political disturbances. The plan neglects some of the CBOs’ obvious 
demands and it is unclear how the state plans on supporting the CBOs (Mababe and Sankuyo) 
that were relying on the return of hunting and are excluded from the new plan.  
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 Overall, it seems like the system is leaning towards a Scenario B, where some feedback is 
incorporated and some of the top-down, exclusive structures still dominate the system. However, 
with the recent development of COVID-19, which will decrease international travel for tourism 
in the 2020 and 2021 seasons, Botswana may have to develop an interim management plan to 
support hunting CBOs when the demand for hunts is low or non-existent. Perhaps the 
development of an interim plan could be an adaptation that may be the beginning of a more 
flexible and uncertain, yet resilient, Trophy hunting system. 
 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
Within scope of the study, there are multiple recommendations for maximizing benefits 
and minimizing challenges of trophy hunting tourism development in Northern Botswana.  
 
Convene a trophy hunting working group to develop a shared vision. 
 
If Botswana desires an approach that has the potential to produce long term, inclusive, 
sustainable human-environment relationships, it’s worth considering the formation of a multi-
stakeholder working group. This collaborative would be inclusive, involving representatives of 
each stakeholder group (e.g. village traditional government, tourism employees from the village, 
representatives of cultural tourism in villages, photo-tourism industry, hunting industry, 
international animal welfare groups, wildlife biologists). A tentative list could include: various 
hunting and non-hunting CBOs, government officials, conservation biologists of NGOs, 
representatives of KAZA-TFCA, and private tourism business owners. It might be most useful if 
the collaborative remain district specific, as each district has its own challenges and opportunities 
in terms of natural resource management. The intention behind the working group would be to 
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create “an even playing field” where traditional power dynamics are mediated and group-
thinking is employed to frame problems, create objectives and solutions. A multi-party 
collaboration might be especially helpful in the villages of Mababe and CECT, which struggle 
with contentious relations between the traditional government, the CBO government, and the 
villages. 
Before a working group can even be formed, a stakeholder assessment analysis would 
need to be conducted to evaluate which parties would be capable and interested in participating. 
In order to maintain the impartiality of the process, the national government would need to hire a 
facilitator to conduct the stakeholder assessment and eventually, facilitate the formation of the 
working group. By viewing and discussing the interests as a group of stakeholders, there is also 
the potential to generate a greater sense of compassion between traditionally polarized groups, 
which could lead to stronger relationships down the road and open the door to potential 
collaborative efforts in the future. Ultimately, the working group would communicate problems 
and potential solutions to managers and politicians. 
 
Move towards a more adaptive hunting management system through reflection of lessons learned 
from the ban. 
The Trophy hunting system is a system that seeks to stabilize wildlife populations and 
trophy hunts, which is an approach that increases vulnerability of the system to unexpected 
change. The system would benefit from a gradual shift to an adaptive management system. 
Adaptive management governance involves a flexible structure and set of policies that can deal 
with uncertainty and change. To achieve this, it is necessary to change how we relate to and 
govern social-ecological systems. 
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One of the lessons learned from the hunting ban is that trophy hunting tourism serves as a 
key component in stabilizing rural livelihoods and sustaining local support for conservation. 
Change within and towards systems is inevitable; as an economic activity and social custom, 
trophy hunting is particularly susceptible to changes in international attitudes and can affect 
national leaders’ politics. Thus, learning how to live and thrive without trophy hunting is a useful 
practice. The exploration of an adaptive management approach to trophy hunting tourism is 
especially relevant in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, which will undoubtedly reduce the 
international demand for hunting this fall and present a “ban-like” situation for sub-Saharan 
nations with trophy hunting.  
Strategies to transform governance for improved management in response to crisis include: 
• Convening a voluntary hunting working group, which would create a network that 
connects individuals, organizations, agencies and institutions at multiple organizational 
levels and increase the Trophy hunting system’s capacity to learn from, respond to, and 
manage change.  
 
• Create a portfolio of projects that could be launched whenever there is an opening and the 
time is right, whether that be dependent on political climate or funding. 
 
 
• Create accountability systems that ensure local, regional, and national leaders uphold 
certain adaptive management principles, like: generating and integrating diversity of 
ideas, viewpoints, and solutions; communicating and engaging with key individuals in 
different sectors; promoting and stewarding experimentation at smaller scales 
 
• Create a monitoring system that will continuously test and reflect on the knowledge that 
is being used to inform Natural Resource Management decisions 
 
 
• Practice patience. The time horizon for effect and assessment is at least 30-50 years; 
building resilience is all about slow dynamics 
 
Primary recommendations at the CBO level include: 
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• Continue to “bench-mark” amongst CBOs (domestic and international, i.e. Namibia) to 
create stronger network through which problems and solutions can be discussed. A CBO 
network could also be helpful in creating a unified voice to continue to express post-ban 
challenges and advocate for hunting policies that better benefit the communities.  
 
• Despite a fragile relationship due to a history of broken or transient promises, CBOs 
became more open to collaborating with NGOs during the ban. Continue strengthening 
partnerships with NGOs and engage in smaller scale experiments to address local 
problems, especially around human wildlife conflict. 
 
• Encourage the use of technology to monitor human wildlife conflicts within CBOs. 
Participants shared that Facebook or WhatsApp were useful tools to announce local 
wildlife sightings to other villagers. Updates on wildlife through social media helped 
prepare villagers for potential encounters. 
  
• Continue to develop community-based economic ventures external to photo tourism, 
which provided relief to the communities by localizing certain essential services and 
providing employment opportunities. 
 
• Lobby for stricter regulations that dictate the terms of JVPs with hunting and photo-
tourism companies to ensure a transfer of business and marketing-based skills to locals as 
well as a gradual increase in CBO ownership of assets over time (perhaps this is achieved 
through the achievement of specific goals).  
 
• Demand more frequent in person visits from government officials, especially those 
working in Gabarone’s CBNRM and Rural Development and Improvement units. The 
geographic distance between the villages and permanent residences of the decision 
makers can cause improper distribution of resources. More visitations from government 
officials to evaluate the community’s specific social, environmental, and economic needs 
can lead to more appropriate and effective allocation of resources.  
 
• Challenge adopted practices related to achieving food security. In most CBOs, 
agricultural production is not a viable option and will only become less effective with 
climate change and threats from wildlife.  
 
Limitations of Research 
 
As with all research, there are limitations to this study. There are a number of 
methodological limitations and research biases that are inherent to conducting qualitative cross-
cultural research (Chilisa, 2012). The qualitative methods of semi-structured interviews 
permitted a more in-depth understanding on the topic, but also limited the sample size of the 
interviews. This study sampled a subset of community-based organizations in Botswana and 
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thus, it may not be possible to extrapolate the results and implications to the greater network of 
the nation’s CBOs. Furthermore, I spent one to two weeks in each village and worked with a few 
escorts, whom served as community guardians (Tosun, 2000) and orchestrated a substantial 
portion of the interviews; their guidance, while helpful and essential to respect community 
expectations for outsiders, may have influenced which individuals participated in the study and 
ultimately, over-represented certain perspectives in the findings. For example, one of the escorts 
who considered themselves “pro-hunting” may have introduced me to other community 
members that shared the same point of view, in order to cultivate the impression of a village 
united in their full endorsement of trophy hunting tourism. 
When reviewing this study, it is prudent to consider the limitations of the adaptive 
capacity model. Firstly, this study focuses on the “local” level and social aspects of the Trophy 
hunting system; it neglects to observe the interaction between the system’s longer term and 
shorter term ecological and biophysical components and how these interactions change our 
understanding of the system’s resilience and adaptive capacity. Additionally, an Afro-centric 
understanding of a resilient and adaptive system can be entirely different than a Western-
European conceptualization (Theron et al. 2012), which might influence this study’s 
interpretation of the adaptive capacity of the CBOs in the Trophy hunting system. Policies based 
only on local scale dynamics can lead to an inaccurate understanding about the state of a larger 
system and consequently, misinform management actions, and vice versa (Linstadter et al., 
2016).   This study focuses on the regulatory environment, framing the hunting ban and lifting of 
the ban as the major disturbances that dictate the function and structure of the social-ecological 
system. However, this framing excludes other potential disturbances that may have occurred at 
different levels throughout the system. 
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 Adaptive capacity is difficult to generalize across time and space, so factors like 
economic diversification and a cultural willingness, that enhanced CBOs’ adaptation post 
hunting ban may not hold true for crisis-stricken communities in other nations that also heavily 
depend on some form of tourism (Ostrom et al., 2007). There is a latency issue when studying 
adaptive capacity in systems (Engle, 2011) and knowing what circumstances were essential to 
fostering specific adaptations is difficult to ascertain. Thus, it’s challenging to operationalize 
adaptive capacity, especially because its determinants of are not independent of one another and 
the way they interact to create adaptive capacity varies in space and time (Tompkins and Adger, 
2004).  
 
Future Research 
 
There is a need for future research on the linkages between trophy hunting tourism, rural 
livelihoods, and wildlife conservation in addition to how this research translates into action. 
Some topics for future research include: 
 
• Perceptions of trust between stakeholders and the relationship to challenges, 
opportunities, and strategies that exist in building a collaborative trophy hunting network.   
 
• Connection between social and cultural histories across villages and how these 
differences and how these influence CBNRM governance.  
 
• Relationship between trophy hunting tourism, poaching, and local motivations to 
participate in the illegal wildlife trade.  
 
• Analysis of “adaptive capacity” through a critical theory lens and exploring the 
relationship between gender and community action in an indigenous and colonial context. 
 
Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
 
This study has both theoretical and practical contributions. In terms of practical aspects, it 
contributes to the understanding of adaptive capacity of Northern Botswana’s Trophy hunting 
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system in response to two key policy changes, the ban on hunting in 2014 and the lifting of the 
ban in 2019. The collapse of many of Botswana’s CBOs in the face of the hunting ban proved 
that these communities had become extremely dependent on hunting tourism to survive. 
However, some hunting CBOs were able to adapt to the ban as a result of several factors and 
strategies including strong communication across levels of government which cultivated a sense 
of inclusion around decision-making; a cultural willingness to diversify economic activities, and 
the establishment of public-private partnerships. These adaptive qualities can be summarized as: 
diversity, transparency, innovation, risk-taking, and flexibility. 
This study offers two main theoretical contributions. One challenge in this study was 
relying on community perceptions as the main component of the Botswana Trophy hunting 
system in the adaptive cycle model. Besides 2014, which was the year of the hunting ban, many 
participants did not offer specific dates or years to describe the different events that defined the 
phases of the system (growth, conservation, release, reorganization). This lack of information 
made it challenging to pin-point what key aspects pushed the system from one phase into the 
other, ultimately questioning this study’s adaptive cycle modelling of Botswana’s Trophy 
hunting system. It is important to consider how differences in cultures’ experiences of time and 
space might impact the capacity of the Euro-centric adaptive cycle model to describe how a 
specific SES changes over-time.  
The second theoretical contribution is how this study helps further conceptualize adaptive 
management, by comparing the ban to accepted adaptive governance qualities. It is tempting to 
think about the hunting ban as an adaptive management policy: a five-year experiment on life in 
Botswana without hunting or hunting tourism. However, the ban was not adaptive management 
because it was not intended to be a “learning” experience. Acknowledging that the ban would be 
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a “learning experience” would have entailed proper evaluation of the risks involved and plans to 
address those risks, especially at the local level in regards to human wildlife conflict and food 
security. Furthermore, the ban was not an adaptive management policy because there was no real 
effort to monitor and evaluate the system’s feedback in response to the ban; data about human 
wildlife conflict post-ban is scarce and data regarding CBOs economic recovery is also 
challenging to find. If the government chooses to construct management institutions and 
processes that learn from the lessons of the ban, the ban may have had some adaptive qualities.      
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GLOSSARY 
 
Batswana: several citizens of Botswana 
BOT: Board of Trustees; group of villagers elected to serve as officials for the Community 
Based Organization 
CBNRM: Community Based Natural Resource Management 
CBO: Community Based Organization 
DWNP: Department of Wildlife and National Parks 
Ipelegeng: a rural development and drought relief program funded by the Botswana state 
government that offers work opportunities and monthly stipends for unemployed citizens 
Kgotla: building that hosts important public assemblies; public assembly whereby important 
governance decisions are made 
Kgosi: chief or “traditional leader” of the village 
Motswana: individual citizen of Botswana 
VDC: Village Development Committee 
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APPENCIDES 
 
Appendix 1 
 
The beginnings of the project started to come together in August 2018, when I began my 
graduate education in International Conservation and Development at the University of Montana. 
My advisor, Jenn Thomsen, had been working on a project with a colleague from the University 
of Namibia, Dr. Selma Lendevlo, on conservancy perspectives of trophy hunting tourism and 
governance in Namibia’s Bwabwata National Park. Jenn saw the potential to extend this research 
to other sub-Saharan African countries involved in the KAZA Trans-frontier Conservation Area, 
informing their trophy hunting governance and practices. Studying the benefits and challenges of 
trophy hunting tourism in Botswana proved especially interesting and useful, as they were 
experiencing what had turned into a five-year ban on trophy and subsistence hunting in their 
country. Jenn and I connected with University of Botswana’s Dr. Joe Mbaiwa, an expert in 
human dimensions of parks, recreation, and tourism, and listened to his take on research needs 
regarding sustainable livelihoods and wildlife conservation in Botswana. We thought it might be 
interesting to pursue the topic of community-based organizations’ (CBOs) experience of the 
hunting ban, but rather than looking at it through a vulnerability framework “impact analysis,” 
we advocated for a resilience oriented approach, exploring CBOs’ capacity to respond and adapt 
to the ban.  
 
Jenn and I began to articulate the study’s research questions and conceptual framework after 
many informative sessions with Dr. Mbaiwa and a review of the relevant literature. Before 
conducting fieldwork, the proposal for the research was shared with Committee members and 
feedback was incorporated into the final research plan.  Shortly after the defense, Jenn and I 
headed to Botswana to begin the fieldwork. This study focused on CBOs in Botswana’s 
northwestern district (Ngamiland) and Chobe District: The Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust, 
Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust, and Mababe Trust. I was lucky enough to spend two 
months in the towns of Kasane and Maun, travelling every couple of weeks to visit and interview 
the villages of Sankuyo, Mababe, and the Chobe Enclave (Muchenje, Mabele, Kachikau, 
Kavimba, and Parakurungu). Over these two months, I completed 71 interviews with members of 
the CBOs and other stakeholder groups. Before and after each visit with the villages, I 
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interviewed leaders of the traditional government (i.e. kgosis, Village Development Committee) 
and the CBO (i.e Board of Trustee, manager, assistant manager, escort guides), who spent most 
of their time in the CBOs’ main offices, which were located in Maun or Kasane. During this 
“bookend” time, I also interviewed individuals from other stakeholder groups to gather a 
diversity of perspectives. These participants included: conservation biologists, former trophy 
hunting operators, photo-tourism community outreach coordinators, and safari guides (27% of 
the interviews). 
 
During the fall of 2019, I worked to transcribe the interviews and began analyzing and coding 
the interview data during the winter of 2019. The spring and summer of 2020 consisted of 
writing up the results and discussing how the findings related to other literature and how they 
further improved our understanding of CBOs’ adaptive capacity and the resilience of the greater 
social-ecological system.  During the spring, grants were received to return to the villages with 
the plan of sharing the study’s preliminary results and providing the opportunity for participants 
to challenge or support the conclusions. However, due to travel complications from the onset of 
the COV-ID 19 pandemic, these plans were put on hold. I hope to revive these plans to share this 
study with participants at a future date, where international travel is safer. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Introduction Questions: 
 
1. What is your occupation in this community?  
2. How are you involved in the trust? 
3. Can you describe hunting tourism in the trust?  
4. What are some benefits that hunting tourism has brought to community? 
  How are these benefits distributed to the community? 
In depth Questions: 
 
Question Research Sub-
Question 
Justification Supporting literature 
In your community, 
what have been the 
main events and factors 
that led to the hunting 
ban? 
 
Sub Question 1 Finding out what stage 
adaptive cycle is at 
now…does the ban fit the 
“disturbance” role? 
Thomsen, 2018; 
Holling, 1973 
In your view, what are 
the top three negative 
changes from a ban in 
your community? 
Any benefits from a 
hunting ban? 
Sub Question 1 Have to know what it was 
like before ban in order to 
know what changes have 
occurred after the ban; can 
better direct questions.  
Thomsen, 2018; 
Holling, 1973 
Describe any conflicts 
between wildlife and 
the community. 
a. Was there a 
species that was 
the source of 
most conflict 
within your 
community? 
b. How did trophy 
hunting tourism 
influence 
community 
wildlife 
interactions?  
c. How have 
wildlife 
Sub Question 
1/Sub Question 
3 
How socio-cultural 
institutions (norms, 
behaviors) adapt to hunting 
ban; access to assets 
Whitney et al 2017 
Speranza, et al. 2014 
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encounters 
changed since 
the ban on 
trophy hunting? 
 
How has the way the 
community values 
wildlife changed since 
the hunting ban? 
Sub Question  How socio-cultural 
institutions adapt to 
hunting ban; how they 
relate to livelihoods 
 
Did trophy hunting 
tourism provide 
opportunities for the 
community to manage 
wildlife?  
a. How have these 
opportunities 
changed since 
the ban?   
All Sub 
Questions  
How access to knowledge 
changes, knowledge 
sharing institutions; access 
to assets 
Whitney et al 2017 
How were decisions 
about trophy hunting 
tourism made within 
the community?  
a. Was this 
effective? 
Explain. 
Sub Question 2 Governance and 
Institutions; accountability 
mechanisms 
Swatuk, 2005; 
Blaikie, 2005; 
Whitney et al 2017 
How are decisions 
about wildlife made 
within the community 
now? 
b. Was this 
effective? 
Explain. 
How does the 
community choose 
those individuals to 
represent them? 
Sub Question 2 
 
Governance and 
Institutions; learning and 
adaptation; accountability 
mechanisms 
Swatuk, 2005; 
Blaikie, 2005; 
Whitney et al 2017 
Do you think the 
community perspective 
is important to trophy 
hunting policies and 
management in 
Botswana? 
Sub Question 2 Governance and 
institutions; accountability 
mechanisms 
Swatuk, 2005; 
Blaikie, 2005; 
Whitney et al 2017 
Describe the 
relationship between 
safari companies and 
Sub Question 2 Governance and 
institutions; knowledge 
sharing, learning and 
adaptation 
Whitney et al 2017 
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community leaders 
after the hunting ban.   
a. Has this 
relationship 
changed? 
Please provide 
an example. 
How did trophy 
hunting tourism impact 
the financial well-being 
of the community?  
Sub Question 3 Diversity and Flexibility of 
livelihoods (relate to 
wildlife differently, how) 
Whitney et al 2017 
Has the community 
changed ways to make 
income since the 
hunting ban? Please 
provide an example.  
Sub Question 3 Diversity and Flexibility of 
livelihoods (relate to 
wildlife differently, how) 
Whitney et al 2017 
Is there anything else 
that I didn’t ask that 
you would like to share 
before we finish up of 
our conversation? 
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Appendix 3  
Map of Controlled Hunting Areas in Hunting and Escort Guidelines 2019. Source: Government 
of Botswana. 
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